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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the Park Chung Hee model (PCHM). This term refers to a South 
Korean variant of the East Asian model of capitalism—particularly, the historical model that 
guided the rapid and sustained growth of the economy since the mid-1960s. This historical 
investigation is theoretically informed by a cultural political economy of variegated capitalism 
(VarCap-CPE) that enables a differential and integral exploration of both historical and 
contemporary capitalism. In this context, my contribution is twofold. The first is theoretical. 
While a theoretically informed historical investigation into East Asian capitalism requires an 
approach to (post-)colonialism, imperialism and hegemony as a prerequisite, VarCap-CPE 
has still not fully integrated such an approach into its analytical framework. So, my first aim 
is to improve this paradigm by drawing on Marx’s insights into colonialism, the world 
market, and international hegemony and propose how they might be put in their place, 
provisionally, in a VarCap-CPE analysis. My second goal is empirical. Based on the enhanced 
version of the VarCap-CPE, I aim to give a better account of the PCHM than previous 
literature in political economy. Specifically, I show how the model was informed by two 
contradictory state strategies: (1) the fascist and autarkic state strategies of Imperial Japan; 
and (2) the liberal and free trade-oriented developmentalism, based on W.W. Rostow’s 
modernization theory. I thereby demonstrate that the PCHM was self-contradictory and, in 
this context, present it as a “chimerical” model that combines in a contradictory manner the 
DNA of two rival species. On this basis, I provide an integral account of its seemingly 
miraculous performance as well as the dilemmas, contradictions and crisis-proneness that 
beset it. In addition, unlike much of the extant literature on the Park model, my analysis 
permits theoretically consistent further research into its crisis and subsequent 
neoliberalisation. 
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1. Introduction: Putting the Park Chung Hee Model in Its 
Place in a Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism 
 
This thesis investigates the Park Chung Hee model (hereafter PCHM). PARK Chung Hee 
was the military strongman who ruled South Korea from his military coup in 1961 until his 
assassination in 1979. He has been a symbolic figure regarding not only the Miracle on the 
Han River but also South Korea’s political economy more generally. In this respect, the 
PCHM refers to a South Korean variant of the East Asian model of capitalism (hereafter 
EAMC)—particularly, the historical model that paved the way for the astonishing and 
prolonged growth of the economy since the mid-1960s until the mid-1990s, i.e., beyond his 
period in power up to neoliberalisation (on growth rates, see figure 6.1). Therefore, this thesis 
is primarily concerned with this model and its predecessors.  
Yet, unlike much of the literature on the EAMC or the PCHM (for more details, see 
the excursus below on previous work in the field), I do not suppose that it has permanent 
and stable features. For the PCHM was never repetitively self-identical even during the Park 
Chung Hee era. Specifically, since its birth in 1961-2, the model has mutated at least, twice 
(in 1964 and 1972-3) enabling its continuing evolution until the late 1970s (for basic 
information on the different phases in the Park Chung Hee era, see table 1.1), with further 
changes occurring thereafter. Nor do I attempt to discover the “miracle ingredient” that 
facilitated its phenomenal performance since the 1960s. For, notwithstanding its marvellous 
and sustained achievement, the model suffered from insoluble dilemmas and incurable crisis-
tendencies that were manifested in different forms but did not fundamentally change. Thus, 
I examine the PCHM warts all. Above all, I explore its origin, mutation and evolution 
genealogically and then provide a form-analysis of its mature, consolidated configuration in 
a world market context, noting its contradictions, dilemmas and crisis-tendencies. This 
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investigation is theoretically informed by a cultural political economy of variegated capitalism 
(hereafter VarCap-CPE; see Sum and Jessop 2013). This emerging paradigm has the 
distinctive merit of enabling a “differential and integral” exploration of a real-concrete objects 
with regard to capitalism(s). It thereby helps us represent the real-concrete as the concrete-in-
thought (for a brief account of what is at stake in this method, see Marx 1857/1986, 37 ff.; 
and, in more detail, Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Yet, my theoretical application of this emerging approach is not uncritical. For, while 
it is wide-ranging, it is not all-inclusive. To give an example directly relevant to this thesis, a 
theoretically-informed historical investigation into the EAMC calls for a theoretical approach 
to (post-)colonialism, imperialism, and international hegemony because of the intertwined 
effects on the EAMC of Imperial Japan’s role as a historically distinctive imperialist power, 
post-war Japan’s role as one of the region’s core states, and the influence of the post-war USA 
as a global hegemon. But the VarCap-CPE as developed until now lacks the substantive 
conceptual tools to develop or integrate these issues. Thus, I seek to upgrade it, albeit in a 
preliminary and provisional manner, by putting supranational relations in their place within 
the VarCap-CPE paradigm and applying this enhanced version in my investigation into the 
PCHM. Based on this theoretical work, then, I focus on the relations of social forces, not 
only within, but also beyond, the state in its narrow sense of the governmental apparatus. In 
other words, I explore how the supranational relations of social forces have been inscribed, 
refracted and reflected in the PCHM. Based on my empirical work, I illustrate how the model 
had been created, mutated and evolved as the rather unintended result of the cumulative 
inscription and condensation of two contradictory state strategies: first, the fascist and 
autarkic state strategies, and; second, liberal and free trade-oriented developmentalism. The 
first strategy originated from two far-right forces in the Army of Imperial Japan and was then 
adopted by Park Chung Hee and his associates. It can be thus viewed as one of the  
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Table 1.1 The Four Phases of the Park Chung Hee Era 
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postcolonial legacies of Imperial Japan. The second strategy was anchored on Walt Whitman 
Rostow’s theory of economic development and modernisation in the third world. It was what 
the US (particularly, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations) sought to implant in South 
Korea. In brief, the PCHM was self-contradictory. In this context, I represent it as a 
chimerical model. In Ancient Greek mythology, the chimera was a beast with a lion’s head, a 
goat’s body, and he a serpent as its tail. In this spirit, I use ‘chimerical’ to describe the hybrid 
or mongrel character of the PHCM as the product of the interbreeding of two contradictory 
gene pools. 
However, why focus on South Korea alone? More precisely, why do we need to study 
and read the previous model of South Korea’s capitalism today when there are other, more 
recent success stories in the region? Is such an inquiry into the historical model of South 
Korea’s capitalism no more than a belated intervention in an outdated topic? In what follows, 
I respond to these questions by locating my concern with the PCHM in a wider context, 
thereby clarifying its relevance. Then I give a more detailed introduction of the VarCap-CPE, 
and of situated universalism as a critical realist tenet for a theoretical application to a historical 
case, thereby clarifying more on my contribution to critical and cultural political economy. 
The last section introduces the overall structure of this thesis. Then, I offer an excursus on 
previous literature on the East Asian economic miracle.  
 
1.1 The EMAC and a Need for a New Theoretical Paradigm 
 
The inspiration for this thesis did not start with an interest in the PCHM itself. Rather it began 
with my observation and personal experience of lay people’s suffering in the South Korean 
economy since the comprehensive implementation of neoliberal measures in response to the 
East Asian economic crisis of 1997-8. This prompted a political interest in alternatives to the 
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neo-liberalised economy. The practical concern was in turn followed by an academic interest 
in different models of capitalism, particularly in its East Asian variants in an increasingly 
integrated world market organized in the shadow of neo-liberalism. The link between these 
two concerns is that a political strategy requires a conjunctural analysis and this, in turn, 
requires a theoretical paradigm. In this respect, academically, my thesis started with an 
interest in a currently fashionable issue in political economy, namely, capitalist variety, 
diversity and variegation. Hence the need to place my investigation into the PCHM in a 
broader political economy context. To elaborate on the context, let me also briefly sketch 
some debates over the EAMC.  
The EAMC has hitherto received substantial attention in academic and policy circles 
in, at least, three distinguishable, albeit entangled, contexts. The first is a debate over the East 
Asian miracle. As soon as it occurred in the 1960s, the phenomenon started being deemed a 
counterexample or, at least, anomaly, to the trade-pessimism that pervaded much post-war 
theorising of economic development and modernisation in the third world (for trade-
pessimism, see Box 1.1). In this context, the need arose for a new account for the marvellous 
and sustained performance of the EAMC and this prompted the introduction and circulation 
in academic networks of some now widely used concepts and metaphors, such as the 
developmental state, the export-led economy, Confucian capitalism, the Asian flying geese 
(for more details, see excursus). 
The second context is a debate over the East Asian economic crisis (hereafter EAEC) 
in 1997/1998 and, equally importantly, over the neoliberal crisis-management approach that 
was adopted in some affected by the EAEC. Admittedly, immediately after the crisis broke 
out, liberal economists in international economic organisations, the media in the Western 
world, and East Asian liberals started identifying the EAMC as the culprit behind the 
   S=
Box 1. Trade-pessimism in the mid-20th century 
 
The mid-twentieth century witnessed the build-up of many forms of trade-pessimism. To 
be more specific, economic literature (e.g., Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Rostow 1960) 
promoted the international division of labour from a Ricardian perspective on trade—
particularly studies that asserted that foreign trade functions as an engine or one of vital 
preconditions to enable less-industrialised and/or newly decolonised states to catch up or 
leapfrog more advanced economies—had been subject to several kinds of trade-pessimistic 
criticism, both theoretically and empirically. For example, dissenting scholars sought to 
dismiss such a predilection for free foreign trade by: (1) problematising the availability to 
poor countries of an outward-oriented economic strategy in the mid-twentieth century on 
the grounds of trade opportunity less than in the late nineteenth century (Nurkse 
1957/2009; 1959/2009); (2) illustrating that the impacts of trade expansion on economic 
growth varied from country to country even in the late nineteenth century (Kravis 1970); 
(3) pointing out that foreign trade between leading and lagging economies tends to bring 
about in the latter perpetual and/or cumulative harms, such as a ‘secular deterioration in 
the terms of trade’ (Prebish 1950) or the cumulative operation of ‘backwash effects’ that 
surpasses ‘spread effects’ (Myrdal 1956), and; (4) disclosing the modalities of a structurally 
unfair relation between core and (semi-)peripheral countries or, more broadly, of capital 
accumulation in an exploitative hierarchy on a world-scale (e.g., Amin 1974; Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974/2011). 
Not long afterwards, however, the rapid and prolonged ascent of East Asian economies 
was evident and this prompted a critical turning point in scholarly treatments of this issue. 
Yet, notwithstanding the Asian miracle, not all trade-pessimistic approaches were 
dismissed as meaningless. For some trade-pessimistic scholars took it not as a 
counterexample in a Popperian sense, but an anomaly in a Kuhnian sense. Thus, they dealt 
with the phenomenon as a deviant case awaiting a supplementary account within the trade-
pessimistic framework. In my view, a geopolitical account, based implicitly on the modern 
world-system approach, of the Asian miracle belongs here (see Cumings 1998; see also the 
excursus). 
Source: My own 
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economic turbulence. In particular, this supranational alliance of liberal elites construed it as 
politically authoritarian, economically oligopolistic (or monopolistic) and socially managed 
by a clique. In sum, they claimed that East Asian capitalism was not only ineffective, but even 
corrupt (see, Fisher 1998a; 1998b; IMF 1998; IMF Staff 1998; Kang 2002). Crony capitalism, 
a term coined at this time, encapsulated all these negative features and, in this context, was 
used to justify calls for market-oriented economic restructuring—that is, the neoliberal 
transformation of the model—as the best response to the crisis. What is more, these liberal 
elites used international agencies to compel the affected states to engage in neoliberal 
restructuring. Also, in a few cases, especially those where this alliance came to be hegemonic 
at the strategic moment (with South Korea as a representative case), abrupt and radical 
measures for economic liberalisation were implemented with bailouts from, and under the 
surveillance of, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Needless to say, such a neoliberal 
interpretation of, and reply to, the crisis spawned fiery debates, turning scholarly attention 
not only to the legitimacy of neoliberal crisis-management but also to the distinctive features 
of the EAMC (see, e.g., Chang 1998; Chang, Park and Yoo 1998; Weiss 1999; Wade and 
Veneroso 1998). 
The third context is far wider than the previous two. For it relates not to a single debate 
over a specific aspect of the EAMC but to a series of controversies over: (1) the hyper-
globalisation thesis, which appeared as a conservative cry of triumph since the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc and the intensification of neoliberal globalisation (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Ohmae 
1995); (2) the capitalism-versus-capitalism thesis (Albert 1993) and varieties of capitalism 
(Hall and Soskice 2001) approach as a response to the ideologically narcissistic hyper-
globalisation capitalism thesis; (3) the diversity of capitalism as a regulationist complement to 
the parsimonious account of the varieties and to the neo-institutionalist silence over 
capitalism itself (Amable 2003; Lane and Wood 2009), and; (4) Variegated capitalism as a 
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critique of all the spatially one-dimensional approaches to contemporary capitalism, and of 
their neglect of the generic features of capitalism, including contradictions, dilemmas and 
crisis-tendencies (Jessop 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; cf. Peck and Theodore 2007). 
That is, the third context is broadly concerned with the convergence and divergence of 
national models of capitalism and, in this context, the EAMC, including post-socialist cases, 
also won more attention in the burgeoning field of comparative and/or geographically 
sensitive political economy literature.  
In reviewing past and present debates regarding the EAMC, there emerges an intriguing 
point, which has been, rather surprisingly, ignored in academic circles. This is the 
dissociation between actual history and major theories in political economy. As noted, the 
EAMC was constructed to describe an alleged East Asian miracle. Yet the East Asian 
economies evolved through different phases in different ways in different East Asian 
economies. After enjoying an unexpectedly surprising performance in the capitalist world 
market, these economies then fell into crisis. At this point, academic theorists questioned the 
validity of the model. In the real world, however, as a response to the crisis and/or for the 
other reasons, different East Asian economies were transformed, abruptly or gradually, 
transformed in line with the prevailing hegemonic or, at least, dominant neoliberal protocols 
in a world market that was being reorganized in the shadow of neo-liberalism. In academic 
circles this transformation was deemed to effect convergence among the national variants of 
capitalism, although, as with other models of capitalism, as with other models of capitalism, 
the EAMC was held to have retained some distinctive features too. In brief, while the history 
and present of East Asian capitalism is complex, this is not always fully reflected in the major 
bodies of political economy literature, which have failed to give a concrete, and theoretically 
consistent, account of the complex history. In my view, this failure has occurred because, 
fundamentally, their theoretical foundations tend to focus one-sidedly on just one facet of 
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the complex and concrete history. In this situation, those who aspire to understand the 
EMAC have often proved opportunistically reductionist, selectively silent, and/or eclectically 
incoherent. 
In a nutshell, we need a new approach to the EAMC or broadly capitalism(s) itself. Yet 
the new paradigm must not be (yet another) simple and abstract theory that aspires to 
subsume all of the historical complexity and concreteness under some generic principles. 
Instead it must be a concrete and complex paradigm. In other words, it must be able to grasp 
the general, particular and singular features of the historical and contemporary capitalism(s). 
In addition, it must be able to deal, in a theoretically consistent manner, not only with the 
relatively stable accumulation and intermittent or recurrent crises, but also with the 
spatiotemporally multi-dimensional transformations, in the capitalism(s). Furthermore, 
equipped with these tools, we must investigate the past of capitalism(s) again, and then link 
such investigations into historical capitalisms to our concerns with the present of 
capitalism(s). My interest in the VarCap-CPE originated from this context and this, in turn, 
has informed my investigation into the PCHM. Therefore, I do not want this thesis to be 
judged as nothing but a belated intervention into an outdated debate. Rather, I hope it will 
be read as a preliminary to future enquiries into the neoliberalisation of South Korea’s 
capitalism and its present in a world market. In addition, I want my analysis to be interpreted 
as a “beta test” for alternative inquiries into other variants of the EAMC. I also hope that these 
can be incorporated into inquiries into another models of capitalism. In this rather broader 
context, my investigation into the PCHM, based on the VarCap-CPE, aims to put the model 
on its place in the VarCap-CPE. But what does this entail? 
 
1.2 A Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism  
 
   NM=
It is impossible to give a full explanation of this paradigm in a short chapter. Here I simply 
identify its basic features and will use Part I to explicate it more fully. A brief summary is 
difficult because the paradigm is itself the synthesis of the diverse. Specifically, it consists of 
critical realism (which resonates with Marx’s method and the meta-theories on which the 
method relies), the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s account of the historical specificity 
of the capitalist mode of production (and, more broadly, his critique of political economy), 
historical and evolutionary institutional economics (particularly, different schools within the 
regulation approach), (post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis, and the 
variegated-capitalism approach. That is, it is provides a complex conceptual schema that its 
authors describe as a heuristic rather than a general theory. Yet, thanks to this complexity and 
its ability to address a wide range of interconnected issues, it enables a concrete inquiry into 
a concrete object. Here are some basic features. 
 
1. The VarCap-CPE is doubly relevant to Marx’s critique of political economy or his 
anatomy of civil society. First, it draws on his intellectual project. But, second, it seeks 
to contribute to the completion of the unfinished project. To do so, the VarCap-CPE 
has integrated many theoretical achievements after Marx’s death. In this context, Sum 
and Jessop (2013, ix) described their approach ‘as pre-disciplinary in inspiration, trans-
disciplinary in practice, and post-disciplinary in its aspiration’. More specifically, while 
the VarCap-CPE is inspired by Marx’s pre-disciplinary critique of political economy, 
it has also drawn, with a post-disciplinary aspiration, on a wide range of scholarship 
and research by social scientists. As a result, it enables a trans-disciplinary inquiry of 
historical and contemporary capitalism (see Jessop 2002, 1; see also Chapter 3). 
2. As regards the philosophy of social studies, the VarCap-CPE is anchored on Marx’s 
method and underlying meta-theory. It also recognises that these resonate with critical 
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realism. In this dual context, its ultimate research object is the real-concrete and its 
ambition is to represent this as the concrete-in-thought. This is the justification for the 
concreteness and complexity of the paradigm (see Chapter 2). But complexity is also 
deemed to require the choice of specific entry-points based on theoretical work to 
identify a specific explanandum or explananda rather than begin with what Marx 
described as a ‘chaotic conception’ of the whole. 
3. As regards social theory, VarCap-CPE depends on the strategic-relational approach. As 
one of the three main forms of critical realist social theory, the strategic-relational 
approach provides comprehensive insights regarding: (1) structure and agency; (2) 
form and content; (3) form and formation; (4) system and sub-system; (5) the objective 
realities and actualities of a world, and subjective construals of the objective features of 
the world, and; (6) spatiotemporally multi-dimensional fixes and transformation (see 
Chapter 3). 
4. As regards capital and the capitalist mode of production, VarCap-CPE takes Marx’s 
value theory as a foundational reference point. In particular, following Diane Elson 
(1980), the VarCap-CPE interprets Marx’s value theory not as a labour theory of value 
but as a value-form theory of labour power (see Jessop 2004). On this basis, the 
VarCap-CPE regards the theory as a foundation for an inclusive inquiry into: (1) the 
historical preconditions for the development of the wage relation as a general feature 
of the social relations of production; (2) the conditions for the relatively stable 
operation of capitalist social formations, despite the inherent crisis-tendencies of the 
CMP; and (3) the societal effects of the historically specific phenomenon, that is, the 
generalization of the commodity form to labour power and its treatment as if it were a 
real commodity. 
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5. As regards institutions, the VarCap-CPE adopts critical institutionalism as an 
alternative to all the old and new variants of institutionalism. This said, while critical 
institutionalism is just one part of the VarCap-CPE, its scope is wide-ranging. For it 
contains the regulation approach, post-Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis 
and the variegated-capitalism approach in its inside. Based on critical institutionalism, 
the VarCap-CPE explores the social and cultural embeddedness and institutedness of 
economic mechanisms and conduct integrally. Above all, it seeks to illuminate ‘how 
institutions aid the provisional stabilization (institutionalization) of specific systems of 
exploitation and domination’ Sum and Jessop 2013, 35). 
 
Of course, each of these five points require detailed explication. They are given in the 
substantive chapters of this thesis—particularly, in Part I, which addresses (meta-) theoretical 
issues regarding the VarCap-CPE. Meanwhile, I want to emphasize only the following points. 
Thanks to its own substantive concreteness and complexity, and for its own methodological 
consistence, the VarCap-CPE enables a differential and integral exploration of historical and 
contemporary capitalism(s)—specifically, differential analyses of the object, based on 
rational abstraction, and then an integral synthesis of the analyses. My investigation into the 
PCHM is theoretically inspired by this paradigm. Yet, as noted, it is not applied uncritically. 
To elaborate this, let introduce a critical realist tenet for a theoretical application for a 
historical case—namely, situated universalism. 
 
1.3 Situated Universalism and Upgrading the VarCap-CPE  
 
Situated universalism emerged as a critical realist response to a postmodernist, relativist 
dismissal of aspiration and practice for accumulating a body of nomothetic knowledge. The 
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oxymoronic tenet posits that, while we must recognise the situatedness of knowledge; this 
sensitivity to context does warrant ‘a plea for particularism or relativism’ (Sayer 2002, 182). 
For ‘[t]he issue is not simply one of situatedness versus universalization; there is also the 
question of legitimate versus illegitimate universalization’ (175). Hence, ‘it is possible to 
conceive situated universalism’ (182). In this context, the notion rejects reductionist 
universalism or simply general theory that aims to subsume even the particularities and 
singularities of a concrete research object under its general principles. Simultaneously, it 
acknowledges a possibility that we can examine a universal or general aspect of the concrete 
research object (for more details on the distinction among the universal, the particular, and 
the individual, see Chapter 2). Needless to say, this epistemological tenet relies on the critical 
realist ontology that acknowledges the differentiation and stratification of the real and the 
contingent actualisation of the real mechanisms. More fundamentally, it resonates with 
Marx’s method and meta-theory.1 
Also, when we rely on this tenet, we can recognise clearly that a relation between theory 
and history can be doubly heuristic. This is because, on the one hand, because observation is 
unavoidably theory-laden. Indeed, based on the VarCap-CPE, I focused on not the 
endogenous attributes or exogenous conditions of the PCHM, but the wider ensemble of 
social relations in which the model is embedded. On the other hand, recognizing situated 
universalism helped me re-discover historical facts. Specifically, I recognised, in examining 
                                               
 
1 Admittedly, Marx (1857/1986) called for a concrete inquiry into the concrete. Simultaneously, in a 
preface for German readers to his book on capitalist mode of production in which England appears 
as the typical example, Marx (1867/1996, 8) proclaimed: ‘De te fabula narratur!’ (i.e., this story applies 
to you). In a same context, we can distinguish grand theory from general theory (see Sum and Jessop 
2013, 98 ff.) 
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its history, that the PCHM was informed by supranational social relations far more than by 
the balance of domestic social relations. 
This is because South Korea is not one of the Western, let alone North Atlantic states. 
Nor is it a first-order state even in a regional hierarchy, let alone on a global scale. 
Furthermore, from a US strategic perspective, South Korea has been one of the states in its 
Asian frontline, first in the Cold War and, presently, in its hegemonic competition with 
China. Thus, since 1945, the US has intervened actively in South Korea’s political, economic, 
and military affairs. Consequently, many South Korean leftist scholars or intellectuals have 
deemed their country as no more than a (neo-)colony of the US. Also, although the Cold 
War has ended, South Korea remains part of a partitioned peninsula. Hence, North Korea, 
too, should be considered as another external influenced on domestic affairs in South Korea. 
Moreover, before being split by the US and the USSR, the Korean peninsula had been a 
Japanese colony for 36 years (1910-1945). Thus, (post)colonial legacies, too, should be 
considered. In addition, its colonising power was not a Western imperialist state, but its 
neighbour—that is, Japan. The latter was initially just another victim of Western imperialism 
the late 19th century. In this context, we must recall that Japan’s colonies, culturally (and 
racially) similar and geographically adjacent to their metropolitan state, had been managed 
differently in the late 19th and early 20th centuries from the Western pattern of imperialism 
and this meant that the colonial influences of Imperial Japan and its postcolonial legacies in 
South Korea were also distinctive.  
These factors are all intertwined and have contributed in their interconnection to the 
creation, mutation, evolution, and operation of the PCHM. In this context, my analytical 
strategy, based on situated universalism, is to insert historical and, partly, genealogical 
analyses of the situated factors between VarCap-CPE and the PCHM. In contrast, the 
VarCap-CPE does not have an approach to such a (post-)colonialism, imperialism and 
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international hegemony. For this reason, drawing on Marx’s insight into colonialism and 
hegemony on a world market, I integrate relevant conceptual tools into the VarCap-CPE 
approach. Thus equipped, I then investigate the PCHM.  
 
1.4 The Overall Structure of this Thesis 
 
The substantive chapters can be grouped into two parts: theory and history. Part I deals with 
theoretical issues regarding VarCap-CPE. Chapter 2 presents a philosophical foundation for 
this approach. Specifically, I present Marx’s method as involving two procedures for 
presentation and inquiry, which, taken together, constitute an artistic whole; clarify Marx’s 
method for inquiry; uncover the meta-theoretical foundations on which the method relies; 
and link them to critical realism. In Chapter 3, I introduce the VarCap-CPE approach itself. 
This chapter gives a more detailed explanation not only of its overall features but also of its 
theoretical components, such as the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s value theory, 
critical institutionalism, (post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis and the 
variegated-capitalism approach. In Chapter 4, I put (post-)colonialism, imperialism and 
international hegemony on their places in the VarCap-CPE. This work is based on Marx’s 
analysis of domination and hegemony in a world market. By doing so, I give an entirely new 
interpretation on Marx’s authentic approach of the birth of a capitalist society, of a first place 
where the society was born, and of the role of Protestantism and Puritanism on the birth and 
operation of the capitalist society. In this context, I contribute not only to improving the 
VarCap-CPE but also to Marxist studies more generally. 
In Part II, I investigate the history of the PCHM. Chapter 5 examines the origin and 
features of the autarkic state strategies of the fascist military cliques in Imperial Japan since 
the 1930, and then indicates its relevance to post-war South Korean and North Korean elites. 
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This work is needed to understand not only the postcolonial legacy of Imperial Japan, which 
was reflected in the PCHM, but also the rather complex relations—that is, commonalities as 
well as dissimilarities—between South Korean capitalism and North Korean socialism during 
the Cold War era. In Chapter 6, I illustrate how the PCHM was created, mutated and evolved 
by the fascist autarkic state strategy and Rostowian developmentalism. I also give a form-
analysis of its functional operation. Chapter 7 analyses two cooperative, and simultaneously 
contradictory, semiotic strategies that contributed to (in)stabilising the PCHM. Needless to 
say, one of them is Park Chung Hee’s “developmentalist” discourse. The other is the US’s 
“developmentalist” and “modernisation” discourse. 
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Excursus: Twelve Bodies of Literature on the Asian Miracle 
 
This excursus provides a comprehensive review of extant literature on the Asian miracle. On 
my reading, this literature can be divided into twelve approaches, which can be put into two 
larger groups, albeit of unequal size. For, while ten approaches seek to identify the decisive 
factor that enabled the Asian miracle, the other two, following Parisian regulationist tenets, 
focus more on the structural features and the overall configuration of the EAMC than on any 
given individual factor. Remember here that regulationism is part of the VarCap-CPE 
approach. Accordingly, these two bodies of literature have a special relation to my 
investigation into the PCHM. But let me first review the other approaches. 
 
1. Weberian statists have studied the rapid and prolonged growth of the East Asian 
economies in terms of the intention, autonomy and capacity of state managers or 
apparatus. On this basis, they argue that the rationally calculated strategy and prudent 
policy decision of a development-oriented and competent pilot agencies in East Asian 
countries caused the splendid performance of their economies. Indeed, the concept 
“developmental state” emerged from this approach. By referring to the East Asian states 
as a development state, the concept has not only highlighted their distinctive features, 
but also distinguished this particular group of capitalist states from regulatory and 
predatory states in capitalist societies as well as the socialist type of state (see Johnson 
1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995). 
2. Market-fundamentalists, too, have highlighted the exceptional features of East Asian 
economies. In particular, they have identified their distinctive features vis-à-vis Latin 
American economies, whose relatively sluggish development has been explained in 
terms of their international dependency or the interregional exploitation of surplus 
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value. In this context, the market-fundamentalists focused on the “freer” trade policy 
(i.e., export promotion and free import) of the East Asian states and the articulation of 
their respective economies with others in a world market. On this basis, they argued 
that export expansion brought about positive externalities (particularly, an increment 
in productivity and efficiency), thereby contributing to the East Asian economies far 
more than export growth itself (see, e.g., Balassa 1978; 1988).  
3. Neoclassical, particularly Keynesian, macroeconomists agree with the claim that export 
promotion generated positive externalities. Yet they reject the market-fundamentalist 
assertion that export expansion augmented efficiency or productivity in the East Asian 
economies. Instead, they viewed an increase in investment as the external benefit, 
which was caused by export promotion (see, e.g., Young 1994; Krugman 1994). Also, 
in this context, they recognise the efficacious role of the East Asian governments in 
boosting their economies.  
 
Before proceeding further, we can address an intriguing debate over the denotation of 
the Asian “miracle”. Admittedly, the Solow Economic Growth Model, which had been very 
influential in neoclassical economics until the emergence of new growth theory in the early 
1980s, views the level of productivity in a production function as an exogenous factor. Thus 
it could not (and cannot) explain changes in productivity. For this reason, although market-
fundamentalists asserted that the productivity of the East Asian economies rose as the result 
of their market-friendly trade politics, this claim could not be explained in the major growth 
model in neoclassical economics of the time. This may be why the rapid and sustained growth 
of the East Asian economies was depicted as “miraculous”. For, although the phenomenon 
was fabulous, it was “scientifically” unexplainable. A few macroeconomists criticised this 
point, because, as noted, they believed that the externalities, led by export promotion, were 
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due to the mass of investment rather than productivity gains. In their view, then, the growth 
can be explained even in the traditional growth model and, hence, the growth was not a 
miracle (see Krugman 1994). This debate is nonetheless relevant to the fourth approach, 
which is located between the market-fundamental and Keynesian positions. 
 
4. In the early 1980s, as mentioned, new growth theory emerged in neoclassical 
economics. The theory, called endogenous growth theory, highlights learning in the 
course of market exchange. It proposes that we learn technologies and managerial skills 
in trading commodities and services, thereby gaining the ability to improve 
productivity. On this basis, advocates of the theory focused on the productivity of the 
East Asian economies again. Yet, unlike market-fundamentalists, they argued that the 
productivity was increased by learning abroad in trading with advanced countries (see, 
e.g., Lucas 1993). 
5. Another approach involves economic eclecticism resulting from a political 
compromise in an international organisation, namely, The World Bank’s 1993 report. 
Market fundamentalists have argued that the Asian miracle occurred by “getting prices 
right”. On the contrary, statists indicated “getting prices wrong” as its cause. Between 
these two, the World Bank suggested “getting fundamentals right” as an alternative 
interpretation on the Asian miracle. Yet fundamentals are nothing but a term that is 
used in policy circles to refer roughly to macroeconomic factors. Also, in this context, 
the report is market-friendly; yet, it simultaneously affirms the previous role of East 
Asian governments as appropriate. Yet, given earlier reports from the World Bank, this 
interpretation was rather deviant, because the international organisation had 
previously offered a more market-friendly account of the Asian miracle. In this context, 
the well-known 1993 report of the World Bank must be read in terms of its internal 
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politics. For the report arose because Japanese technocrats and economists in the 
World Bank lodged a protest about the libertarian bias of the organisation, leading to 
neglect of Japan’s actual economic history (for the internal politics in the World Bank, 
see Rodrik 1994; Terry 2000; Wade 1996). 
6. Weberian culturalists, as opposed to statists, were dissatisfied with political-economic 
approaches to the miracle. Thus, they focused on “Asian values”. They argued that, just 
as the Protestant ethic contributed to the emergence, operation and development of 
modern Western capitalism, Confucianism played an identical role in East Asian 
capitalism. This led to the concept of “Confucian capitalism”, which, for Weberian 
culturalists, complements the developmental state (Lew 2013; Tu 1996) 
7. As I noted above, the development of the East Asian economies has frequently been 
regarded as a “Popperian” counterexample to the trade-pessimistic literature. Yet some 
have regarded it instead as a “Kuhnian” anomaly in this context. Specifically, they 
provide a geopolitical account that focuses on the exceptional status of East Asian states 
in the exploitative world system of capitalism. For, because East Asian capitalist states, 
unlike their Latin American and African counterparts, were located in one of the fronts 
of the Cold War, the US and other core capitalist states felt obliged, exceptionally, to 
boost their economies to advertise the superiority of capitalist over socialist 
development and also protect them from communist threats (Cumings 1998). 
8. Some scholars focused on the historical preconditions of the Asian miracle. 
Accordingly, they highlighted the colonial managements of Imperial Japan. Although 
not all historians who investigated the relation between the colonial history and the 
Asian miracle are sympathetic to fascism, this is, certainly, one of the approaches that 
Japanese fascists have most liked. For it implies that, unlike Western metropolitan 
states, Imperial Japan contributed to the economic development and, broadly, 
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modernisation of their colonies. For this reason, its ideological background is crypto-
fascism (see, e.g., Eckert 1999; Kohli 1994) 
9. There is also another version of crypto-fascism. Since the early 1960s, a few Japanese 
economists have accentuated Japan’s leadership in the Asian economy. They argued 
that as a leader in East Asia, Japan not only enabled the mutually reciprocal division of 
labour in the region, but also led the East Asian group to the ranks of the advanced 
economies in the Western world. This view generated the metaphor “flying geese”. Yet, 
its political implication is at least crypto-imperialist if not crypto-fascist. For it implies 
that, while, as trade-pessimistic studies illustrate, Western core states have exploited 
Latin America and Africa by means of international trade, Japan has actually proved 
beneficial to (semi-)peripheral states in East Asia (Akamatsu 1962). 
10. Lastly, let me introduce a class-deterministic account. Some Marxists draw on the 
asymmetric nature of the capital-wage labour relation to argue that the rapid 
accumulation of capital in East Asian states was anchored in over-exploitation of their 
labour force by means of the low wages and long working hours in the East Asian 
economies (Chang 2009). However, given the resulting economic growth, this did not 
mean that East Asian workers did not, in certain conditions, experience rising wages. 
It meant simply that wages did not rise in line with productivity as that capital retained 
a growing proportion of surplus-value. 
 
None of the ten approaches to the Asian miracle is, on its face, entirely absurd. Even 
the market-fundamentalist claim has its own rational kernel. Yet, they also have some 
common flaws that underpin their respective shortcomings as well. In reading the ten bodies 
of literature, it emerges that they rely, explicitly or implicitly, on an empiricist-comparativist 
logic – although some of the political economy theories on which they draw have few affinities 
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to, or even contradict methodologically, empiricist comparativism. Thus, all ten sought to 
discover some single decisive factor that enabled the miracle. In doing so, some argued that 
the miracle can be reenacted in spatiotemporally different situations by transplanting the 
decisive factor there (e.g., their industrial and trade policies). Others claimed that it is 
impossible, because the decisive factor cannot be transplanted (e.g., the East Asian 
geopolitical location during the Cold War era, the Asian value, Japan’s leadership, etc.). 
Yet, empiricist comparativism, which draw on David Hume’s philosophy and John 
Stuart Mill’s logical methods, is problematic in its own terms. Nonetheless, for the moment, 
let me assume for the sake of argument that it is best suited to scientific inquiry, especially 
where there are only a few cases, ruling out reliance on statistical analysis as well as real-world 
experiments. Even so, the ten approaches have seriously flawed research designs. For there 
are too many variables in a small number of cases for valid conclusions to be drawn. 
Empiricist-comparativist methodologists have thus developed their own solutions to avoid 
this problem: (1) increase the number of cases; (2) reduce the potential property space by 
using parsimonious dichotomies; (3) combine a most-similar-cases design, based on John 
Stuart Mill’s method of difference, and a most-different-cases design, based on Mill’s method 
of agreement, in order to eliminate as many non-decisive factors as possible in 
comparing/contrasting cases (see, e.g., Przeworski and Teune 1970); (4) when exploring only 
one case, choose either a most-likely case study for a hypothesis that the researcher seeks to 
refute or a least-likely case study for a hypothesis that the researcher seeks to uphold (Eckstein 
1975). While these different protocols can prove productive, they are not followed by any of 
the ten approaches considered above. Worse, as mentioned, in some of them, we find a 
contradiction between politico-economic theories on which they rely and their 
methodological position. On the basis of the poor research designs, what they did was to 
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accentuate again what the theories or political ideologies on which they draw have 
accentuated. 
One might claim that this is unavoidable. For observation is theory-laden, and theory 
is value-laden. And yet, the theoretical foundations of these ten approaches have a one-sided 
focus on one or another facet of the East Asian capitalism. Taken together with the flaws in 
their research designs, this led to factual inaccuracies in their arguments. For example, it is 
right that state managers played an important role in boosting the South Korean economy. 
Yet, a unified pilot agency, whose economic strategy stemmed from Friedrich List’s thoughts, 
never existed in South Korea. It is partly correct that South Korea had implemented a policy 
measure to free imports during the Cold War era. It eliminated a barrier to import for only 
capital goods and raw materials that are necessarily required to manufacture their own goods. 
The “Asian value” discourse has little to say about Koreans’ resistance to their authoritarian 
and, sometimes, totalitarian regimes. It also neglects the history that Western-centric value, 
traditionalism, nationalism and Japanese fascism had ideologically struggled with one 
another in South Korea. I provide more examples of factual errors in the substantive chapters 
of this thesis. Yet it has to be here reassured that the factual errors in the ten analyses 
considered here are not just accidental but are grounded in their theoretical flaws. 
Lastly, let me briefly comment on two regulationist analyses of the EAMC. First, one 
early Parisian regulationist, Alan Lipietz, conceptualised the models of capitalism in the third 
world as “peripheral Fordism” (1987). In my view, his analysis has two strong analytical 
purchases. First, following regulationist protocols, it focused on the structural features and 
their configurations of the East Asian model of capitalism. Second, it opened space to explore 
the uneven relations in the international hierarchy of capitalism. Yet, it grasped the capitalist 
models of the third world in terms of their dissimilarities from Western Fordism. This led to 
neglect of many of their immanent features. For this reason, the earlier work of regulationism 
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on the third world has been criticised even by regulationists themselves on the grounds that 
it depends implicitly on a Eurocentric perspective. Second, in response, later analyses of East 
Asian capitalism(s) have sought to overcome this bias. For instance, Boyer and Yamada 
(2002) gave an alternative account of Japanese capitalism by conceptualising it as 
“companyism” (for more advanced analyses of Japan, see Boyer, Uemura and Isogai 2013). 
Jessop and Sum (2006) also gave a non-Eurocentric account of the East Asian “Gang of Four” 
(Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) by conceptualising them as “exportism”.  
Remember here that the VarCap-CPE was launched in academic circles by Jessop and 
Sum. In this regard, my investigation into the PCHM, based theoretically on the VarCap-
CPE, has affinities to their regulationist analysis of exportism. More specifically, my research 
seeks to upgrade their empirical analyses of the PCHM and partly the EAMC in relevance to 
the following points. First, they relatively neglected the internationally uneven relations and 
their effects on exportism. Second, in this context, they rather uncritically interpreted the 
macroeconomic policies of the exportist models of capitalism during the Cold War era as 
Ricardian or Listian. That is, they gave a similar interpretation with that of Weberian statists. 
Third, they did not integrate discursive struggles, developed on a supranational scale, for a 
particular type of societalisation in South Korea. By focusing on the supranational relations 
in which the PCHM was embedded from a variegated-imperialism perspective, I improve the 
regulationist approach to exportism (for variegated imperialism, see Chapter 4).  
  










Part I. Theoretical Considerations 
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2. Laying a Philosophical Foundation for a VarCap-CPE 
Approach 
 
Here I lay a philosophical foundation for both the VarCap-CPE approach and my 
investigation into the PCHM. Generally speaking, empirical inquiries in social studies seek 
one or more of the following four objectives: first, discovering constancy or regularity; 
second, explaining causality; third, describing a process, and/or, fourth, interpreting a 
meaning. To do so, they tend to draw theoretically on just one single paradigm or one aspect 
of a broader paradigm. In contrast, my eventual goal in this thesis is to re-define in a relatively 
detailed fashion the previous development model of South Korea’s capitalism—particularly 
one that is still often claimed to have produced an economic miracle. In addition, I utilise an 
integral paradigm, dubbed the VarCap-CPE approach, along the way. In these two respects, 
my thesis differs fundamentally from usual empirical inquiries in social studies, and for this 
reason, I justify it in the light of the philosophy of social sciences. To do so, above all, I clarify 
what is at stake in Marx’s method and then unveil its philosophical foundations. For, on the 
one hand, the VarCap-CPE approach is fundamentally anchored in Marx’s method and his 
distinctive scientific philosophy; on the other, however, notwithstanding their importance, 
these premises remain unclear. Accordingly, subsequent sections deal with the following 
topics: first, Marx’s method; second, his metaphysics; third, his epistemology; fourth, his 
methodology; fifth, analysis, synthesis and pragmatist elements in Marx’s method; sixth, 
rational kernels and a mystified shell in Hegel’s philosophy; seventh, existing interpretations 
on Marx’s method. Then, I shall connect the aforementioned issues to my investigation, 
based upon the VarCap-CPE. 
 
2.1 Marx’s Method as a Procedure  
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Contemporary social scientists tend to refer to their research techniques in terms of their 
methods. In contrast, Marx (1857/1996, 37-8) referred to his method of research 
(Forschungsweise) and distinguished it from the method of presenting his research results 
(Darstellungsweise) (1873/1996: 18-19). I suggest that the two procedures can be diagrammed 
as follows. 
 
Figure 2.1: Marx’s Procedure for Inquiry and Presentation 
Source: My own interpretation 
Note: A scientific inquiry starts with “motion 1”, whereas a logical presentation about the inquiry 
begins from “point 2”. 
 
Simply speaking, a Marxian method of research proceeds as follows: first, observing or 
experiencing a factual phenomenon; second, perceiving and then conceiving a research object, 
which Marx referred to as the real, the concrete, a living whole, an organic whole, and the 
like; third, analysing the initial conception of the research object (i.e., a conceptual descent 
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(i.e., a conceptual ascent from the simplest determination to the concrete-in-thought), and; 
fifth, testing the concrete-in-thought practically in an outer world (see Marx 1845/1975, 3-4; 
1857/1996, 37-8). Note, however, that this procedure is an idealized representation of his 
research practice. In reality, this procedure can never be completed. It thus results only in an 
incomplete body of knowledge of the research object that we can obtain and then test again 
and again. In this case, the practical test can itself function as a new observation or 
experience—that is, as a new starting point for a more developed inquiry of the object. In this 
context, I regard Marx’s procedure for an inquiry as a spiral process that allows us to obtain 
an increasingly detailed body of knowledge. For this reason, I name the test as a “pragma-
dialectic test”, which involves trial-and-error (re-)search practices. In contrast, the Marxian 
method of presentation starts with the conclusion of the aforementioned descent—that is, 
with the simplest determination. Although this has encouraged some to simplify Marx’s 
method with the slogan, “from abstract to concrete”, this catchphrase does not concern 
Marx’s method itself but his method of presentation. 
On the other hand, from this interpretation on Marx’s method and in the light of his 
plans for the critique of political economy, we can infer that Marx’s inquiry started with his 
observation of a periodically recurrent crisis in the contemporary world market. We know 
that it was the ‘first world economic crisis’ of 1857 that led him to renew his intensive studies 
of political economy. In this context, it seems that beginning from such crises (i.e., which 
would have been part of the topic of the last book in his initial six-book plan for Capital, 
namely, the world market and crises), Marx asked what the capitalist world must be like for 
such global crises to occur. He then analytically moved down, through foreign relations 
among states, to the state itself. It also seems that, at this point, he analytically decomposed 
the state into three social classes and/or the three factors of production (i.e., capital, landed 
property and wage-labour). Furthermore, in my view, considering that both the world 
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market and the state are anchored on the capitalist mode of production (hereafter CMP), he 
would choose capital as the first topic. Here, to deal with capital, he would move downward 
again until arriving at the cell form of a bourgeois society—that is, a commodity. It seems in 
this context that Capital vol. 1 came to be presented from a commodity (for his six-book 
plan, see Marx 1857/1986, 45; 1857-8/1986, 195; 1859/1987, 261; for his four-book plan, 
including three theoretical books and a historical-literary one, see Marx 1865/1987, 173; for 
his discussion on the commodity as the economic cell form of capitalist society, see Marx 
1867/1996, 19). The project, of course, remains incomplete. However, in the light of his 
methods for both an inquiry and a presentation, his project has an intriguing totality. Also, it 
seems in this context that Marx (1865/1987, 173) wrote: ‘Whatever shortcomings they may 
have, the advantage of my writings is that they are an artistic whole’ (for more details on the 
debates over his plan, see Chapter 3). 
 
2.2 Marx’s Metaphysical Stance 
 
Metaphysics (or ontology) deals with the ultimate nature of being. For his inquiry to be 
scientific, Marx’s method must rely on a specific, particularly acceptable, set of metaphysical 
doctrines. Marx, of course, did not give us an inclusive and systemic explanation of his 
position in metaphysics. Yet, we can infer it, albeit imperfectly, from his method and other 
pieces of writing. In my reckoning, his metaphysical stance depends on the following points. 
 
1. An object in an outer world exists independently of our mind (see, e.g., Marx 
1857/1986, 38). In this context, the object can be referred to as the real. Here, the real 
denotes the mind-independent. Yet, as I shall add, that something is real may also mean 
that it has an ontic depth. 
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2. The mind-independent object is neither universal nor general. According to Marx 
(1857/1986, 23), a general thing can exist only in a form of pure abstraction. On the 
contrary, the mind-independent has its own historical trajectory that is geographically 
specific. Furthermore, its emergence, too, relies on its historical presuppositions that 
are also geographically specific (see, e.g., Marx and Engels 1846/1975, 38 ff.).2 
3. Not only the mind-independent and historico-geographically specific object, but a 
world itself is also “overlaid” or “laminated”. In other words, a world has an ontic 
depth; as mentioned, in this context, both the object and the world can be also 
described as real. Specifically, Marx decomposed the world into actual and real layers, 
though critical realist Marxists, following Roy Bhaskar (1975/1997, 1979/1998, 1987, 
1989), tend to trifurcate it into empirical, actual and real realms. An actual world, which 
Marx and Engels (1846/1975, passim) also referred to as a ‘sensuous world’, is a 
presently apparent and thus immediately observable part of the world. Thus, it 
corresponds to a surface or an outer layer in the laminated world. In contrast, a real 
world is an inner layer in the overlaid world. It is thus the layer at which our senses do 
not reach directly. In this context, the real world is also a place where what Marx 
referred to as inner connections, relations or necessities are operated (see Marx 
1867/1987, 390; 1869/1988, 232; 1873/1996, 17-20). On the other hand, for this reason, 
                                               
 
2  Thus far, Marx’s anatomy of a capitalist society has been in large part regarded as historically 
materialistic. Yet it was also geographically sensitive from the outset, and this feature in his critique of 
political economy is found par excellence in his discussions on the historical emergence of a capital 
relation, the CMP, and a capitalist system in the context of a world market—particularly his 
discussions on capitalist hegemony on a world market (for more details on Marx’s world market and 
hegemony, see Chapter 4). 
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the real in Marx’s method refers to a mind-independent and, simultaneously, 
ontologically deep object.  
4. Such a real and historico-geographically specific object is also regarded as concrete. 
This means that the object is the synthesis of the diverse. Therefore, it is a rich totality. 
In this context, to borrow Hegel’s terminology, it may be regarded as having its own 
individuality too.3 On the other hand, the concrete is opposite to the abstract. Here, the 
abstract is only one-sided and thus simple. In this context, the concrete is coupled with 
the complex (see Marx 1857/1986, 38).4 
5. The real-concrete that has its own historico-geographical specificity is synthetically 
determined by not only its innate attributes, but also its relations or mediations. For 
this reason, Marx synthetically defined an object as not only an attribute, but also a 
                                               
 
3  Here we need to distinguish the individual in Hegel’s philosophy from an individual in 
methodological individualism. In Hegel’s philosophy, the individual (or, in some cases, what is 
translated into the singular) refers to an abundant and concrete whole. Thus, it corresponds to the 
concrete. In particular, the individual is regarded not only to include mediations among its parts, but 
to be also mediated with others (Hegel 1807/1977; 1816/2010; 1817/2010). On the contrary, an 
individual in methodological individualism is close to a windowless monad. Individuals are, therefore, 
simple units that are mutually insulated. Considering these, it is correct to argue that Marx’s inquiry 
does not start with an individual. Yet, it may be wrong to argue that his inquiry does not start with 
the individual. For, as noted, Marx’s inquiry for the critique of political economy started with his 
observation of a world market—particularly the 19th-century world market, and the market had its 
own totality and thus individuality (cf. Ehrgar 2007). 
4 On the one hand, as is well recognised, the dichotomy between the simple and the complex can be 
also found in Locke’s and Hume’s methods. For instance, in Hume’s method, the complex image (or 
idea as a faint image) in our mind is a result that simple images (or ideas), obtained through our senses 
from an outer world, are habitually associated with each other in mind. On the other, the dichotomy 
between the abstract and the concrete originated from Hegel (for Hegel’s distinction between the two, 
and further for his advocate of a concrete thought about a concrete object, see Hegel 1808/1966, 461-
5; 1807/1977, passim; see Section 6). 
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(social) relation. Recall that Marx (1845/1975, 3-4; 1849/1977, 211; 1867/1996, 753; 
1894/1998, 801) grasped a human being, a commodity, money, capital, and so forth as 
ensembles of social relations. Also, for the same reason, a Marxian definition of a thing 
differs from the Aristotelian genus-differentia definition that is usually employed in 
scientific research (for details, see Section 6). On the other hand, this implies that Marx 
adopted the realist approach to a relation too. That is, in Marx’s reckoning, relations 
too exist mind-independently or, as Marx (1859/1987, 263) sometimes highlighted, 
will-independently. They are also ontologically deep in that relations are not observed 
directly. In addition, they have effects on a thing, and thus come to be inscribed in the 
thing. Here, we need to recognise that the realist approach to a relation is a highly 
distinguishable position in modern metaphysics.5 Therefore, the distinctive position in 
                                               
 
5  According to Bertrand Russell (1912/1998, 94 ff.), there are two ways of thinking about a 
metaphysical topic. The first is to do so by way of a proposition that comprises a substantive and an 
adjective. The second is to do so by way of a proposition, including a verb and/or a preposition. 
Generally speaking, the first way focuses on only a property or an attribute in an object that the 
substantive indicates. Thus, it hinders us from thinking about its relation. On the contrary, the second 
way allows us to deal with a relation, because both a verb and a preposition tend to imply relations. 
Here, Russell argued that since Spinoza, most of modern philosophers had followed only the first way, 
and thereby they had treated a relation as merely nominal. In contrast, irrelevantly of whether or not 
Russell was aware of it, it seems that Hegel acknowledged a mediation as effective being. Moreover, 
Hegel recognised the becoming of a relatively concrete thing that emerged, in part, out of the 
interplays, through the meditations, among relatively abstract things. Yet, Hegel’s philosophy was not 
realistic in that he went further to acknowledge the all-pervasive, all-embracing whole that is 
immaterial. In Hegel’s philosophy, therefore, mediations even in an objective world are not 
independent from the immaterial whole. It is basically in this context that Marx’s realist approach to 
a relation is eminently distinguishable in modern metaphysics. Unlike those who Russell categorised 
as most of modern philosophers, and like Hegel, Marx acknowledged mediations as effective being. 
He also acknowledged the emergence of a relatively concrete thing. Simultaneously, he discarded the 
all-pervasive whole as the mystified shell of Hegel’s philosophy (for more details on Hegel, see Section 
6). 
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metaphysics seems to be one of the decisive factors that fundamentally distinguishes 
Marx’s critique of political economy from earlier and current contributions to classical 
or vulgar political economy. His realist approach to social relations helps us avoid 
fetishising a thing or its innate substance. 
6. As regards Marx’s realist approach to a relation, let me return to the dichotomy 
between the simple-abstract and the complex-concrete. As mentioned, the dichotomy 
between the simple and the complex can be found in Hume’s method too. Yet, the 
complex in Hume’s method is no more than the habitual association of the simple 
things, regardless of whether it properly reflects an object in an outer world. In contrast, 
for Marx and Hegel, the complex is far much more than the simple sum of the simple 
things. This is because both of them recognised not only mediations as effective being, 
but also becoming into, or the emergence of, a relatively concrete thing. The becoming 
arises, in part, out of the interplays (i.e., a dialectical synthesis), through relations, 
among relatively abstract things. In this context, for both Marx and Hegel, relations are 
not only inscribed in the object; they also concretise it. 
7. Insofar as different kinds of relations are densely embedded and even mutually 
entangled in a world and, further, insofar as they concretise, and thus change, an object, 
the real-concrete and historico-geographically specific object, and further the world 
itself can be conceived as a living organism. In this context, they can be referred to a 
living or organic whole. Also, in the same context, we can state, as Lukács argued, that 
Marx highlighted the category of totality. Note, however, that Marx did not 
acknowledge ‘the all-pervasive supremacy of a whole over its parts’ (Lukács 1923/1972, 
27). It seems to me that the supremacy of a whole seems nothing but the ‘mystified 
shell’ of Hegel’s philosophy. Indeed, nothing in Marx’s inquiry corresponds to the 
pantheistic existence in Hegel’s philosophy. Thus, the supremacy of a whole over its 
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parts is not the method that Marx took from Hegel, but the method that Marx 
discarded in taking ‘rational kernels’ from Hegel6 (See also Louis Althusser’s comments 
on the specificity of the Marxian dialectic vis-à-vis Hegel). 
 
All in all, as Marx (1873/1996, 19) himself admitted, Marx’s metaphysical stance is 
‘severely realistic’. Specifically, as critical realists have correctly argued, the stance can be 
referred to as ‘depth realism’ that acknowledges not only the mind independence of a world, 
but also its ontic depth (see, e.g., Collier 1994). In particular, as noted, Marx adopted the 
realist approach to a relation, which is highly distinguishable position in modern 
metaphysics.  
 
2.3 Marx’s Epistemological Stance 
 
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and how to obtain it. Marx’s 
method of inquiry also requires an acceptable set of epistemological principles that must also 
be compatible with his position in metaphysics. In my reckoning, Marx’s epistemological 
stance comprises the following points. 
                                               
 
6 I agree with Lukács’s (1923/1971, 1) argument that Marxist ‘orthodox refers exclusively to method’. 
In addition, as mentioned, I agree with his argument that Marx attached great importance to the 
category of totality. Yet, the supremacy of an all-embracing whole over its parts is relevant to God, 
Notion, Concept, and/or Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy. In my reckoning, it corresponds to 
the shell of Hegel’s philosophy that makes the philosophy mystified, and thus it seems to be stripped 
off by Marx that attempted to take rational kernels in it (for more details on Hegel, see Section 6). 
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1. Scientific knowledge is, basically, produced through subjective, mental, labour 
concerning a mind-independent object in an outer world.7 The knowledge is thus the 
particular product of a particular human practice. For the same reason, it can be 
regarded as a mental tool that is manufactured by, and thereby has a use-value for, a 
human. In this respect, as with the utility of a physical tool, mental tools must also be 
tested in the light of their practical use in an outer world (Marx 1845/1975, 3-4; see also 
Section 5). In this context, while Marx’s method depends on ontological depth-realism 
and epistemological pragmatism. 
2. Given that the mind-independent object has ontic depth, the process of fashioning the 
mental tool must include a process of probing, with reason, the real determinants of 
the object. Otherwise, ‘we should surely have no need of science at all’ (Marx 
1867/1987, 390, italic in original; see also Marx 1869/1988, 232; 1873/1996, 19). Given 
also that the real object is concrete, knowledge production must involve a process of 
identifying the contingent co-working of necessary mechanisms. Added here that the 
real-concrete object is also historico-geographically specific, the production has to 
include a process of exploring the historical presuppositions of the object and its 
historical development that are geographically specific. 
                                               
 
7  This is drawn from Marx’s (1845/1975, 3) synthesis between what he called ‘all the hitherto 
materialism, including that of Feuerbach’ and idealism. According to Marx, all the materialism before 
him has a rational kernel in that it basically acknowledges the mind-independence of an object. Yet, 
simultaneously, it has a chief defect in that it takes the object only in the form of contemplation. In 
contrast, idealism, particularly a Hegelian one has a rational kernel in that it seeks to grasp (greifen) 
an object through subjective labour and produce concepts (Begriffe). That is, it accentuates the active 
side of mental labour. Yet, it relies on an illusion that an outer world is the representation of an all-
pervasive immaterial whole. To me, it seems that Marx articulated the rational kernels of the two, 
producing thereby a distinctive, realist-pragmatic view of knowledge production.  
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3. Yet, even the integrated exploration of the research object is only one part of the 
knowledge production. Recall here that, at the ending point of the integral synthesis, 
knowledge refers to the concrete-in-thought that reflects the real-concrete. This 
implies that, at the final stage, knowledge appears in the form of a concept in which the 
diverse determinations of the research object have already been taken into account 
synthetically. It further implies that, at the latest stage in the process of manufacturing 
the mental tool, we aim to re-define the research object synthetically. For this reason, 
on the one hand, knowledge production is involved with the integrated exploration of 
the contingent co-operations of the diverse mechanisms; on the other, it is 
accompanied by the elaboration of concrete concepts. In other words, the synthetic 
course in producing scientific knowledge is also involved with concrete 
conceptualisation—more specifically, the synthetical derivation of increasingly 
concrete concepts from relatively abstract concepts. This also implies that knowledge 
production involves a process of rendering an extant conceptual system itself more 
abundant by adding concrete concepts to it. 
 
Marx argued that, to produce knowledge—that is, to create a mental tool— we have to 
engage in a real labour process. In my reckoning, the process is Marx’s method as a procedure 
for an inquiry that I outlined in Section 1. The more detailed introduction of the procedure 
is as follows. 
 
1. We start the inquiry with a sensuous observation. In political economy, thus: ‘We 
proceed from an actual economic fact’. In other words, we do not start our inquiry with 
‘a fictitious primordial condition’ (Marx 1844/1975, 271; italic in original). For 
instance, we may start with an observation of the ‘periodic recurrence’ or ‘periodic 
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average incidence’ of a factual phenomenon (Marx 1869/1988, 232). Then, we perceive, 
and further conceive, a research object that has a rich totality.8 However, the concept, 
obtained through the initial conception, is superficial. For it is nothing but one that 
refers to the living, organic and concrete whole as a whole. In other words, the 
superficial concept says little things about the historico-geographical and real 
determinations of the object. That is, the history, the geography, and the real 
determinants, of the object still remain indefinitely in the whole concept, and the initial 
conception is thus ‘chaotic’ (Marx 1857/1986, 37). 
2. Faced with a chaotic conception, therefore, we must disaggregate it in a descending 
analysis to produce a conceptual system that we can then utilise. In other words, in view 
of an outer world and history, we must analyse the superficial concept by using the 
power of reason. Here, an analysis can refer to two distinguishable activities. One is to 
decompose the initial concept into simpler categories. This must be continued until 
the discovery of the simplest category that generally (or universally in Hegel’s 
terminology) defines the research object. This analysis involves the decomposition of 
the initial concept in line with a descent in an existing conceptual system. In addition, 
by this means, we can dig out not only the contemporarily real determinants of a 
                                               
 
8 In 1857 Introduction, of course, Marx (1857/1986, 36) argued: ‘It would seem right to start with the 
real and concrete … Closer consideration shows, however, that this is wrong’. To me, it seems in this 
context that many Marxists have simplified his method as a catchy phrase of “from abstract to 
concrete”. Yet, Marx also wrote that the concrete in an outer world is ‘the real starting point, and thus 
also the starting point of perception and conception’—though: ‘In thinking, it … appears as a process 
of summing-up, as a result, not as the starting point’. In addition, as noted, Marx argued elsewhere, 
the inquiry proceeds from a fact. In this context, I suggest that whilst a Marxian presentation proceeds 
from abstract to concrete, the inquiry starts with an observation which is followed by perception and 
conception (see Section 6).  
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research object, but also the historically preceding determinants that the initial concept 
presupposes. Ideally speaking, therefore, this type of analysis involves an infinitesimal 
unit of differential abstractions from the rich totality of a research object (see Section 
5; for a realist method for rational abstraction, see Sayer 1992). The other is to identify 
a form (i.e., a specific mode of organisation of content) at only an abstract level (for a 
critical realist view of a social form, see Jessop 2007a, 421-2).9 To distinguish the two 
analyses, I refer to a former sense of analysis as a differential analysis or a conceptual 
differential—and the latter as a form-analysis. On the other hand, although the 
destination of the differential analysis is the simplest determination, we must not end 
with the discovery of a few general relations at the simplest level. For it is close to the 
Hobbesian, Newtonian or Wolffian approach in pursuit of a deductive and 
parsimonious explanation of a world—that is, according to Marx, the approach on 
which the 17th-century political economists drew (Marx 1857/1986, 37; Engels 
1859/1980, 473). 
3. From the end-point of the conceptual descent, therefore, we need take one more step, 
and this is a synthesis that I call a conceptual integral or an integral synthesis. Ideally 
speaking, the synthetical course seems to comprise the repetition of the following steps: 
first, discovering the mode of a relation (or mediation) between two abstract things; 
                                               
 
9 Incidentally, this view of a form differs greatly from that in the Aristotelian hylomorphism. For 
Aristotle, the form of an object is close to its essence, and the essence refers to the differentia specifica 
in a genus-differentia definition of the object. For instance, Aristotle regarded a rational soul as the 
form and essence of a human. It takes up the differentia specifica in the Aristotelian definition. That 
is, in a genus-differentia definition of a human, such as “A human is a rational animal”, the differentia 
specifica is the rationality of a human. On the other hand, needless to say, whilst the genus-differentia 
definition has been usually used, Hegel’s and Marx’s definitions of a thing is highly different from it 
(for the Aristotelian hylomorphism, see Ainsworth 2016; for more details on Aristotle’s, Hegel’s and 
Marx’s definitions of a thing, see Section 6).  
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second, specifying the modalities of the relation; third, identifying the mutual 
inscribing of the two abstract things through the relation; fourth, moving toward a 
relatively concrete thing that emerges in part out of the dialectical working, through 
the relation, between the relatively abstract things, and; fifth, if necessary, deriving 
relatively concrete concepts from relatively abstract concepts (i.e., re-defining the 
relatively concrete thing concretely enough to contain real and historical determinants 
until the level). In this context, whilst a conceptual differential is to descend the ladder 
of abstraction in a conceptual system that we can use presently, a conceptual integral is 
to ascend it. Yet, the latter course is not to ascend the ladder merely again. In other 
words, it is not a return journey to the chaotic conception. For the ascent requires 
improving the ladder itself by developing concrete concepts and adding them to the 
existing conceptual system. Thereby we can arrive at the concrete-in-thought. Also, in 
this context, scientific progress involves a process that renders a conceptual system itself 
more abundant than ever before. On the other hand, according to Marx, Hegelians 
particularly highlighted this synthetic course. Yet, as repeatedly highlighted, they 
acknowledged an immaterial whole as being. For this reason, Hegelians were mistaken 
to assimilate a human conceptual fabrication, which is nothing but the result of mental 
labour for reflecting the real-concrete, to a human interpretation on, and further a 
human approach to, God, Notion or Concept which is claimed to march self-
referentially (for more details, see Section 6). 
 
As mentioned above, the basic principle of Marx’s epistemological stance is pragmatist. 
As also stated, it originated from Marx’s synthesis of materialism, which acknowledges a 
mind-independent and/or ontologically deep material world, and idealism, which attaches 
great importance to mental labour regarding an object. Likewise, Marx’s mode of research 
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also seems to stem from his articulation between the research procedure of 17th century 
political economists and that of the Hegelians. Simply put, the early classical political 
economists, who acknowledged the mind independence of a research object, analysed only 
their research objects. For this reason, their researches ended up with ‘the discovery of a few 
deterministic abstract, general relations’ (Marx 1857/1986, 37). In contrast, Hegelians started 
their scientific inquiry with sensuous certainty. Then, they rightly proceeded from the 
sensuously certain body of knowledge, through the universal and particular, toward the 
singularity of the individual, that is, the concrete (see Section 6). However, as noted above, 
Hegelians acknowledged the mystified entity too, and thereby ‘arrived at the illusion that the 
real was the result of thinking synthesising itself within itself’ (Marx 1857/1986, 38). Marx 
articulated these two methods from his distinctive realist and materialist perspective. On the 
other hand, in my reckoning, this same context has led to contradictory readings of Marx’s 
method for the critique of political economy. As Marx (1973/1996, 17-9) put it, after Volume 
I of Capital was published, while some commentators assimilated Marx’s method to that of 
the British theoretical economists, others dismissed the method as ‘Hegelian sophistry’, and 
yet others correctly appreciated it as ‘severely realistic’. This kind of confusion seems to arise 
from some commentators’s partial grasp of the total procedure. 
 
2.4 Marx’s Methodological Stance  
 
Methodology for science is understood as a theory of scientific method. Conventionally, its 
subject matter covers: first, whether science should focus on prediction or explanation, and; 
second, what is the best reasoning for scientific argumentation (more specifically, whether 
induction, which has a few notorious flaws, is sufficient for science or it has to be 
complemented, or even alternated, by other types of reasoning). In this context, mainstream 
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social scientists, particularly naturalists who have stubbornly advocated the possibility of, and 
a need for, hard science even in social studies, base their researches either on inductively valid 
reasoning, starting with a finite set of observations (e.g., statistics or a comparative research 
method), or on deductively valid reasoning, starting from a few axioms (e.g., mathematical 
modelling or a theoretical explanation for identifying a nomological link or a causal 
mechanism). By doing so, they have sought either to discover constant (or regular) 
conjunctions between two events, which are simplified as dependent and independent 
variables, or to identify causality or a natural law that makes an event, which is simplified as 
an explanandum, occur. 
In contrast, Marx’s methodological stance belongs to neither of the two approaches. 
Rather, it subsumes and goes beyond them both. This is basically because, as I illustrated, the 
procedure for a Marxian inquiry comprises multiple stages, each of which requires mutually 
complementary types of reasoning. Recall, first, the inquiry starts with a finite set of 
observations. Thus, it may start with a contemplation of a periodically recurrent or average 
incident. In this context, the inquiry does not exclude induction. An important point here is 
that the inquiry does not end, but earnestly starts, with the inductively valid contemplation. 
Likewise, after contemplation, the inquiry proceeds through the perception and conception 
of a research object to an analysis. This in turn can be divided into two activities. At the stage 
of conceptual differentiation, as critical realists argue, we must use transcendental 
questioning or retroductive reasoning to reveal simpler categories. Conversely, at the stage of 
a form-analysis at an abstract level, we must use deductively valid reasoning in order to 
construct a necessary sequence where causal powers are at work. Here, the inquiry also 
involves deduction. This said, Marx regarded a relation as bidirectionally effective. Therefore, 
to explore causal necessity in a Marxian way, the deductively valid inference must be applied 
bidirectionally even at an abstract level. Moreover, Marx thought that the mutual effects of 
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the abstract things generate emergent properties. So, at this stage, Marxian inquiry requires 
another reasoning. Specifically, it must use dialectical reasoning that allows us to derive 
synthetically a relatively concrete thing from the interplay of relatively abstract things. 
In addition, we must recall here that a Marxian inquiry does not limit itself to abstract 
levels alone. It involves the gradual synthesis of abstract mechanisms, thereby moving 
towards the reproduction of the real-concrete as a concrete-in-thought. At this stage, Marx 
attached great importance to the interaction and co-evolution of diverse mechanisms, some 
of which may counteract each other. In this context, Marx regarded those mechanisms as 
only tendentially instantiated. Moreover, the contingent instantiation of the diverse 
mechanisms may also lead to the emergence of a more concrete thing or the occurrence of a 
more concrete phenomenon. Thus, the synthetic stage too requires dialectical reasoning. 
Overall, then, I regard Marx’s reasoning for scientific argument as dialectical. Yet this can 
only be true in an overarching sense. For, it seems to me, Marx’s dialectical reasoning is not 
something mysterious that is completely distinct from induction, deduction and 
retroduction. For, as I explained, the dialectically valid derivation of a concrete thing from 
relatively abstract things presupposes inductively, deductively, and retroductively valid 
inferences. 
Based on this, we can now turn to the objective of a Marxian inquiry. As mentioned, 
naturalistic social scientists in mainstream academic circles have sought for expectation or 
explanation. In contrast, Marx did not only aim for the two, but also went beyond. First, a 
Marxian inquiry too aims for expectation. Yet a noteworthy point here is that the form of the 
expectation differs from that of a Humean one. To give an example, Marx’s critique of 
political economy implies an expectation that if a causal mechanism necessarily relevant to 
an economic crisis remains operative, or at least unless it is counteracted, the crisis is likely to 
occur in some form or other. This further implies that it is unlikely that a prolonged period 
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of stable capital accumulation will not be interrupted by an economic crisis. In this way, a 
Marxian inquiry too can produce a prediction regarding a probable event. Yet, this does not 
rely on a constant or regular conjunction between two empirical events but, rather, on a 
contingent link between a real causal power and an actual event. Second, needless to say, a 
Marxian inquiry seeks for explanation as well. Yet, its form too differs from that of 
mainstream social scientists. For, whilst those scientists aim for a simple explanation at a 
universal or general level, Marx sought for a synthetic one. Therefore, whilst the mainstream 
explanation is a parsimonious one, a Marxian explanation seems close to an explication—
that is, to unfold a detailed explanation gradually that can increasingly contain the rich totality 
of a research object. Third, in producing the particular type of expectation and explanation, 
a Marxian inquiry seeks to invent concrete concepts, thereby aiming to improve a conceptual 
system itself. It is in this context that the inquiry manufactures a mental tool. Fourth, 
admittedly, the inquiry finally aims to help change a world.  
 
2.5 More on Analysis, Synthesis and Pragmatistic Elements in a Marxian 
Inquiry  
 
As noted, a Marxian inquiry has pragmatist elements. In particular, the elements are linked 
to not only the objective of Marx’s inquiry, but also his epistemological position. To deal with 
this issue in a broad context, let me return to analysis and synthesis. Analysis and synthesis 
were first introduced in the ancient Greek for obtaining geometrical knowledge. In this 
context, then analysis meant a method for discover foundational things in a geometrical 
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figure in order to develop a proof on the assumption that the figure itself is already admitted.10 
In contrast, synthesis meant a method for developing the proof by arranging and interlinking 
analyses on the assumption that the analyses are already completed (see Beaney 2014). That 
is, the two methods were dialectically utilised at the inception. Also, then they were not merely 
philosophical, but particular mathematical methods. In modern times, however, the methods 
encountered new thoughts and reflections. Particularly by Leibniz, they started being linked 
to differentiation and integration, both of which are centred on a concept of infinity. As a 
result, they also started being held for new fields. For instance, it is already well known that 
Leibniz applied them for calculus and thereby invented a mathematical symbol system for a 
differential-and-integral calculus. In addition, he applied the two methods for making 
propositions of infinitely possible worlds, or of the contingent instantiation of a 
fundamentally necessary and further harmonious order (for Leibniz’s infinite analysis, see 
Look 2017). Also, in my reckoning, the idea that we can differentiate and integrate a world 
can be found in Hegel’s philosophy and Marx’s critique of political economy. 
In this context, not only the ancient, but also modern thinking on analysis and synthesis 
have a few important implications, some of which I have only mentioned, for a Marxian 
inquiry. First, it implies that an outer object is so concrete that it can be differentiated into an 
infinitesimal unit of parts. It is basically for this reason that as noted, a Marxian inquiry 
cannot be perfectly completed. Also, this further implies that the concrete-in-thought, 
indeed, cannot be the exact mirror of the real-concrete, though we may pursue it ideally. The 
knowledge that we can obtain is, thus, always partial. Second, whilst analysis and synthesis 
used in geometry or calculus have a mathematical object. In contrast, Marx’s analysis and 
                                               
 
10  Recall that extracting a concept of value form exchange-value, Marx gave us a geometrical 
illustration to make it clear. That is, he compared value to a triangle in different rectilinear figures (see 
Marx 1867/1996b, 47). 
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synthesis are concerned with an outer world that is not only historico-geographically specific 
but also mind-independent. Therefore, Marx’s analysis and synthesis necessarily pose a 
question of whether the concrete-in-thought reflects the real-concrete correctly, albeit even 
partially. In Marx’s epistemology, however, there is no criterion that allows us to make an 
eventual judgement of the correspondence between the concrete-in-thought and the real-
concrete. Yet, simultaneously, Marx already provided us with his own solution to the 
problem. In a nutshell, he did not consider the issue itself as merely epistemic. Conversely, 
he was critical of the merely epistemological stance. Instead, according to Marx (1845/1975, 
3): 
 
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory, but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality 
and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality 
or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question. 
 
It is basically in this respect that his inquiry includes a pragmatistic element. Also, the 
element is linked to other parts in his philosophical positions. Recall, for instance, that Marx 
regarded the knowledge itself as a mental tool. In this context, Marx’s pragmatistic view of a 
scientific test corresponds to his view of the nature of knowledge. In addition, this view is 
accordant with his view of the purpose of science. As mentioned, for Marx, ‘the point is to 
chance a world’. In this context, the test of the produced knowledge is, indeed, an attempt to 
change a world. Also, insofar as a Marxian inquiry is a trial-and-error (re-)search, such an 
attempt has to be continued. In this respect, I named the test as a pragmatic-dialectical test. 
 
2.6 A Mystified Shell and Rational Kernels in Hegel’s Philosophy 
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Thus far, I have attempted to clarify Marx’s method and to unveil the philosophical 
foundations on the method relies. Yet, indeed, my explication of them is still much 
insufficient. For, to explain them in full details, I should have dealt with more on the 
relationship between Hegel and Marx. That is, to grasp Marx’s method concretely, we cannot 
turn away from Hegel. Yet, because of the lack of space, I could not include my discussion on 
the relation between Hegel and Marx in my previous explication of Marx’s method. As 
regards the relation, of course, Marx (1873/1996, 19; see also Marx 1859/1987, 261-5) once 
wrote simply that: ‘My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its 
direct opposite … With him it is standing on its head’. Yet their relation is not that simple, 
and I believe that for this reason Marx intended to author a piece of writing about his own 
dialectics and, further, its difference from the Hegelian one. Moreover, even Hegel’s 
philosophy itself is not so simple that it can be summarised in a nutshell. For these reasons, I 
prefer to distinguish the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy clearly from its mystified shell 
rather than to dumb down their intricate relations in a few sentences. In this context, I give 
my own brief note on them. In my reckoning, the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy 
include, but are not limited to, the following points. 
 
1. Hegel regarded an object as the concrete—and, further, the individual in that the 
concrete has its own individuality, based on its own rich totality. For Hegel, an object 
is thus the synthesis of the diverse.  
2. Hegel acknowledged a mediation as effective being, whilst most modern philosophers 
had since Spinoza treated a relation as nominal. On this basis, Hegel recognised the 
becoming of the relatively high or concrete properties that arise out of the interplay 
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(i.e., dialectical synthesis), through the mediations, among relatively low or abstract 
parts.  
3. In this context, Hegel regarded the concrete as an organism—and, further, as far much 
more than the simple association of its parts. In the same context, Hegel asked us to 
market into a concrete thought on the concrete object. Hegel viewed a merely abstract 
(i.e., only one-sided and simple) thought on the concrete as typical of “the 
uneducated”. For Hegel (1807/1977, 317), such a thought is nothing but an 
‘uneducated thoughtlessness’ about a dialectically effective mediation—and, thus, no 
more than an obstacle to a concrete thought (for Hegel’s theoretical distinction 
between the concrete and the abstract, see Hegel 1807/1977, passim; for the everyday 
examples of abstract and concrete thoughts, see Hegel 1808/1966; for Hegel’s 
mediations, see also Hegel 1816/2010; 1817/2010).  
4. In this context, Hegel’s definition is highly different from the Aristotelian definition—
that is, a genus-differentia definition that we have usually used. In my view, the 
difference can be specified, at least, in three respects. 
(a) Whilst the Aristotelian definition takes a species, which is located at the lowest 
position in a taxonomical rank, as its object, the Hegelian definition grasps the 
individual, which has the rich totality and concrete abundance, as its object.  
(b) In this context, the Aristotelian definitions has only two moments of a concept: 
first, the proximate genus of the defined species, and; (b) a differentia that the 
defined species in the genus exclusively shares. In contrast, Hegel’s definition 
‘contains three moments of the concept: the universal as the proximate genus 
(genus proximum), the particular as the determinacy of the genus (qualitas 
specifica), and the individual as the defined object [Gegenstand] itself’ (Hegel 
1817/2010, 294). Note here that, in the Hegelian definition, whilst the first move 
   QU=
from the universal to the particular can be achieved at one go, the second move 
from the particular to the individual is not the case. For the second move is to 
follow a long path in order to include all the remaining details of the individual. 
Also, because of this second move, the Hegelian definition seems as an infinitude 
of conceptual synthesis.  
(c) Whilst the Aristotelian definition takes the endogenous property of the defined 
species as the differentia specifica, the Hegelian definition accentuates not only 
properties, but further medications as determinants, because as noted, Hegel 
acknowledged a mediation as effective being (Hegel 1817/2010, 294-5; see also 
Hegel 1816/2010, 707 ff.).11 
5. This distinctive view of definition is also relevant to Hegel’s view of science (for the 
Hegelian scientific cognition, see Hegel 1807/1977, 1-45). Simply speaking, for Hegel 
                                               
 
11 Let me here discuss on Marx’s definition of a thing. For instance, basically, Marx regarded a human 
as Homo Faber (see Marx and Engels 1847/1975). Note here that there is a great difference between 
“Homo Faber” and a “rational animal”, though both definitions of a human commonly contain only 
two moments of a concept. Simply speaking, when we define a human as a rational animal, we focus 
on only its endogenous property. This holds for other definitions of a human, such as Homo Sapiens 
or Homo Economicus. In these cases, we come to take wisdom or economic rationality as our 
distinctive essence. Those definitions are explicit. Yet, they come to end there. On the contrary, when 
we define a human as Homo Faber, it is to highlight our specific action. Needless to say, in many 
cases, an action presupposes its object. Thus, in those cases, it implies the mediations of a human. For 
instance, when we treat a human as Homo Faber, we can go to think about mediations among a 
human, its products and, further, materials that we use for the production, and for this reason, the 
definition can be additionally unfolded. Recall here that Marx’s definition of a human does not end 
with Homo Faber. According to Marx (1845/1975, 4): ‘In its reality it is the ensemble of the social 
relations’. In my reckoning, this succinct statement about a human implicitly expresses the long path 
in order to contain all the remaining details of a human. In addition, the same holds for Marx’s 
approach to a commodity, money, capital and the like. Basically, Marx regarded them as a social 
relation. In addition, his discussions on them are gradually developed. In particular, in doing so, Marx 
(1996) moved upwards the relatively concrete, that is, from a commodity, through money, to capital.  
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(1807/1977, 58), a scientific cognition starts with sensuous certainty. Based on it, we 
can obtain a body of knowledge. In particular, according to Hegel, the sensuously 
certain kind of knowledge ‘appears as the richest kind of knowledge’. It also ‘appears 
to be the truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object, but 
has the object before it in its perfect entirety’. Yet, simultaneously, ‘this very certainty 
proves itself to be most abstract and poorest truth. All that it says about what it knows 
is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing’ (cf. 
Marx’s perception and chaotic conception of a research object). Therefore, the object 
has to start being definitely identified, and a definition of it is thus needed. In other 
words, the abstract parts of the rich and concrete abundance need to be differentially 
classified. Needless to say, the starting point of the definition is to find out the universal 
(cf., the simplest determination in a Marxian inquiry). In this context, Hegel’s 
cognition for science proceeds from a sensuously certain body of knowledge to the 
universal that defines the concrete universally (cf., Marx’s conceptual decent from a 
chaotic conception to the simplest determination). From then onward, it proceeds, 
through the particular, toward the individual, that is, the concrete (cf., Marx’s 
conceptual ascent toward the concrete-in-thought).  
6. In this context, for Hegel too, the starting point of an inquiry (or, a scientific cognition 
in Hegel’s terminology) differs from that of a presentation (Darstellung) (or, a logical 
beginning in philosophy in Hegel’s terminology). That is, discussing the scientific 
cognition of human consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit, as noted, Hegel 
(1807/1977, 58) indicated sense certainty concerning the concrete as the start of our 
coming to know. In contrast, in The Science of Logic, ‘[t]he essential point’ of which is 
‘an altogether new concept of scientific procedure’, Hegel (1816/2010, 9, 45, 48) 
presented ‘pure being … this simplest of all simples’ as ‘a beginning in philosophy’, that 
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is, ‘the logical beginning’. It was the Science of Logic that Marx chanced to read while 
preparing Capital and, in a letter to Engels, described as a major source of inspiration 
regarding his own method in that work. In a nutshell, not only for Marx, but also for 
Hegel, a method as a procedure is twofold: one for a scientific cognition 
(Forschungsweise), and one for a logical presentation (Darstellungsweise). 
7. The Hegelian definition and/or scientific cognition include the derivation of 
increasingly concrete concepts from abstract ones by sublating and synthesising the 
abstract concepts. 
8. This view of a scientific cognition is also linked to Hegel’s distinctive view of a human. 
To begin with, it seems well recognised that Hegel regarded a human as a (self-
)consciousness that can appear in different forms in accordant with the phases of its 
evolution. Here, in particular, Hegel argued that a human (self-)consciousness can be 
witty, particularly when it encounters contradictions, and thereby, when it becomes 
inwardly disrupted and thus unhappy (see Hegel 1807/1977, passim). That is, Hegel 
thought that a human is capable of dealing with a language in an inventive way. By 
doing so, when it is disrupted by contradictions, a human is assumed to be capable of 
manufacturing something linguistically synthetic, though not all humans can do so in 
that the uneducated remains to be mired in merely abstract thoughts. Also, by doing 
so, a human can manufacture something relatively concrete in thought and, thereby, it 
can go beyond the contractions that have made it unhappy.  
9. In this context, it can be stated that Hegel basically saw a human as Homo Faber. To 
me, it seems in this context that Marx (1844/1975, 333, italic in original) wrote: ‘Hegel 
grasps labour as the essence of man’.  
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10. In the same context, Hegel seems to highlight the active side of mind, that is, mental 
labour regarding knowledge production, whilst all the materialism before that of Marx 
had taken an object only in a form of contemplation.  
 
In my reckoning, all of these points belong to the rational kernels of Hegel’s 
philosophy. However, Hegel also brought an elusive being, that is, an immaterially mystified 
substance to the fore in the whole system of his philosophy. Needless to say, it is what he 
called God, Concept, Spirit, and so forth. Appeared to be fundamentally conceptual, 
discoursal or linguistic, 12  it is presented as an all-pervading and all-embracing entity in 
Hegel’s philosophy. Also, in the philosophy, it is regarded to march self-referentially toward 
a concrete one, and also to functions as a kind of motive power as well that did not only bring 
about a world into being, but further has made it possible for the world to evolve into an 
increasingly concrete one. This is, needless to say, the mystified shell of the philosophy. Also, 
because of it, even the rational kernels in Hegel’s philosophy came to remain in a mystified 
form. For instance, Hegel (1807/1977 ,17) rightly argued, like Marx, that: ‘Science set forth 
this formative process in all its detail and necessity, exposing the mature configuration of 
everything’. Yet, simultaneously, Hegel thought that the everything regarding the concrete 
‘has already been reduced to’ only a part of the concrete in the entire world scale, that is, ‘a 
moment and property of Spirit’. For this reason, for Hegel, a human scientific cognition is 
no more than an interpretation on, and further an approach to, the Spirit, God or Concept.  
                                               
 
12 My view of taking Hegel’s God as conceptual, linguistic and/or disposal depends on analytical 
Hegelians’ interpretation on his philosophy. From the last decade, some analytical philosophers have 
argued, pace Russell’s reading of Hegel, that the Hegelian philosophy is, indeed, a conceptual holism, 
and thus, that it implies the ubiquitousness of something linguistic (see, e.g., Redding 2007). 
   RO=
Here recall my previous argument that Hegel saw a human as Homo Faber. In what 
sense was it regarded by Hegel as Homo Faber, however? As noted, the Hegelian God, Spirit 
and Concept marches self-referentially toward a more concrete one. In line with the 
movement, the Hegelian human fabricates a concrete concept or discourse, thereby chasing 
the concretisation of the Concept. In this context, indeed, Marx argued: ‘Hegel’s standpoint 
is that of modern political economy. He grasps labour as the essence of man’. However: ‘The 
only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is abstractly mental labour. Therefore, that 
which constitutes the essence of philosophy’. In contrast, Marx knew not only mental labour 
regarding philosophy, but further physical labour regarding material interests. He knew not 
only ‘the doings of philosophy’, but also doings for the material condition of human life 
(1844/1975, 333). Here, if we fix our focus only to this point, Marx’s method would seem a 
direct opposite to the Hegelian one. It would seem, then, that Hegel’s method ‘is standing on 
its head.’ In contrast, as I have attempted to illustrate it, if we broaden our focus onto the 
overall relation between Hegel and Marx, we will be able to be far more aware of the marks 
of Hegel’s rational kernels in Marx’s method and the philosophical foundations that the 
method relies.  
 
2.7 Existing Interpretations on Marx’s method  
 
Based on previous work, here I briefly review existing interpretations on Marx’s method. 
First, although dialectical materialists and Lukács focused on mutually different sides with 
regard to the history of human life, they committed a common mistake. That is, in 
interpreting Marx’s method in terms of its relation to Hegel’s philosophy, they accepted not 
only the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy, but also its mystified shell. For this reason, 
dialectical materialists contended that the history evolved self-referentially (see, e.g., Adratsky 
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1934; Kuusinen 1960/1961), and Lukács (1923/1971) claimed that there was a whole, the 
supremacy of which guided its parts, even in Marx’s theory. Second, the opposite holds for 
both structural Marxism and analytical Marxism. Admittedly, the two strands in a Marxist 
tradition focused on different sides with regard to the structure-agency issue. Yet they 
commonly dismissed not only the mystified shell of Hegel’s philosophy, but also its rational 
kernels. For this reason, Althusser and his associates overemphasized the alleged theoretical 
rupture between young Marx and old Marx, and on the dissimilarities between Hegel and 
Marx (see Althusser 1965/2005; Althusser et al. 1968/1979). For the same reason, analytical 
Marxists came to succumb to methodological individualism (see, for instance, Elster 1985; 
1986; Przeworski 1985). Third, systemic-dialectical Marxists have accentuated a need for a 
re-reading of Hegel’s philosophy. Yet, along the way, they tend to privilege his Science of Logic, 
which is directly relevant to a logical presentation (Arthur 2004; Moseley and Smith 2014). 
By doing so, they tend to ignore the other side of Marx’s method—that is, a method for an 
inquiry that presupposes a logical presentation.  
Lastly, critical realists have discussed a relation between critical realism and Marxism. 
In my view, it is not easy to answer to this question. For, first, the philosophical stance to 
which critical realism refers is somewhat unclear. For instance, even Roy Bhaskar’s work on 
critical realism can be divided into three different phases, each of which is respectively 
relevant to the basic tenet of critical realism, dialectics and meta-reality (see Gorski 2013). 
Second, the theoretical stance to which Marxism refers is also unclear. For instance, Marxism 
can be viewed in term of a family resemblance. In this case, modern world-system theory or 
analytical Marxism can be regarded as Marxist analysis. However, Marxism can be seen in 
terms of a theoretical focus on a capital relation. In this case, modern world-system theory 
can be regarded as Braudelian or Smithian approach—I return to these in my concluding 
chapter. In addition, as Lukács argued, we can understand Marxism in terms of totality. In 
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this case, analytical Marxism is not Marxist approach. Also, we must recognise that, generally 
speaking, whilst Marxism is categorised as scientific theory of a bourgeois society, critical 
realism is close to meta-theory for scientific theory.  
In this context, here I focused on not Marxism, but Marx himself. Furthermore, I gave 
the focus to, specifically, not his critique of political economy, but his method of political 
economy. On top of that, I went further to uncover his meta-theory on which the method is 
anchored. And, in the light of my previous discussion, we draw a few provisional conclusions 
regarding the relation between critical realism and Marx’s meta-theory. First, ontologically, 
Marx’s inquiry relies on depth realism, and epistemologically, it is pragmatistic. In these 
regards, Marx’s meta-theory resonates with the basic or original tenets of critical realist 
ontology and epistemology. For, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism for natural science and its 
naturalist, albeit qualified, application for social studies is the depth realism. It is also because 
a few critical realists have regarded practical adequacy as a criterion for judgemental 
rationality, which is distinguished from epistemological relativism (see Sayer 1984/1992). For 
this reason, on the one hand, I believe that Marx’s ontology and epistemology can be recast 
in critical realist terms.  
However, the relation between the dialectical aspect in Marx’s meta-theory is critical 
realism is still ambiguous. I argued that Marx’s reasoning can be seen as dialectics. Yet, in my 
reckoning, the speculative derivation, based on the dialectics, of something relatively concrete 
from relatively abstract things presupposes inductively, deductively and retroductively valid 
inferences. Based on them, a concrete concept can be manufactured by mental labour and, 
by doing so, we can re-define the real-concrete in an increasingly concrete manner. Also, in 
my reckoning, this view depends substantially on the rational kernels of Hegel’s philosophy. 
That is, it seems a result that Marx sublated respectively, and then synthesised, both Hegel’s 
philosophy and what he referred to ‘all the hitherto materialism, including that of Feuerbach’. 
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In contrast, such a speculative, synthetical derivation of a concept seems to have been less 
focused by critical realists. For a critical realist re-definition means a transformation from a 
nominal definition, which grasps ‘actualistically understood characteristics or manifest 
appearance’, to a real definition, which captures ‘the essential structure or ALETHIC truth of 
the thing’ (see Faulkner 2015, 112-113). Also, while Marx, certainly, took the rational kernels 
of Hegel’s philosophy, Bhaskar (1993, xiii) offered his own dialectics that has a ‘non-
preservative sublation of Hegel’s dialectic’ as one of its features (for a brief overview of 
dialectical critical realism, see Norrie 130-8). For these reasons, Marx’s meta-theory and 
critical realism can be seen as having important dissimilarities as well. Let me recall, however, 
that Bhaskar is not the only critical realist. Nor do all critical realists endorse his later work 
on dialectics and meta-reality. Also, in this context, provisionally, I conclude that Marx’s 
meta-theory and critical realism can be mutually complementary. That is, as noted, Marx’s 
ontology and epistemology resonate with the earlier tenet of critical realism. They can be thus 
recasted in critical realist terms. Simultaneously, I believe that Marx’s meta-theory has 
something that can be added to critical realism for its enrichment. 
 
2.8 Concluding Remark 
 
Let me here return to the start of this chapter. Unlike usual empirical inquiries in social 
studies, my investigation finally aims to re-define the previous model of South Korea’s 
capitalism. This means that I bring not a why-question, nor a how-question, but a what-
question to the fore. Yet posing such a question does not suggest that my inquiry is non-
academic or non-scientific. Nor does it imply that the investigation is entirely distinct from 
an explanatory, or expectative, inquiry. For, according to Marx’s method and meta-theories, 
an answer to a what-question presupposes to why- and how-questions. Indeed, I shall 
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identify how the PCHM was created, mutated and then evolved. I shall also reveal what 
factors influenced the fabulous performance of the South Korean economy since the mid-
1960s. In addition, I shall explain that, even so, why it had been that unstable. To do so, 
following Marx, I will focus not merely on the attributes of the PCHM but also on the social 
relations in which the model was concretised. In particular, I will consider not only domestic 
social relation but also the supranational scale of social relations. By doing so, I shall represent 
the development model of South Korea as a chimerical one that embodies mutually 
contradictory genes. This inquiry is theoretically informed by the VarCap-CPE. Also, the 
paradigm itself relies on Marx’s method and meta-theories. In this context, I introduce the 
approach in Chapter 3. 
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3. Introducing the VarCap-CPE 
 
In previous chapter, I tried to lay a philosophical foundation for the VarCap-CPE. On this 
basis, I now introduce the VarCap-CPE itself. The overarching merit of the emerging 
paradigm is that it enables a concrete inquiry into a real-concrete object in relevance to 
capitalism. This implies that the VarCap-CPE is in itself integral, because no single theory 
can exhaust the concrete object. Indeed, it consists of several theories and approaches in the 
traditions of Marx’s critique of political economy, critical political economy and critical 
discourse studies. Also, for this reason, it is far way more complex and concrete than any 
other in both political economy and cultural studies. To be specific, it contains critical 
realism, the strategic-relational approach, Marx’s value theory, critical institutionalism, 
(post-)Marxist state theory, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach. 
For this reason, it is by no means easy to outline its genealogy, features and even competitors. 
Considering this difficulty, subsequent sections address: the basic and overall features of the 
VarCap-CPE; second, its philosophical and, particularly, social-theoretical foundation; third, 
its approach to capital and capitalism; fourth, its approach to institutions; fifth, its approach 
to the state; sixth, its approach to the discursive, the linguistic and/or the cultural, and; 
seventh, its approach to capitalist spatiotemporality. In concluding remarks, I relate it to my 
investigation, and indicate its deficiency that I shall supplement in the following chapter. 
 
3.1 The Basic and Overall Features of the VarCap-CPE 
 
The VarCap-CPE emerged as a result of some 20 years of work by Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling 
Sum, sometimes individually and at other times together, in the aforementioned traditions. 
Thus, basically, it aspires to be an emancipatory, and theoretically grounded and reasoned, 
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critique both of an extant social system of exploitation and dominance, and of mainstream 
discourses that serve for the system (Sum and Jessop 2013, 35, 164, 501; for more details on 
not merely critical, but particularly “emancipatory” social science, see Sayer 2001; 2009; for 
the (meta-)theoretical foundation of, and methodical steps for, such a critique, see Jessop and 
Sum 2016). In particular, as I shall show, it has a double relation to Marx’s lifelong project—
that is, the critique of political economy or, more broadly, the anatomy of a bourgeois civil 
society. On the other hand, it has been also engaged with many theoretical developments in 
humanities and social studies after Marx’s death. And these features, taken together, have 
brought about its incremental complexification and concreteness. 
 
The VarCap-CPE and Marx’s Anatomy of a Bourgeois Society  
 
In chapter 2 I argued that the VarCap-CPE relies on Marx’s method and philosophy. In 
addition, it takes Marx’s value theory as a foundational reference point for its integral inquiry 
into bourgeois society. However, as is the case with Marx’s method, Marx’s value theory has 
been arguably interpreted. In terms of this issue, following Diane Elson (1979), the VarCap-
CPE distinguishes the labour theory of value (LTV) from the value-form theory of labour 
(VTL), and adopts the latter as Marx’s theory of value. By doing so, Marx’s value theory is 
now understood as extensively concerned with a society in which the historically specific 
phenomenon, that is, the ‘buying and selling of labour power’ (Marx 1867/1996, 177) 
becomes a generic feature of capitalism. In other words, the CMP generalizes the commodity 
form to labour-labour. In this way, the VarCap-CPE interprets Marx’s value theory as a 
foundational theory of a bourgeois society (or, more broadly, world) where labour power is 
generally treated as value or, more specifically, as if it were a commodity. By doing so, the 
VarCap-CPE regards Marx’s VTL to pave the way for an integral inquiry into: (a) historical 
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preconditions for the emergence of such a society; (b) historical conditions for the relatively 
stable operation and evolution of the society, and; (c) social effects that the treatment of 
labour power as a fictitious commodity has reversely on the society (see Jessop 2004; see 
Section 4).  
Yet, as mentioned, the relation between the VarCap-CPE and Marx’s critique of 
political economy is not one-directional. For the VarCap-CPE has also sought to contribute 
to the completion of the “incomplete” project. To elaborate on this, let me recall the debate 
over Marx’s plan for his anatomy of civil society. Admittedly, Marx could not finish even 
three volumes of Capital in his life-time. In addition, since the late 1850s, broadly speaking, 
he suggested two different plans for the anatomy. The first is the “six-book” plan that we have 
discovered in his notes, letters (to Lassale, Engels and Weydemeyer) and publication in the 
late 1850s (Marx 1857/1986, 45; 1857-8/1986, 194-5; 1858/1983a, 269; 1858/1983b, 298; 
1859/1983, 376-7; 1859/1987, 261). According to the plan, his anatomy of a bourgeois world 
comprises six books on, respectively, capital, landed property, wage labour, the state, foreign 
trade, and world market and crisis. The second is the “four-book” plan that has been found 
out in his letters (to Engels and Kugelmann) in the 1860s (Marx 1862/1985b, 435; 1866/1987, 
328-9; 1867/1987, 357). According to this plan, it seems that, in the 1860s, Marx intended to 
publish only four books, that is, three theoretical books on capital and a historical-literary 
book on the theories of political economy. 
In this context, Marxists have debated over the status of the three volumes of Capital 
and Theories of Surplus Value in the light of his plans. Noteworthy are three interpretations, 
none of which, indeed, bases its argument on bibliographically sufficient evidence (see 
Oakley 1983, 114). First, citing Marx’s correspondence to Kugelmann, Henryk Grossman 
(1929/2013, 140; italic in original) claims that: ‘Capital, as it is presently available to us in four 
volumes, is essentially complete’. Second, based on his earlier reading of Marx’s economic 
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manuscripts in 1857-8, Roman Rozdolsky (1968/1977, 11) argues that Marx’s original plan 
was abandoned. More specifically, according to him: (a) the first book on capital was 
expanded; (b) in the course, the second and third books on landed property and wage labour 
were incorporated into the three volumes of Capital, and; (c) the last three books—‘or at least 
one of them, on the world market’—were allotted to an ‘eventual continuation’. Third, 
Maximilien Rubel asserts that, although the first book on capital came to be unexpectedly 
extended, Marx himself never revealed any intent to abandon his six-book plan. For Rubel, 
therefore, the three volumes of Capital and Theories of Surplus Value are no more than small 
fragments in Marx’s original plan. In this context, he also contends that even the three or four 
volumes of Capital cannot be ever a ‘Marxist bible of eternally codified canons’ (O’Malley 
and Algozin 1981, 181). That is, according to Rubel, at least, five books still remain unwritten 
(see also Lebowitz 1992/2003, 27-30). 
Among those three, the VarCap-CPE implicitly prefers Rubel’s interpretation to the 
other two. Also, in this context, the paradigm, which takes Marx’s VTL as an interpretive 
foundation for the three volumes of Capital, has been keenly engaged with not only critical 
geographer’s works, such as David Harvey’s (1982; 1989) ones, on land use, uneven 
development and spatiotemporal fixes in capitalism, but also Michael A. Lebowitz’s 
(1992/2003) work on wage labour, for it regards them as partial complements to the 
deficiencies in the fragmentarily fulfilled plan (for Jessop’s critical endorsement of those 
works, see Jessop 2004; 2006). Furthermore, Jessop and Sum themselves have, individually 
or jointly, contributed to Marx’s intellectual project. For instance, Jessop’s (1982; 1990; 
2002b) works on the capitalist type of state, his collaboration with critical human geographers 
for a spatially sensitive form-analysis of the state (Jones, Brenner and Jessop 2003; Jessop, 
Brenner and Jones 2008) and his works on régulation and (meta-)governance in relevance to 
the state are not simply complementary to the missing book on state, but have also developed 
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Marx’s theory of the state that Althusser (1968/1971, 138) once evaluated as ‘still partly 
descriptive’ (for the regulation approach and (meta-)governance, for instance, see Jessop 
1995a; 1995b; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2002a; 2015c; see also Sum and Jessop 2006). Also, more 
recently, Jessop and Sum have, theoretically or empirically, enquired into a world market and 
a crisis (Jessop 2012; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; Sum 2013). Needless to say, those 
attempts are particularly germane to the sixth book in Marx’s original plan. In this way, the 
VarCap-CPE has sought to contribute to the completion of Marx’s critique of political 
economy and I, too, shall attempt to make such a contribution in this thesis by unfolding 
Marx’s view of hegemony on a world market (see Chapter 4). 
 
The VarCap-CPE and Paradigmatic “(Re-)Turns” in Humanities and Social Studies 
 
I have thus far associated the VarCap-CPE with Marx’s critique of political economy. Yet, 
indeed, the approach has also set out to go beyond the completion of Marx’s original plan. 
For it does not only acknowledge Marx’s genius, but also recognises that he was no more than 
an intellectual in Europe in the 19th century. On this basis, the VarCap-CPE has been vigilant 
against a risk of falling into a theoretically, empirically and linguistically Eurocentric bias, on 
the one hand (for its self-critique of such a bias with regard to East Asian studies in critical 
institutionalist political economy, see Jessop and Sum 2006, 152-86; for a similar reflection 
in a regulationist tradition, see Boyer 1990, Boyer and Yamada 2002; Boyer, Uemura and 
Isogai 2013); on the other, it has been engaged with several paradigmatic shifts and theoretical 
accomplishments in humanities and social studies after Marx’s death. In this context, we 
might describe it as post-Marxist. Yet, in this case, the term of post-Marxism does not imply 
any “retreat from class” or from Marx (for a Marxist criticism on such a retreat, see Wood 
1986/1998). In other words, it does not mean to succumb to, for instance, post-structuralism 
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(e.g., Laclau and Mouffe 1994), even though not all the post-structuralist theorists are 
dismissed by the VarCap-CPE theorists as absurd (for Jessop’s critical realist adoption of 
Michel Foucault with regard to the state, see Jessop 2007b; 2010; for a triad relationship 
among Marx, Gramsci and Foucault in the VarCap-CPE, see Sum and Jessop 2013, 203-214; 
for a critical realist critique of Foucault, see Sayer 2012). For, as repeatedly accentuated, the 
VarCap-CPE still starts with Marx’s value theory in the field of political economy. It is also 
because it has sought to contribute to the completion of Marx’s unfinished anatomy of a 
bourgeois world. Thus, this version of post-Marxist paradigm implies not any retreat, but a 
sanguine advance, from Marx. Such an advance is, of course, to develop the integral 
paradigm, which resonates with Marx’s method, meta-theory and anatomy of civil society, 
on the one hand; on the other, it is also to occupy, with a flag of Marx, new “commanding 
heights” in theoretical battle fields.13 
In this context, to give a few examples, the realist, linguistic, discursive, reflexive, 
spatial, cultural and institutional (re-)turns have been respectively marked somewhere in the 
VarCap-CPE. Due to spaces limit and my incapacity, not all the details can be outlined in this 
section. Instead, I shall mention some of them in subsequent sections. Here, therefore, let me 
                                               
 
13 It seems, however, that Jessop himself prefers the term “plain Marxism” to post-Marxism. The term 
originates from C. W. Mills’s (1962) book. According to Mills, Marxists can be divided into vulgar, 
sophisticated and plain ones. Vulgar Marxists are dogmatic. They give a monocular focus to only a 
part of Marxist political ideologies, and identify the arbitrarily construed part with Marxism itself. By 
contrast, sophisticated Marxists accept Marx theoretically. Yet, they reduce Marx’s complex theory to 
a simple model of society. In addition, when they face a deviant case to the model, they try to eschew 
the fact itself or escape the crisis of the theoretical model by adding supplementary hypotheses to the 
model. Plain Marxists different from both tendencies. First, while they also work in Marx’s tradition, 
they treat him as one of the great scholars in the 19th century. They recognise that Marx’s work 
remains relevant to their own attempts to grasp current issues. Yet, simultaneously, they also 
recognise that Marx’s work, too, is historically specific, and thus, tied with the context of the 19th 
century. 
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reassure the following two points. First, the integral absorption of insights and concepts from 
such paradigmatic (re-)turns into the VarCap-CPE has by no means conducted in an eclectic 
way. For, as I shall illustrate, the work has been always done in line with, generally, Marx’s 
philosophical, and critical realist, rubrics and, particularly, with a Marxist and critical realist 
social theory—namely, the strategic-relational approach. Second, much of the work has been 
also done in relation to Marx’s critique of political economy or, at least, Marx’s other and 
some Marxists’ classical texts.  
On this basis, we can now understand the way that the VarCap-CPE has, justifiably, 
come to be so complex and concrete. In brief, its engagements with Marx’s unfinished 
anatomy of a bourgeois world and, also, with paradigmatic (re-)turns have rendered it 
increasingly integral. In doing so, theoretical “repair” works have been also continually 
conducted. For instance, encountering state theory, economic theory, discourse theory, 
systems theory, geographic theory, and so forth, the strategic-relational approach (hereafter 
SRA) has continually evolved (for an overview of the development of the SRA, see Jessop 
2007c, 21-53; for its current form, see Section 2). On the other hand, it is also noteworthy 
that in the course, a few traditional Marxist frameworks or concepts come to be replaced with 
others. For instance, although the VarCap-CPE has been inarguably inspired by Marx and 
Gramsci, it does no longer endorse a dichotomy between an economic base and a political-
ideological superstructure, because it recognises that the intersubjective production of sense 
and meaning (i.e., semiosis) occurs in all the “empirical” (i.e., perceived and conceived) 
realms in a world. By doing so, it has sought to go beyond a dichotomy between the material 
and the ideological. In addition, although the VarCap-CPE has been influenced by Althusser 
and, far more importantly, Poulantzas, it no longer utilises the concept of relative autonomy. 
For it argues that some concepts appropriated from the autopoietic systems theory are better 
in understanding a society in that they help us distinguish between operationally autonomous 
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and substantively (or materially) interdependent relations among the subsystems, and thereby 
also pave the way for grasping the ecological dominance of a particular subsystem and the 
structured coherence (or, at least, patterned incoherence) of the overall social system (see 
Jessop 2001a; 2001b; 2008; Jessop, Ji and Kytir, 2006). 
All in all, the VarCap-CPE is an integral approach. As such, it enables social scientists 
to analyse a capitalist society differentially and, then reversely, of integrally synthesising the 
analyses of the differentiated parts. In this context, the VarCap-CPE is, in essence, oriented 
toward an anti-reductionist inquiry. Let me recall here again Marx’s polemic against the 
universalist perspective of the 17th-century economists (Marx 1857/1987, 37-8). 
Nonetheless, as repeatedly accentuated, it is also vigilant of a risk of falling into eclecticism 
that: ‘merely goes snuffling round amidst the wealth of set answers’ (Marx 1862/1985a, 379). 
Also, in this context, Sum and Jessop (2013, ix) describe their integral ‘approach as pre-
disciplinary in inspiration, trans-disciplinary in practice, and post-disciplinary in its 
aspiration’ (for their distinction among pre-disciplinary, disciplinary, multi- or pluri-
discipilary, inter- or trans-disciplinary, post-disciplinary and anti-disciplinary studies, see 
Sum and Jessop 2013, 13-4). In the following sections, I shall introduce the theoretical 
components of the VarCap-CPE approach respectively. 
 
3.2 Its Philosophical and Social-Theoretical Foundations: The SRA as a Marxist 
and Critical Realist Social Theory  
 
Social studies must rely on one of the acceptable methodological positions that not only 
informs a specific method but also presupposes a specific set of metaphysical (or ontological) 
and epistemological doctrines. For this is, of course, a key criterion that distinguishes 
scholarship from journalism. Thus, the VarCap-CPE, too, needs its own philosophical 
foundation, which I explicated in Chapter 2. Here, then, I focus on the distinctive social 
   SR=
theory on which it depends within the general framework of philosophy. This social theory 
is, as repeatedly noted, the SRA. Broadly speaking, it is widely concerned with structure and 
agency, form and content, form and formation, subsystem and system, and multi-scalar 
spatiotemporal fixes and transformation. I shall start the introduction of it with revealing a 
place where the SRA is located in the fields of social theory. To do so, let me first deal with 
the way that structure has been understood in social theory. 
 
Putting the SRA on Its Place in Social Theory 
 
Broadly speaking, social theorists have grasped social structure as one of the following five 
things: first, aggregate behaviour that we can observe more or less stably in a society (e.g., 
methodological individualism); second, nomothetic regularities among social facts (e.g., 
Durkheimian sociology); third, an internally differential system that was arbitrarily pre-given 
as a whole at a point in time (e.g., Saussure’s linguistics and French structuralism); fourth, 
collective rules and resources (e.g., Giddens’s structuration theory), and; fifth, the ensemble 
of social relations.14 As Douglas Porpora (1998) indicates, both Marx and critical realism 
belong to the last position, though not all Marxists have followed Marx with regard to this 
issue. Based on Marx’s philosophy and critical realism, the SRA, too, is the case. It is also in 
this respect that the SRA can be primarily distinguished from other positions in social theory. 
Yet we need to recognise here that the SRA is not the only social theory in Marx’s, and the 
critical realist, meta-theoretical framework. To elaborate on this, we also need to categorise 
Bhaskar’s work on critical realism into three phases and, further, to divide his critical realism 
                                               
 
14 I added French structuralism to Porpora’s (1998) four conceptions of social structure.  
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in the first phase into a general rubric (i.e., critical realism as philosophy) and a particular 
approach (i.e., critical realism as social theory) 
To begin with, as most critical realists concede, Bhaskar’s critical realism can be broken 
down into three kinds according to the three phases of his philosophical work: first, “basic” 
or “original” critical realism on which he had worked from the late 1970s to the early 1990s; 
second, “dialectical” critical realism after his dialectical turn in the early 1990s, and; third, 
“transcendental dialectical” critical realism since his theological or spiritual turn in the 2000s 
(Gorski 2013; see also Bhaskar and Lawson 1998). Among the three, the critical realism that 
has attracted a scholarly attention as philosophical or, more specifically, methodologically 
metaphysical realism for science (i.e., transcendental realism) belongs to basic or original 
critical realism (see Bhaskar 1975/1997). The critical realism that is recognised as a set of 
ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality also belongs to 
original critical realism. In addition, the critical realism as critical and “qualified” 
naturalism—that is anchored on the aforementioned transcendental realism as a “midwife” 
or an “under-labourer” for natural science and, simultaneously, that allows both naturalist 
and hermeneutic studies for an explanatory critique of a society—is also the case (see Bhaskar 
1979/1998). For this reason, although many have proclaimed themselves as critical realists, it 
does not mean that all of them acknowledge Bhaskar’s later works as well. For some have 
endorsed merely his basic critical realism or only his works until dialectical critical realism. 
The VarCap-CPE acknowledges only his original critical realism.  
On the other hand, as a few critical realists (Archer 1998; Jessop 2005; Outhwaite 1990) 
have perceptively indicated, even Bhaskar’s work on the original critical realism can be 
divided into a philosophical or meta-theoretical rubric (critical realism in general) and social 
theory (critical realism in particular). That is, according to this distinction, a set of ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality belongs to a philosophical 
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rubric. In contrast, Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (hereafter TMSA) is a 
specific social theory within the general rubric (for more details on the TMSA, Bhaskar 1987; 
1989). Furthermore, his TMSA is not the only social theory in critical realism, because we 
also have two other specific social theories within the general critical realist framework: first, 
Archer’s morphogenetic/morphostatic approach (hereafter M/M approach; see Archer 
1998), and; second, Jessop’s SRA. Here is thus the exact place where the SRA is located. That 
is, the SRA is one of the Marxist and critical realist social theories. Also, as I shall illustrate, it 
is the most advanced one of the three.  
 
The Features and Merits of the SRA 
 
Now let me introduce its features and merits. Admittedly, it was invented, discovered, or 
creatively reformulated, by Bob Jessop.15 Also, whilst one might be still confused about it, the 
SRA emerged as a specific social theory for underpinning a specific state theory that 
synthesises the German state-derivation theory, Gramsci and Poulantzas (see Jessop 1982; 
1990). Then, as mentioned, encountering economic theory, discourse theory, autopoietic 
theory, geography, and so forth, it has continually evolved. Here, I briefly introduce the latest 
version of the SRA (for more details, see Jessop 2005; 2007c) 
 
1. On the dualism between structure and agency. Unlike both the agency-fetishised and 
structure-fetishised social theories, and like structuration theory, the TMSA and the 
M/M approach, the SRA recognises that structure and agency are inseparable with one 
another, and also mutually influential. In particular, as I shall show, it examines one in 
                                               
 
15 As regards the invention of the SRA, Jessop himself says: ‘[I]t’s more a question of discovery than 
invention because it was already there’ (see Jessop, Ji and Kytir, 2006). 
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relation to the other, thereby seeking to go beyond a dualism between structure and 
agency.  
2. On the social relations of collective social agents. Structuration theory, the TMSA and 
the M/M approach treat social actors as nearly homogeneous. For this reason, they tend 
to stop at the point of concentrating on the relatively abstract interplay between 
structure and agency. By doing so, in particular, the TMSA and the M/M approach fail 
to fulfil their meta-theoretical accentuation of complex social relations at a social-
theoretical level. In contrast, the SRA brings the co-existence of collective social agents 
to the fore. That is, the SRA supposes that individuals, albeit not all, can be grouped 
into distinguishable social classes or, more broadly, social forces that have different (or, 
in some cases, even mutually contradictory) strategies and tactics. By doing so, it gives 
way more concrete insights in relation to the complex and dynamic interplays between 
structure and agency. 
3. On the structural selectivities. On this basis, the SRA does not regard structure as 
simply constraining. It goes further to recognise that the structural constraints are 
strategically selective. This means that structure does not accord equal opportunities or 
constraints to all the social forces. That is, the SRA argues that structure privileges some 
collective agents and their strategies over others, thereby paving the way for disclosing 
inequality, exploitation and dominance. Furthermore, in this context, it regards social 
actions are constrained by structurally inscribed strategic selectivities. Also, it is in this 
regard that it examines structure in relation to agency.  
4. On structure and context. Let me recall here again that the SRA is one of the Marxist 
and critical realist social theories. In this context, it argues that the structure is only 
“tendentially” selective. This is the reason why it argues that structure contains not 
selections, but selectivities (see Jessop, Ji and Kytir 2006). This means, on the one hand, 
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that the structural selectivities are causal properties in a real realm; it implies, on the 
other, that the contingent actualisation of the necessarily selective properties can bring 
about mutually distinguishable conjunctures, which belong to an actual realm, within 
even the same structural configuration. In this way, the SRA perceptively distinguishes 
between real-structural and actual-conjunctural realms, thereby giving not only 
structurally, but further contextually sensitive insights in terms of the structure-agency 
issue. 
5. On the performance of social agents. On this basis, it is argued that social agents 
perform on a specifically pre-given structural-contextual matrix. On top of this, the 
SRA argues that the performances of the social forces are also based on their respective 
observations of, and reflections on themselves and, the given matrix. This occurs in an 
empirical realm. Thus, according to the SRA, social actions are based not only on 
objectively pre-given (i.e., strategically selective structural-conjunctural) matrix, but 
further on a subjectively obtained (i.e., ideologically and discursively construed) 
observations and reflections. 
6. On the permeation of the semiotic through the empirical world. In this context, the 
SRA does not conceive an empirical realm in a world as merely objective. Instead, the 
SRA regards it as, in essence, semiotic. That is, according to the SRA, the semiotic, the 
ideological, the discursive and/or the cultural permeate the empirical world. In this 
way, the SRA highlights the role of the semiotic and the discursive. Also, in such a way, 
it seeks to go beyond the old-fashioned dualisms between the material and the 
discursive, and between an economic base and its superstructure. 
7. On the strategic calculation and structural orientedness of social actions. As noted, 
different social forces may have mutually different aims, strategies and tactics. For 
instance, their strategic and tactical actions may aim either to reproduce or to transform 
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the pre-given matrix. Yet, in any case, the actions are structurally oriented. In addition, 
as also noted, their actions are based on their interpreted observations and reflections. 
In this context, their actions are also strategically calculated. Taken together, the SRA 
regards social actions as structurally oriented and strategically calculated. Also, in this 
context, as regards the structure-agency issue, the SRA basically examines an interplay 
between structurally inscribed strategic selectivities and strategically calculated and 
structurally oriented actions. 
8. On the structured coherence or patterned incoherence of a society. Yet the SRA does 
not stop here. For it goes further to examine the possible outcomes of the recurrent 
interplays. That is, the SRA argues, on the one hand, that the path-dependency of 
structure and the condensation of different social forces’ strategic actions combine to 
bring about reflexively reorganisation of structural configuration; on the other, this 
structure too contains its own selectivities, and thereby strategies and tactics come to 
be recursively selected. In addition, based on all of these, the SRA seeks to explain an 
autopoietic (self-producing) social configuration which is a structurally coherent. 
9. On social forms, contents and a social formation. Its approach to form, content and 
formation can be understood in terms of its approach to the structure-agency issue. 
When the SRA is applied to a real-concrete object, following Marx himself, German 
“state-derivation” theorists and Poulantzas, it basically seeks to analyse its forms. In 
particular, the SRA regards a form as inscribed by a social relation and thereby 
synthetically determined. Thus, a social form is nested in a wider ensemble of social 
relations, and determined by the condensation of the strategic actions of the social 
forces. A social formation refers to an ensemble of the social forms. It is examined by 
synthesising the priorly analysed social forms integrally.  
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10. On the multi-scalar spatiotemporalities. Lastly, the SRA is also sensitive to 
spatiotemporal fixes. The SRA argues that neither structural selectivities, nor strategic 
actions are transhistorical or trans-geographical. In this context, it also argues that the 
structural selectivities privileges a specifically spatiotemporal fixes over others. 
Therefore, it also argues, reversely, that the strategic actions can be also oriented toward 
either the reproduction or transformation of spatiotemporal selectivities. 
 
All in all, the SRA is one of the three social theories within the Marxist and critical realist 
framework. Furthermore, among the three, it provides the most concrete insight regarding 
many social theoretical issues. The VarCap-CPE is anchored on this specific social theory. 
Thus, at a social theoretical level, an analysis based on the VarCap-CPE, indeed, means a 
Marxist, critical-realist and, further, strategic-relational form-analysis. Below, we shall see 
that the SRA is, indeed, associated with theories of value, the state, institution, discourse and 
capitalist spatiotemporalities. 
 
3.3 Capital and Capitalism: Marx’s “Value Theory of Labour” 
 
Now I enter the field of political economy. As noted, the entry point of the VarCap-CPE in 
the field is Marx’s VTL. Also, as I shall illustrate, the reference point is linked to a specific way 
that Marx conceived capital and capitalism. To elaborate on it, let me recall that a word of 
capital has been diversely understood by political economists. To begin with, presumably on 
the ground that, in an economic context, the word originally referred to the principal of a 
money loan as opposed to the interest, some political economists (e.g., Turgot, Sombart, 
Schumpeter, Polanyi, etc.) have conceived it with regard to its monetary value (for the 
etymology of the word and its development as an academic concept, see Braudel 1979, 231-
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248; Böhm-Bawerk, 1891/1930, 24-35; see also Schumpeter 1954/2006, 307; Polanyi 1944; 
for Sombart on capital and capitalism, see Parsons 1928). In contrast, the other political 
economists (e.g., British classical political economists after Adam Smith, neoclassical 
economists, Böhm-Bawerk, Weber and even many Marxian economists) have conceived 
capital as the means of, or an aggregate of goods for, production (for Weber on capital, see 
Parsons 1929; see also Böhm-Bawerk 1891/1930, 36 ff.). Yet, particularly since the early 20th 
century, another political economists, historians and sociologists have attempted to include 
intangible assets into capital. In doing so, they have defined capital as an (in)tangible asset, 
particularly one that returns illegitimately excessive or differential profits to its owners for any 
reasons. Broadly speaking, American old institutionalist Thorstein Veblen (1908), the French 
Annales School of historiography Fernand Braudel (1979), and their respective associates, 
such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974/2011), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Simshon Bichler and 
Jonathan Nitzan (2009), belong to this position. Furthermore, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) 
cultural capital, Catherine Hakim’s (2010) erotic capital and Thomas Piketty’s (2013/2014) 
Capital in the Twentieth-First Century are all, indeed, capital as an asset that accords its owners 
differential profits.  
While these three conceptions of capital are all to refer to a particular thing as the term 
of capital, Marx conceived it with regard to a definite social relation or, rarely, a definite social 
process. This idea is not easy to grasp at first glance. My synthetic interpretation of it can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
1. For something to be designated as capital, it has to be a commodity. That is, at least, it 
must have both exchange and use values. In other words, on the one hand, it must be 
tradeable in a market and thereby monopolistically possessed or owned; on the other, 
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it must be capable of being exploited in market-mediated, profit-oriented 
accumulation. 
2. However, the first condition is no more than one of the necessary conditions for 
anything to be capitalised. That is, for any commodities monopolistically exploited for 
the production to be referred to as capital, it must also be associated with labour power 
that is purchased in a market and exploited in the whole process of production. In other 
words, unless free proletarians are subsumed under capitalist control, other kinds of 
means of production cannot be designated as capital. This is the point that Marx made 
in discussing Mr Peel in Australia. It is why Marx repeatedly stated capital is a social 
relation in the first and third volumes of Capital and other work (see Marx 1849/1977, 
211-215; 1867/1996, 753; 1894/1998, 801-802). Also, this is the very definition of 
capital that the VarCap-CPE follows. 
3. Yet, we also need to recognise here that, indeed, labour power is not a genuine 
commodity. For, whilst a commodity is (re)produced for sale, labour power is not so 
produced. To borrow a term from Karl Polanyi, labour power is a fictitious 
commodity. For, as the generic human capacity to appropriate and transform labour-
power that is typically reproduced in extended or nuclear families, its treatment as if it 
were a commodity becomes universal only with the development of the capitalist mode 
of production. In this context, Marx developed a value theory of labour rather than, as 
often but falsely posited, a labour theory of value. It is a foundational theory for 
enquiring into the historical preconditions for such a capitalist society and the effects 
that the historically specific phenomenon has reversely on the society. 
4. Finally, the primary objective of making such a capital relation, of investing money in 
production, and of exploiting other kinds of the means of production is the self-
expansion of value in the process of production and then to realise profits through 
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exchange on the market. Yet, if the things and their interrelations are at rest, 
valorisation does not occur. For this reason, unless they are in motion, they are not 
capital. In this context, Marx (1885/1997, 110) only once defined capital as a definite 
social process in the second volume of Capital. Also, this is the definition of capital that 
David Harvey (over-)stresses. 
 
All in all, Marx did not regard capital as a thing, because he adopted the same relational 
approach to capital as he did to other reified social relations, such as the commodity, money 
as money, law, the state, or social categories such as women or slaves. Thus, according to the 
view, a question such as whether money as such is capital has no significance. Money is a 
social relation or, more precisely, an ensemble of social relations. That is, from Marx’s 
perspective, not all money is capital. Yet, money which is put into the total process of 
production, anchored on a capital relation, is money as capital, namely money-capital. 
Likewise, not all labour power is capital. Yet, labour power as a fictitious commodity 
subsumed under the process is labour power as capital. In this way, Marx divided capital into 
money-capital, merchant capital, interest-bearing capital, constant capital, variable capital, 
commodity-capital, fictive capital, and the like. Also, he tried to analyse their 
metamorphoses. In enquiring into capitalism, the VarCap-CPE approach follows this 
conception of capital. Along with the conception, it also uses a term, the “capitalist mode of 
production” (hereafter CMP). In addition, although it seems that Marx himself did not use 
the term, following a conventional usage in academic circles, the VarCap-CPE approach 
refers to an overall social system, based on the CMP as capitalism. Likewise, based on the SRA 
as the Marxist and critical realist social theory, this approach tries to analyse the differential 
forms of the social system, and then to synthesise the form-analyses integrally into a social 
formation. In what follows, we shall see how the VarCap-CPE analyses institutional, state and 
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semiotic forms regarding a capitalist social formation, and the spatiotemporal fixes of the 
social formation. 
 
3.4 Institutions and Capitalism: Critical Institutionalism and the Regulation 
Approach 
 
A notion that economic conduct and mechanisms can and should be studied in terms of 
institutions has incrementally diffused in social sciences. VarCap-CPE, too, affirms the 
importance of institutionalist analysis, the methodological feasibility of such an analysis and, 
more importantly, the inevitability of the social institutedness and embeddedness of 
economic conduct and mechanisms (for more details on the SRA to diverse institutional 
turns, Jessop 2001; 2008, and Sum and Jessop, 2013, chapter 1). Furthermore, as an integral 
paradigm, the VarCap-CPE contains a specific version of institutionalism as one of its 
components. The institutionalism is self-described as critical institutionalism (hereafter CI), 
and CI is highly distinguishable from a few variants of “new institutionalism” or “neo-
institutionalism” (i.e., game-theoretical, sociological, historical and constructivist ones) for 
many reasons. To give a few examples, first, CI seeks to place institutions in the ensemble of 
social relations. Thus, at a fundamental level, it regards institutions in a bourgeois society as 
inscribed by a capital relation. This implies, unremarkably, that CI is anchored on Marx’s 
method, critical realism and the SRA. Also, in this way, CI is nested in the VarCap-CPE. 
Second, CI is Marx-inspired and this implies that it is an emancipatory project. Yet, CI 
does not reduce the extant forms of institutions to the instantiation of a capital relation. For 
CI resonates not only with Marx’s VTL, but also with Marxist institutionalism and, partly, 
post-structuralist concerns with institutions. Therefore, CI conceives not only accumulation 
regimes or ideological apparatuses, but also what Foucault termed dispositives. In this 
context, CI regards the extant institutions as instantiated by the condensation of complex 
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power relations. Also, in the same context, it strives to disclose the contribution of such 
institutions to various forms of dominance and hegemony. Third, CI does not have a single-
minded focus on one set of institutions. On the contrary, it explores not only economic 
mechanisms and institutions but also extra-economic ones – and their articulation. In 
addition, in the course, CI examines the role of semiosis (i.e., the intersubjective making of 
sense and meaning) in normalising or stabilising extant institutions, and/or in justifying 
specific institutional changes. Fourth, CI gives spatiotemporally sensitive analyses of 
institutions, whilst new institutionalist variants are in large part confined to methodological 
nationalism.  
Yet, because of those complex features of CI, a fuller explanation of it goes beyond the 
range of this section. In other words, as mentioned, CI is based on Marx’s method, critical 
realism, the SRA and Marx’s VTL that I have thus far explicated. Also, for this reason, CI can 
be nested in the VarCap-CPE. However, CI is in itself a rather integral approach to 
institutions. In particular, it includes the regulation approach, the SRA to the capitalist type 
of state, critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach that I shall 
introduce below. For this reason, here I deal with only the regulation approach (hereafter 
RA), thereby building a bridge between what I have explicated above and what I need to 
explicate in the following sections. 
 
1. The VarCap-CPE prefers terms of the RA or regulationism to régulation theory. For it 
conceives this as an ongoing research programme rather than a single or unified theory. 
In this context, the VarCap-CPE does not identify the RA with a few early French 
regulationist works (e.g., Aglietta 1976/1979; Boyer 1990; Lipietz 1987) but, instead, 
incisively periodises the history of the RA into a few generations. Also, it distinguishes 
seven schools in even its first generation, though it simultaneously acknowledges the 
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dominant status of the Parisian variant among the schools (see Jessop 1990; Jessop and 
Sum 2006, 13-57).  
2. The VarCap-CPE approach does not regard the history of the RA as a linear 
development. Rather it perceptively differentiates the merits and limits of each 
generation. For instance, the earlier regulationists started their institutional analyses 
with a capital relation, and for this reason, their analyses resonated, both substantively 
and methodologically, with Marx’s critique of political economy. Also, they tended to 
highlight not only (extra-)economic institutions, but further economic mechanisms 
themselves. For this reason, some of them have examined the possibility of Kaleckian 
macroeconomics, supplemented by post-Keynesian economics, and the need for the 
mathematical modelling of advanced economies (see Boyer 1990). In contrast, many 
later regulationists have forgotten, or even ignored, the Marxian roots of the RA. Also, 
they tended to put a one-sided focus on (extra-)economic institutions, thereby 
ignoring economic mechanisms. On the other hand, the early regulationist work had 
remained underdeveloped regarding the state, governance and the like. Furthermore, 
their case studies had been by and large limited to North Atlantic states. Also, even 
though a few early regulationists attempted to examine the third world, their work was 
based on Eurocentric bias. In contrast, later regulationists started articulating state 
theory to the RA, dealing with governance theory, and correcting the Eurocentric bias 
latent in the early RA.  
 
VarCap-CPE theorists have sought to synthesise the merits of different regulationist 
schools and generations (see Jessop and Sum 2006). In the course, they have also contributed 
to the regeneration of the RA and, further, the re-articulation of the later versions of the RA 
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with a Marxian root. Yet, as mentioned, the RA is a component of CI and, further, of the 
VarCap-CPE. Thus, for a fuller understanding of it, we need to go further.  
 
3.5 The State and Capitalism: The Strategic-Relational Approach to the State  
 
The VarCap-CPE contains a distinctive state theory too. The theory basically relies on a 
strategic-relational form-analysis of the state (for more details, see Jessop 1982; 1990; 
2002b).16 In this context, as regards the issue, this approach has the following features. First, 
it focuses on states in particular rather than the state in general. Needless to mention, insofar 
as it is basically concerned with capitalism, with particular states referring to the capitalist 
type of state – and this in turn being explored in increasingly concrete-complex terms. 
Specifically, the VarCap-CPE explores its forms, functions and their tendential 
transformation. By doing so, it identifies not only the substantial features of the capitalist 
state, but also its accidental changes. Second, basically, it regards the state as a relatively 
unified ensemble of state apparatus (i.e., institutions and organisations). Yet, this does not 
entail that it this ensemble is an independent entity. Rather the VarCap-CPE argues that the 
ensemble is intertwined with other institutional and/or organisational orders. Furthermore, 
it posits that their respective logics are mutually influential. In this context, it also examines 
the modes and modalities of their articulation. Third, it places the institutional 
and/organisational ensembles, including that of state apparatus, as embedded in a wider 
ensemble of social relations. On this basis, it treats the forms and functions of the state as 
inscribed within social relations. It is in this context that, following Poulantzas, the VarCap-
                                               
 
16 Bob Jessop identifies six potentially complementary approaches to the state. Form-analysis is but 
one. He also argues that the integral use of all six enables a concrete understanding of state. 
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CPE defines the state as a social relation. This, of course, resonates with Marx’s approach to 
capital as well. 
Fourth, because it treats the state as a social relation, the VarCap-CPE does not regard 
the state as ‘a fully constituted, internally coherent, organizationally pure and operationally 
closed system’. In contrast, the state is ‘an emergent, contradictory, hybrid and relatively open 
system’ (Sum and Jessop 2006, 97). Fifth, it provides a spatiotemporally sensitive form-
analysis of the state. For instance, the spatiality of the state is not innately fixed. Based on this, 
the approach enables multi-scalar examinations of the state. Seventh, the it acknowledges the 
role of discourses or, more broadly, semiosis in the exertion of state power. For instance, 
some discursive or semiotic formations may contribute to the normalisation, stabilisation 
and/or naturalisation of the specific functions or projects of the state. In other words, the 
VarCap-CPE recognises that the exertion of state power requires discursive legitimatisation. 
Eighth, according to the approach, the state is not only the subject of regulation and 
governance, but simultaneously their object. This implies that the state can be both explanans 
and explanandum. Needless to say, insofar as it is based on the SRA, a strategic-relational 
form-analysis of the state is based methodologically on Marx’s philosophy and critical 
realism. Also, insofar as it regards the state as a social relation, it follows Marx’s VTL. 
Furthermore, it regards the state as a rather unified ensemble of institutions and 
organisations, resonating thereby with the RA too, because the state can be regarded as a part 
of extra-economic institutions that regulationists highlight. In addition, insofar as it also 
analyses the mode of societalisation and multi-scalar spatiotemporalities, it is naturally linked 
to critical semiotic analysis and the variegated-capitalism approach. I now discuss these two 
in more detail. 
 
3.6 Culture and Capitalism: Critical Semiotic Analysis 
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Here I show how the VarCap-CPE deals with discourse, culture, performativity, identity 
formation, and the like. For this set of issues, as mentioned, it depends on critical semiotic 
analysis (hereafter CSA). As a rather belated response from critical realists to diverse cultural 
turns (see Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2002; 2004), CSA has a distinctive and significant 
status in the VarCap-CPE. For it is the very component that transforms no more than a 
critical political economy, into a cultural political economy, of variegated capitalism. Its basic 
features are as follows. First, CSA prefers the term “semiosis” over others, such as 
argumentation, narrative, rhetoric, hermeneutics, reflexivity, discourse, reflexivity, and the 
like, that have been accentuated in diverse cultural turns. For semiosis includes all of them. 
That is, semiosis is used as an ‘umbrella concept’ (Jessop 2004, 161; Sum and Jessop 2013, 
24). Second, CSA posits that semiosis is not only meaningful, but also causally efficacious. 
For this reason, semiotic analysis can and should operate in the generic framework of critical 
realism (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2001). Third, when dealing with the casual effects of 
the semiotic, CSA highlights its evolutionary mechanism—that is, variation, selection, and 
retention. Furthermore, when analysing the mechanism and the semiotic formation, CSA 
depends on the SRA. On the other hand, because it is based on critical realism and the SRA, 
critical semiotic analysis can be nested in CI and, more broadly, the VarCap-CPE. 
Fourth, according to CSA, semiosis does not occur in just one or two fields (e.g., 
political and ideological superstructure or economic base). Rather CSA posits that it happens 
everywhere in the social world. For social action takes the complexity reduction of the world 
as a precondition and the complexity reduction requires semiosis. In this context, semiosis is 
regarded as ubiquitous in the empirical world. However, in the same context, it is argued that 
semiosis does not exhaust the world itself. Fifth, for this reason, CSA does not argue for a 
monocular focus on semiosis. In other words, it simultaneously highlights the 
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indispensability of extra-semiotic analysis and, further, of a synthetic understanding of 
semiotic and extra-semiotic analyses. In this context, the VarCap-CPE depends on not only 
CSA, but also other theoretical components that belong to critical political economy, thereby 
presenting the third route between hard political economy and soft economic sociology, or 
between structuralism and constructivism. In other words, although CSA and, more broadly, 
the VarCap-CPE acknowledges the effects of semiosis on normalising, stabilising or 
regularising structuration, it does not reduce the structural to the semiotic. Sixth, CSA itself 
has its own theoretical sources. They can be divided into grand theory and grounded 
analytics. At the level of grand theory, it relies on Marx, Gramsci’s vernacular materialism, 
historical semantics, and Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy. At the level of analytics 
grounded in the grand theory, it resonates with critical discourse analysis, particularly its two 
variants: Norman Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach and Ruth Wodak’s discourse-
historical approach. It is in this context that CSA enables not only a description of, and 
interpretation on, a specific text, but also an explanation at the levels of inter-texts, contexts 
and supra-texts. Lastly, CSA too gives us a spatiotemporally sensitive analysis of semiosis. 
Yet, such sensitivity applies for not only CSA, but further other components in the VarCap-
CPE. In the following section, I shall deal with this feature. 
 
3.7 Time, Space and Capitalism: Periodisation and Variegated Capitalism 
 
There are two final issues to address: how to deal with temporality and spatiality with regard 
to capitalism. To begin with let me recall that there are several methods to study historical 
time (e.g., chronicle, narrative, genealogy, chronology and periodisation; see Jessop 2012). 
The VarCap-CPE frequently relies on periodisation, though it does not dismiss others as 
useless. Periodisation refers to a classification of the flow of historical time and, as such, this 
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relies on a construal of internal affinities and external breaks between historical events and/or 
processes. Also, because it depends on construal, periodisations can be partial or mistaken. 
Construal is theory-laden, and theories are value-laden. This also holds for t VarCap-CPE 
approach to periodisation. Specifically, it relies on critical realism and the SRA. Thus, the 
periodisation has the following features. 
 
1. Critical realism acknowledges the differentiation and stratification of the real world. It 
also acknowledges the contingent actualisation of necessary mechanisms. These imply 
that, even in the same structural configuration, mutually distinguishable conjunctures 
exist. In this context, the periodisation of the VarCap-CPE acknowledges ‘the 
paradoxical simultaneity of continuity/discontinuity in the flow of historical time’. In 
the same context, the periodisation accentuates relative continuity and relative 
discontinuity. An elaboration on those requires a discussion on the SRA.  
2. The SRA acknowledges the structural coherence (or patterned incoherence) of a 
specific regime or system. In periodising the regime or system, relative continuity and 
relative discontinuity are both relevant to the structural coherence. Specifically, relative 
continuity is used to describe a period in which, although there are relevant changes, 
they do not disorganise the structural coherence itself. Similarly, relative discontinuity 
is to point to a time when relevant changes disrupt the structural coherence itself. Yet, 
simultaneously, the collapse of the structural coherence, that is, the end of a specific 
regime or system does not suggest a sheer rupture with all features relevant to the 
previous regime or system. For some of them are likely to be extant even in the new 
regime or system that demarcates a new period, and must also operate newly in 
accordance to the new context.  
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In brief, the periodisation, based on critical realism and the SRA, enables us to grasp 
both “variation in invariance” and “invariance in variation” in the flow of historical time. 
More broadly, it allows us to examine multi-scalar temporalities with capitalism in history 
and the history of capitalism. This means, of course, that the VarCap-CPE does not take 
history as a linear and teleological process that is governed by a single law. It implies that the 
VarCap-CPE takes into consideration diverse time scales that penetrate the real-concrete, 
that is, a research object as the synthesis of the diverse.  
As regards capitalist spatiality, the VarCap-CPE adopts the variegated-capitalism 
approach. This approach, which emerged out of a series of debates over the history since the 
end of the Cold War and the effects of globalisation on national states, provides a third route 
between the hyper-globalisation thesis (e.g., Fukuyama 1989; 1992; Ohmae 1995; Negri and 
Hardt 2000) and comparative-institutionalist studies on the rivalry, or varieties (or the 
diversity), of capitalism (e.g., Albert 1993; Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001). For 
variegated capitalism not only acknowledges the possibility of the co-existence and co-
evolution of national capitalisms, but also sets out to examine the articulation of the multi-
scalar regimes of capitalism in a world market. In particular, Jessop’s elaboration of the 
concept is also to contribute to the completion of Marx’s critique of political economy. For 
his work on variegated capitalism is directly relevant to Marx’s world market (for more 
details, Jessop 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 2015b; cf. Peck and Theodore 2007). Thus, in line 
with Marx’s realist approach to relations, the variegated capitalism approach not only 
examines the multi-scalar relations among different places and locations in an increasingly 
integrated world market, but also the effects of the relations on the places, locations. 
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
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To recap, the VarCap-CPE is, fundamentally, associated with Marx’s critique of political 
economy and, more broadly, his anatomy of civil society. In other words, it depends upon 
the incomplete project and, simultaneously, seeks to contribute to the completion of the 
project. To do so, rather than holding a hermeneutic attitude toward Marx’s “divine” texts, 
VarCap-CPE theorists (effectively in this context, if must be admitted Jessop and Sum and a 
few dedicated followers) have not hesitated to adopt theoretical accomplishments in critical 
scholarship that have occurred after Marx’s death. Also, as a result, the approach emerged as 
an articulation of Marx’s VLT, the RA, the strategic-relational and regulationist theory of the 
capitalist type of state, CSA and the variegated-capitalism approach. Also, such integration 
has occurred in line with the same philosophical and social-theoretical rubrics, which enables 
the overall approach to escape the pitfalls of both reductionism and eclecticism. My 
investigation into the PCHM is guided by this integral paradigm. Yet, simultaneously, as 
argued in the opening chapter, its current form is not (yet) sufficient for a historical 
investigation of East Asian models of capitalist development. This is because it lacks, on my 
reading, an adequate theory of imperialism and/or hegemony on a world market. Yet, as also 
noted in my introduction, in many cases, the capitalist development in East Asia since the 
Second World War cannot be understood without reference to Japanese colonialism, its post-
colonial effects, US hegemony in the Cold War, and the like. Thus, a concrete inquiry into 
East Asian capitalism requires consideration of the supranational relations of social forces. 
As the tools for such an historical analysis are missing, the VarCap-CPE needs to be updated. 
This is the task of the following chapter. 
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4. Putting (Post-)Colonialism, Imperialism and International 
Hegemony in Their Places in a Cultural Political Economy of 
Variegated Capitalism 
 
In this chapter, I place (post-)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony in a 
VarCap-CPE. This work is needed on two grounds. First, while longstanding scholarly 
interest in those issues has been burgeoning explosively for several reasons since the end of 
the Cold War, the VarCap-CPE approach has not yet addressed them. Second, my historical 
investigation requires the insights from such work because it highlights the effects of such 
supranational relations on the PCHM. In particular, such work must meet three 
requirements and their corollaries. First, it must be commensurable with critical realist and 
strategic-relational tenets, thereby allowing its integrated into the VarCap-CPE approach. 
Second, if possible, it should draw on Marx’s critique of political economy. Third, also if 
possible, Marx’s insights regarding the issue must be articulated with theoretical 
achievements after his death. 
Keeping those points in mind, here I pursue three sets of tasks. First, I offer a 
conceptual map regarding imperialism and its cognate terms. Second, anchored upon a 
“strategic-relational”, particularly geo-historical, reading of Marx, I clarify Marx’s analysis of 
hegemony on a world market to fill contents in the conceptual map. In doing so, I also give 
an entirely new interpretation on the birth of capital, the CMP and capitalist society. Third, 
based on Marx’s analysis of the supranational relation on the market, I offer my periodisation 
of an imperialist system in variegated capitalism at the level of the world market. Specifically, 
subsequent sections deal with: (1) terms concerning imperialism and its cognate words; (2) 
Marx on a world market; (3) Marx on hegemony on a world market; (4) Marx on geo-
historically specific hegemonies on geo-historically world markets; (5) Marx on the 
commonalities of the geo-historical hegemonies; (6) the periodisation of an imperialist 
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system in variegated capitalism. My conclusions are followed by an excursus on extant 
literature on (post)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony. 
 
4.1 Defining Terms: Imperialism, Imperialist Practice, Imperialist Relation, and 
Imperialist System 
 
Notwithstanding a difference in etymology, I regard imperialism and colonialism as 
interchangeable. Also, as imperialism or colonialism, I refer to an ideology in pursuit of inter-
state, inter-population and inter-territorial dominance. Based on this, I distinguish 
imperialist practice, relation and system from the imperialism as an ideology. 
 
1. By imperialist practice, I mean strategically calculated (in)actions to fulfil imperialist 
aspiration (i.e., imperialism). Furthermore, I divide it into three kinds of practices: first, 
militaristic-geopolitical; second, geo-economic, and; third, cultural-semiotic ones. The 
first two roughly correspond to the territorial (or geopolitical) and capitalist (or geo-
economic) logics of capitalist imperialism discussed by Arrighi (1994), Callinicos 
(2009), Harvey (2003), and others. In contrast, cultural-semiotic practice is involved in 
what post-colonialists problematise, and/or what Nye (2003) call ‘soft power’. In my 
view, all three are important in establishing and, further, maintaining supranational 
dominance. Also, in a specific phase, each seems to have specific forms. Imperialist 
dominance in a specific phase, therefore, relies on the specific compound of specific 
forms of the three kinds of imperialist practice. Also, from this perspective, all the 
extant discourses on the American empire or neo-imperialism since the end of the Cold 
War, rightist or leftist, only deal with parts of changing forms of US’s practice (see 
excursus 2). 
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shaped not only an Oriental identity but also an Occidental one. The same holds for 
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supranational articulation of, in some cases, multiply unequal and, in others, multiply 
rivalrous social formations. Thus, it is impossible to define the system fully from the 
outset; for, it is irreducible to an individual and linear relation, although extant 
literature tends to do so (see excursus). Here, conversely, a specific imperialist system 
is regarded as one of the determinants that effects a specific mode of imperialism (i.e., 
ideology). In this regard, a specific ideological aspiration for supranational dominance, 
too, is not reduced to innate malignancy. It is determined by outer structures as well. 
Figure 2 briefly shows the hitherto definitions. 
 
Note here that my discussion is not meant to suggest that states should be regarded as 
independent actors in the manner of classical realism; for, my strategic-relational approach 
to the state is carried over into my analysis of imperialism. Both are interpreted as material 
condensations of shifting balances of force mediated through specific social forms and, in this 
context, inter-state relations often reflect and refract on a supranational scale the relations 
among domestic social forces with different scalar horizons of action. 
 
4.2 Marx on the World Market 
 
To fill contents in the conceptual map, here and in the following three sections, I elucidate 
Marx’s insights into hegemony on a world market. Let me start with the world market. 
Political economists in the 18th and 19th centuries focused only on the universal aspect of 
the world market. Quesnay (1766/1846, 76), for instance, viewed the world market as ‘the 
universal commercial republic extending over different countries’, and Sismondi (1819/1991, 
205, 276, 304, 562) saw it as ‘the market of the universe’. Ricardo (1821/2004, 134) also 
defined it as ‘the universal society throughout the civilized world’ (cited in Gimm 2016, 218-
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9). Let me recall Marx’s polemic against the universalist disposition of political economists 
(see Chapter 2). That is, from his perspective, the political economists’ view is nothing but a 
pure abstraction. Marx’s world market is not a universal one. It is the real-concrete, and for 
this reason, it can be regarded as the singular or the individual that contains within itself both 
the universal and the particular. Furthermore, it should be viewed as a far larger totality. For 
it is a nexus or ensemble that comprises many “internal” and “local” markets in both “home” 
and “foreign” markets that are mutually interwoven, at least, on an intercontinental scale (for 
the scale of a world market, see below). In this context, although Marx referred to it as a world 
market, he also thought that a global scale of a world market emerged in the 19th century. In 
addition, even in a world market, territorial barriers still survive, albeit they will tend to 
disappear as the market reaches completion – to the extent that this is possible. 
Moreover, Marx thought that the world market has a dialectical relationship with 
capital, the CMP or, more specifically, ‘the historically specific division of labour’. In other 
words, the emergence and development of a capital relation and the CMP requires a world 
market as a prerequisite. ‘The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically’ (Marx and 
Engels 1846/1975, 49; italic in original). Simultaneously, after their emergences, the 
development of a capital relation and the CMP has a tendency of (re-)creating a world 
market, because: ‘The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
established connexions everywhere’ (Marx and Engels 1848/1976, 487). In this context, Marx 
(1857-8/1986, 335; italic in original) also wrote: ‘The tendency to create the world market is 
inherent directly in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be 
overcome’. Yet, this does not imply, of course, that a world market expands linearly in a 
capitalist era. As regards this, Marx (1857-8/1986, 337; italic in original) wrote:  
 
   VM=
‘[F]rom the fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier which it has ideally 
already overcome, it does not at all follow that capital has really overcome it; and since 
every such limit contradicts the determinations of capital, its production is subject to 
contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited. Moreover, 
the universality for which capital ceaselessly strives, comes up against barriers in 
capital’s own nature, barriers which at a certain stage of its development will allow it to 
be recognised as being itself the greatest barrier in the way of this tendency, and will 
therefore drive towards its transcendence through itself’.  
 
For these reasons, Marx (1857-8/1993, 227-8; cf. Marx 1857-8/1986, 160) conceived 
the world market as a field ‘in which production is posited as a totality together with all its 
moments, but within which, at the same time, all contradictions come into play.’ According 
to him, afterwards, ‘[t]he world market …, again, forms the presupposition of the whole as 
well as its substratum’. It is in this context that Marx regarded the market as dynamically 
reshaped and even reemerged. Indeed, as I shall elaborate below, Marx mutually 
distinguished, at least, three world markets, which were geo-historically specific. According 
to Marx, they arose since, respectively, (a) Crusades in the 13th century (thus, the emergence 
of the 14th-century world market), (b) the discovery of America in the late-15th century 
(thus, the rise of the 16th-century world market), (c) the absorption, in the 19th century, of 
California, Australia, China, Japan and the like into the 16th-century world market (thus, the 
emergence of the 19th-century world market). 
 
4.3 Marx on Hegemony on a World Market 
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Here I should address Marx’s approach to hegemony on a world market. To be sure, Marx 
never used the term, hegemony, in the three volumes of Das Kapital or their drafts. However, 
he certainly left his distinctive explication of what we usually refer to hegemony or a 
“hegemonic state”. In doing so, yet, he used a term “supremacy” instead of hegemony.17 
Therefore, to Marx, what we can refer to as “hegemony on a world market” was, indeed, 
“supremacy on a world market”. Also, as I shall illustrate, if we focus on his explication of 
this supremacy, Marx will be read in an entirely novel manner, particularly regarding the early 
history of capitalism and supranational relations on a world market. First, however, we 
should recall that his method is both differentially analytical and integrally synthetical and he 
applies this approach to supremacy as well.  
To begin with, Marx divided supremacy into two subcategories: commercial (or 
trading) and industrial supremacy. Then, he related this division to his distinction between 
the epoch of machinofacture and its precedent epochs—particularly phases between the first 
emergence of a world market and the emergence of machinofacture. Here, according to 
Marx, in the epochs before the emergence of machinofacture, it is ‘the commercial supremacy 
… gives industrial predominance’. That is, in these epochs, a state that seized commercial 
supremacy, went further to accede to industrial supremacy, thereby ascending to whole 
supremacy (see Marx 1867/1996, 742). To give an example relevant to the manufacturing 
period, this is because: ‘Manufacture arises where there is mass production for export, i.e., 
on the basis of large-scale maritime and overland trade, in its emporia’ (Marx 1857-8/1986, 
434; italic in original). In this context, in the period, supremacy in large-scale trade precedes 
                                               
 
17 He used the term “supremacy” not only in the context of an international relation, but also other 
political and/or economic contexts. To give an example, he wrote: ‘The labour of superintendence 
and management, arising as it does out of an antithesis, out of the supremacy of capital over labour’ 
(Marx 1894/1998, 384; italic added; for other examples, see ibid, 383, 595). 
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supremacy in manufacture. Also, in the same context, Marx (1867/1996, 742) argued that, in 
the manufacturing period, ‘the colonial system plays’ a ‘preponderant rôle’. In contrast, in 
the machinofacturing period, this occurs in the reverse direction. In this epoch, ‘industrial 
supremacy implies commercial supremacy’ (Marx 1867/1996, 742). Therefore, total 
supremacy in the machinofacturing period is anchored fundamentally upon industrial 
supremacy. In other words, in this epoch, a state that seeks to gain supremacy should first 
seize industrial supremacy. In this way, supremacy in the manufacturing and 
machinofacturing periods are subtly different. This is evident from Marx’s account of three 
successive examples of supremacy. 
 
4.4 Marx on Northern Italian, Dutch and British Supremacy on Three 
Historical World Markets 
 
Marx (1847/1976a, 574) confirmed that a ‘world market appeared before the discovery of 
America’. That is, it emerged after the Crusades that did not only make ‘the product of the 
Orient’ known, but further ‘greatly increased the demand for such products’, in Western 
Europe. In the world market in the 14th and 15th centuries—‘when there were as yet no 
colonies, when America did not yet exist for Europe, when Asia existed only through the 
intermediary of Constantinople’—‘the Mediterranean was the centre of commercial activity’ 
(Marx 1847/1976b, 179). Specifically, the republican city-states in Northern Italy seized the 
commercial supremacy. This led to their industrial supremacy and, thereby, overall 
supremacy. In particular, as regards their supremacy in industry, Marx (1867/1996, 707) 
argued that Italy was a place ‘where capitalist production developed earliest, the dissolution 
of serfdom also took place earlier than elsewhere’. That is, in Marx’s reckoning, a capital 
relation and capitalist manufacture arose in the 14th or 15th century. Furthermore, Marx 
(1857-8/1986, 434) argued that the manufacture later extended to ‘Constantinople, the 
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Flemish and Dutch cities, a few Spanish ones like Barcelona’ (see also Marx 1861-3/1986, 465; 
1861-3/1994, 328; 1894/1998, 334; Marx and Engels 1846/1975, 67). By any means, however, 
Marx did not regard those towns as a bourgeois society. Thus, in the 14th and 15th centuries, 
whilst both a capital relation and capitalist production already appeared, a capitalist society 
did not exist. For, in those centuries, manufacture, based on a capital relation, did not develop 
on a large scale. According to Marx (1857-8/1986, 429, 434; italic in original), even ‘in the 
Italian cities’, ‘it developed side by side with guilds’, whilst ‘if capital is to generally dominant 
for an epoch, its condition must be developed not merely locally, but on a large scale’. In 
other words, capitalist manufacture at that time appeared only ‘sporadically or locally, 
alongside the old modes of production’.  
In this situation, the world market was radically expanded after the discovery of the 
Americas in the late 15th century. This revolution on a world market led to the rise of the 
16th-century world market, thereby replacing the old emporia with new ones. Accordingly, 
the Mediterranean could no longer function as the centre of a commercial activity (see Marx 
1853/1979, 628). As a result, it also ‘annihilated Northern Italy’s commercial supremacy’. 
Consequently, in Italy’s industry as well, ‘a movement in the reverse direction set it. The 
labourers of the towns were driven en masse into country, and gave an impulse, never before 
seen to the petite culture, carried on in the form of gardening’ (Marx 1867/1996, 707; italic in 
original). In brief, Northern Italy, by seizing the commercial supremacy on the 14th-century 
world market, could accede to the industrial and total supremacy. Conversely, Northern Italy, 
by losing the commercial supremacy on the 16th-century world market, came to lose even 
the industrial and total supremacy. For Marx, during the course, a capital relation and thus 
capitalist production emerged for the first time in history. A capitalist society, however, did 
not emerge. 
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On the 16th-century world market, the Dutch gained commercial, and thereby 
industrial, supremacy.18  As regards this supremacy, Marx identified a few distinguishing 
features. First, regarding the commercial aspect of the supremacy, Marx argued that whilst 
‘[u]ntil then there were only first trading towns’, the Dutch was the ‘first dominant trading 
nation’. Marx did not claim that only the Dutch succeeded in such a transition. For: 
‘Spaniards and Portuguese [also] form[ed] a transition from dominant trading towns to 
dominant trading nations’. Marx added, however: ‘Carrying trading and fisheries 
nevertheless still form[ed] a decisive constituent of Dutch supremacy’ (Marx 1847/1976a, 
575; italic in original). That is, in Marx’s reckoning, whilst the 14th-century world market 
had existed in the form that a town-scale of local markets had been rather sparsely entangled 
on an Eurasian scale, the 16th-century world market existed in a form that a nation-scale of 
home markets, albeit still not all on the whole world market, were interlinked on not only an 
Eurasian, but also Atlantic scales. From this phase, therefore, the commercial supremacy also 
began to be seized on a nation-scale, and the first nation that achieved it was the Dutch. 
Second, as regards the industrial aspect of the supremacy, Marx argued that the Dutch 
established a capitalist social formation. It is also in this context that Marx (1867/1996, 706-
707) wrote: ‘Although we come across the first beginning of capitalist production as early as 
the 14th or 15th century, sporadically, in certain towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalist 
                                               
 
18 In discussing about Dutch hegemony, Marx rather confusingly used terms such as “the Dutch”, 
“Holland”, “Netherlands”, “the United Provinces”, though he usually used the first two terms. Yet, 
when he discussed Dutch hegemony, it seems to refer to the state that was ‘since 1579 separated from 
Spain as the United Provinces’ (Marx 1861-3/1991, 401; italic added). This is, above all, because Marx 
regarded the late 16th century as the starting point of Dutch supremacy. Also, he argued that the 
Dutch seized supremacy on a nation-scale for the first time in history. Therefore, regardless of 
nomenclature, his referent seems to be the Dutch Republic. The same issue occurs for English 
hegemony. For, when he referred to the hegemony in the 18th and 19th centuries, Marx usually writes 
“England” instead of “Great Britain” or “the United Kingdom”. 
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era dates from the 16th century’. Third, as the colonialist aspect of the supremacy, whilst 
‘there were as yet no colonies’ in the world market in 14th and 15th centuries, the Dutch ‘in 
the 16th and 17th centuries was the dominant … colonial nation’ (Marx 1861-3/1991, 397).  
My interpretation that Marx regarded the Dutch republic as a capitalist social 
formation, of course, may make many readers surprising. Some of them may view the 
interpretation as absurd. They might argue that the Dutch republic at that time was no more 
than a mercantile society. Yet such an argument is, certainly, different from Marx’s view of it 
(see Marx 1867/1996, 740; 1894/1998, 331; 1961-3/1989b, 531). In Marx’s reckoning, 
basically, the rise of the 16th-century world market, followed by the discovery of America, 
transplanted the commercial centre from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coast of Western 
Europe. In the 16th-century world market, the Dutch—after its revolt with, and separation 
from, Spain—seized the trading supremacy on a nation-scale for the first time in history. This 
contributed to the flourishing of the Dutch manufacture, based on capitalist relation, that 
had emerged, albeit sporadically, in the 14th and 15th centuries. Remember here that, in the 
15th century, the capital relation in Northern Italy’s manufacture was extended to 
‘Constantinople, the Flemish and Dutch cities, a few Spanish ones like Barcelona’ (Marx 
1975, 67). Remember also that Marx (1986, 434; italic in original argued) argued: 
‘Manufacture arises where there is mass production for export, i.e., on the basis of large-scale 
maritime and overland trade, in its emporia’. That is, capitalist manufacture existed, albeit 
sporadically, in Dutch cities even before the emergence of the 16th-century world market. 
On the new world market, the Dutch seized trading supremacy. In turn, this led to the 
flourishing of the Dutch manufacture. 
In this context, Marx indicated Holland as a place ‘where capitalist production in the 
form of manufacture and the large-scale of trade first blossomed’. More specifically, 
according to Marx, ‘in its early phase capitalist production, having gained strength, seeks to 
   VS=
subordinate interest-bearing capital to industrial capital by force’ and ‘this was in fact done 
first of all in Holland’. In contrast, ‘in England in the 17th century it was, partly in very naïve 
terms, declared to be the primary requisite of capitalist production’ (Marx 1861-3/1989b, 
531). In the same context, in Das Kapital, vol. I, Marx (1867/1996, 740) pointed out Holland 
as the ‘head capitalist nation of the 17th century’. Overall, Marx did not regard Holland as 
either precapitalist or merely commercial. Indeed, he criticized this view. For instance, recall 
Marx’s remarks on Gülich who argued: ‘Holland … in 1648 in the acme of its commercial 
greatness’. As regards this, Marx commented: ‘Gülich forgets to add that by 1648, the people 
of Holland were more overworked, poorer and more brutally oppressed than those of all the 
rest of Europe put together’ (Marx 1867/1996, 740). Nevertheless, we can still argue that 
commerce had a preponderant role in the Dutch society. Yet, it does not imply that the Dutch 
in the 17th century was not a capitalist social formation. It suggests that Dutch supremacy 
was anchored on not industrial, but commercial supremacy. It means that the era belongs to 
the age of manufacturing in the history of capitalism.  
In identifying the Dutch as the first capitalist society, Marx (1847/1976a, 575; 1861-
3/1991, 397, 401) specifically discussed its several features. For example, he argued that Dutch 
Protestantism contributed to the emergence of the capitalist social formation.19  Also, in 
                                               
 
19 In discussing Protestantism, unlike Weber, Marx did not distinguish Lutheranism and Calvinism. 
Instead, he employed terms such as ‘Protestantism’, ‘Dutch Protestantism’, ‘English Puritanism’, and 
‘American Puritans’. For him, Dutch Protestantism contributed to the emergence and operation of a 
capitalist society on three grounds. First, it justified usury, thereby enabling interest-bearing capital 
to be invested in capitalist production. In this context, he described Holland as ‘the first apologia for 
usury’. Second, ‘by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays’, it played ‘an important 
part in the genesis of capital’ (Marx 1867/1996, 218). Third, Marx (1857-8/1986, 164) connected 
‘English Puritanism and Dutch Protestantism’ with ‘the cult of money, … its asceticism, its 
renunciation, its self-sacrifice—thrift and frugality, contempt for the worldly, temporary and 
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mentioning Dutch “wool” manufacturing, Marx also noted that the Dutch preferred ‘cattle 
breeding within the country rather than tillage’.20 On this basis, he offered an intriguing 
comment of the relation between Holland and England. According to Marx, Dutch 
supremacy in commerce and industry brought about an economic upheaval in England in 
the 16th and early 17th centuries.  
 
For instance, in England in the 16th century, the development of Dutch industry made 
English wool production of great commercial importance, and, on the other hand, 
especially increased the need for Dutch and Italian commodities, arable land was 
converted into sheep-walks and the small-tenant system was broken up, producing that 
rather violent economic upheaval which Thomas More deplored (Marx 1857-8/1987, 
481). 
 
In other words, ‘the importation of commodities from the Netherlands gave a decisive 
significance to the surplus of wool that England had to offer in exchange’, thereby producing 
the ‘rather violent economic upheaval’ in England in the 16th and early 17th centuries. Thus, 
the surplus of wool in England at that time was to supply materials, that is, wool to Dutch 
wool manufacturing. In return, this corresponded to increasing English demands for Dutch 
                                               
 
transient pleasures; the pursuit of eternal treasure’ (see also Marx 1857-8/1987, 364). In this context, 
Marx (1861-3/1991, 403) regarded Protestantism as one of ‘the intellectual prerequisites’ of a capitalist 
society. 
20 In this context, Marx argued: ‘Holland as the first trading and industrial nation, from the end of the 
16th to the middle of the 17th century, is also the first nation for whom its domestic agriculture is 
insufficient and where the population is growing in far too great a proportion to domestic agriculture. 
Therefore carries on the first large-scale trade in grain. Amsterdam becomes the chief granary of 
Western Europe’ (Marx 1976a, 575; italic in original). 
   VU=
products. In the course, the enclosure occurred, producing landless workers in England. 
Marx called this as ‘the civilising effect of foreign trade’ (1857-8/1986, 187; italic in original). 
Of course, Marx did not regard Dutch capitalism as matured. Instead, he described the phase 
of Dutch supremacy in the history of capitalism as ‘infancy’ (Marx 1861-3/1994, 327). In the 
infant phase of capitalism, the Dutch lost its total supremacy by losing its commercial 
supremacy following the wars with Britain. Thus, Britain came to seize total supremacy by 
taking commercial supremacy from the Dutch. Then, the Industrial Revolution occurred 
there. Thereby, Britain acquired a new kind of supremacy on a world market. That is, British 
supremacy since the 18th century was fundamentally anchored not on its commercial, but 
on its industrial, supremacy. This led to the creation of the 19th-century world market in 
which, Marx (1858/1983, 346) wrote: ‘bourgeois society has for the second time experienced 
its 16th century’. 
 
4.5 The Commonalities of the Geo-Historical Supremacy on the Geo-Historical 
World Markets 
 
Marx (sometimes, together with, Engels) also dealt with their commonalities. The first 
emerges from their discussion about the system of public credit. That is, according to Marx 
and Engels, an ‘idea that only the state becomes richer when individuals become richer on 
the basis of bourgeois property, or that up to now all private property has been state property, 
is an idea that again puts historical relations upside-down’. This is because: ‘with the 
development and accumulation of bourgeois property, i.e., with the development of 
commerce and industry, individuals grew richer and richer while the state fell even more 
deeply into debt’. Then, they added: ‘This phenomenon was evident already in the first Italian 
commercial republics; later … in Holland, and now it is again occurring in England’. In this 
regard, they concluded:  
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It is therefore obvious that as soon as the bourgeoisie has accumulated money, the state 
has to beg from the bourgeoisie and in the end it is actually bought up by the latter. 
This takes place in a period in which the bourgeoisie is still confronted by another class, 
and consequently the state can retain some appearance of independence in relation to 
both of them (Marx and Engels 1847/1975, 361). 
 
Second, according to Marx, as all three states were losing their supremacy, they began 
to invest their money, particularly in their rivals. For instance: 
 
Thus the villainies of the Venetian thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the 
capital wealth of Holland to whom Venice in her decadence lent large sums of money. 
So also was it with Holland and England … Holland had ceased to be the nation 
preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business, therefore, 
from 1701-1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its 
great rival England. The same thing is going on today between England and the United 
States. A great deal of capital which appears today in the United States without any 
certificate of birth, was yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children (Marx 
1867/1996, 743-4).  
 
Even in the early 1850s, Marx gave an identical argument.  
 
In the competitive struggle between America and England we see the latter pushed 
increasingly into the position of Venice, Genoa and Holland, which were all forced to 
lend their capital on interest after the monopoly of their trading power had been  
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Table 4.1 A Comparison among Italian, Dutch and English Supremacy 
Italian supremacy Dutch supremacy English supremacy 
• From the 14th to 15th 
centuries 
• Based on the 14th-century 
world market as the sparse 
interlinkage, on a Eurasian 
scale, of a town-scale of 
local markets 
• The Mediterranean as the 
centre of a commercial 
activity 
• Capital and the CMP in a 
form of manufacture 
emerged; thus, the 
embryonal phase of 
capitalism 
• The total supremacy, 
anchored on commercial 
supremacy; thus, relatively 
easy to break 
• The first supremacy on a 
world market, albeit on a 
town-scale 
• No colonies 
• The origin of a credit 
system; invested in, 
particularly, its rival, 













• From the end of the 16th, to 
the middle of the 17th, 
centuries  
• Based on the 16th-century 
world market as the 
interlinkage, on not only a 
Eurasian, but also Atlantic 
scale, of a nation-scale of 
home markets  
• The Atlantic coast of 
Europe as the centre of a 
commercial activity 
• Capitalism in a form of 
manufacture emerged; thus, 
the infant phase of 
capitalism 
• The total supremacy, 
anchored on commercial 
supremacy; thus, relatively 
easy to break 
• The first supremacy on a 
nation-scale 
• The epoch of “colonialism” 
• The place in which a credit 
system first took root; 
invested, particularly, in its 
rival, England, with the 
decline of the supremacy 
• The first nation that 
experienced a far greater 
rise in population than that 
in agricultural products 







• Its first phase from the 
middle of the 17th century; 
also, its second phase from 
the last third of the 18th 
century  
• Initially arose from, 
basically, the 16th-century 
world market; later, 
produced the 19th-century 
world market as the 
interlinkage, on a global 
scale, of home markets 
• The Atlantic coast of 
Europe as the centre of a 
commercial activity 
• In its second phase, 
capitalism in a form of 
machinofacture; thus, the 
mature phase of capitalism 
• In its second phase, the first 
total supremacy, anchored 
on industrial supremacy; 
thus, relatively tricky to 
break 
• The epoch of “colonialism” 
which was later called as 
“imperialism” 
• In its second phase, a large-
scale of financial investment 
in industry in not merely 
America, but also other 
continents 
• Achieved a historically 
incomparable scale of trade 
in the first phase 
• Even unlimited usury 
recognised as a condition 
for capitalist development 
• Puritanism 
Commonalities 
• As bourgeois were richer, the states were poorer because of a rise in national debts. 
• As the supremacy declined, they invested in their rivals, especially the rising power. 
 
Source: My own 
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broken. Genoa and Venice helped Holland to emerge, Holland provided England with 
capital, and now England is obliged to do the same for the United States of America. 
Only today all the conditions in this process are of a much larger scale than they were 
at that time (Marx 1853/1979, 628). 
 
Marx added, however, that: ‘England’s position differs from that of those countries in 
that the main factor for them was a monopoly of trade, which is easy to break, whilst she 
possesses a monopoly of industry as well, which by its very nature is tougher’ (for more details 
on a comparison among the three hegemonies, see table 4.1) 
 
4.6 Periodising the imperialist system in variegated capitalism 
 
Thus far, I have offered a new interpretation on Marx’s approach to supremacy on a world 
market, which has many implications for Weberian and Braudelian criticisms of Marx. For, 
without ignoring the capital relation and the division of labour, Marx also considered points 
that only Weber and Braudel of the three are supposed to have highlighted and that provided 
the grounds for their polemics against Marx. Examples are the contribution of a specific 
religion to the genesis of capital, a hegemonic transition from a long-run perspective and the 
emergence of finance-led accumulation following the decline of hegemony. To elaborate 
these points would take me far beyond this thesis.  
Instead, based on my previous analysis of the commonalities and dissimilarities of the 
three bodies of supremacy, I offer a periodisation of an imperialist system in variegated 
capitalism. As shown in Table 4.2, I divide it into four phases. That is, based on a broad 
consensus about 20th century history, I added the fourth phase, when the US has seized the 
supremacy, to the three phases of Italian, Dutch and English supremacy. Recall, however, 
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that the first phase does not belong to a capitalist era, though capitalist production had 
already appeared alongside commerce. I thus designate it as an “embryonic” phase. Note also 
that the fourth phase does not imply the mortality of capitalism in a foreseeable future. On 
the other hand, Table 4.2 rather concretely illustrates the features of each phase. Note, 
however, that they are basically relevant to the geo-historical heartlands where supremacy 
and metropoles were located on the geo- historical world markets. Remember also that an 
imperialist system can be simply reduced to neither a hegemonic state, a horizontal rivalry 
between metropoles, nor a vertical dominance in the hierarchical system. Thus, the features, 
outlined in Table 4.1, should be further complemented. Considering, this and, that many of 
the features in the table have been already discussed, I add a few remarks on the contents of 
the table, particularly on some of the issues about which I have not mentioned above. 
First, Table 4.2 indicates that geo-historical heartlands on the geo-historical world 
markets commonly experienced the rise of “liberal” economic thoughts. As regards this 
interpretation, three points needs to be clarified, because it may have readers confused. 
 
1. As regards the expression of scholastic liberalism, one might ask: In what respect can 
scholastic economic thoughts be regarded as liberal? They were certainly not liberal in 
a contemporary sense. Yet, in using this expression, I want to highlight that, since the 
13th century, scholastic scholars started conceding possible exceptions to the 
longstanding Aristotelian, and earlier Medieval Church’s, tenets regarding the sterility 
of money. For instance, Thomas Aquinas denied the possibility of usury theoretically; 
yet, practically, he conceded it with a few exceptions (Le Goff 1988/1990, 65 ff). This is, 
needless to say, an important question for the genesis of capital. For, as Marx (1861-
3/1989b, 531) noted, ‘during the transition to capitalist production, the first step is the 
recognition that “usury”, the old-fashioned form of interest-bearing capital, is a 
   NMQ=
condition of production, a necessary production relation’. Also, according to Braudel 
(1979/1983, 232): ‘Italy, the forerunner of modernity in this respect, was at the centre 
of such discussions’. On the other hand, this period corresponds to the time when the 
term “capital” started being used in an economic sense—particularly, to refer to the 
principal of a business loan. According to Braudel, it was also Italy  ‘that the word was 
first coined, made familiar and to some extent matured’.21 
2. The other might wonder at the expression of Dutch liberalism. For many have still 
regarded Adam Smith as the founder of economic liberalism. Yet, in analysing reasons 
for the economic success of the Dutch Republic, Dutch economists published books 
that advocated free trade, free competition and a republican regime even in the 17th 
century, which were highly popular in the Netherlands at the time (for more details, 
see Weststeijn 2012). That is, Dutch people witnessed the rise of economic liberalism 
before English people. Recall also that Marx argued: ‘[Holland] was the first apologia 
for usury’. Yet, the expression “the first” does not mean that there had been no interest-
bearing capital in Northern Italy. Instead, his stress on the Dutch republic as providing 
                                               
 
21 In this context, Braudelians have argued that Marx was mistaken to limit capital to production (see 
Braudel (1979/1983). In my view, however, their argument highlights not Marx’s mistake, but their 
misreading of Marx. For Marx (1867/1996, 157), too, recognised that: ‘As a matter of history, capital 
… invariable takes the form at first money; it appears as moneyed wealth, as the capital of the 
merchant and of the usurer’. Yet, here Marx added: ‘[W]e have no need to refer to the origin of capital 
in order to discover that the first form of appearance of capital is money. We can see it daily under 
our very eyes.’ Recall here that a capitalist circulation (i.e., M—C—M’) starts with money-capital. 
Remember also that Marx pointed out Northern Italy as the first place where capitalist production, 
based on a capital relation, appeared. Thus, it is not difficult to infer that, in Marx’s view, the origin 
was money-capital in Italy. Yet, as repeatedly accentuated, Marx did not regard Northern Italy’s city-
states as a capitalist society.  
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the first apologia for usury is relevant to Calvinism that Marx himself referred to as 
Dutch Protestantism. On top of this, Marx (1861-3/1989b, 169) argued: ‘[Holland] 
compels most capitalists, except the largest ones, to employ their capital in industry, 
instead of living on interest and is thus a spur to production’. In this context, Marx also 
argued: ‘it was the first nation that subordinated interest-bearing capital to commercial 
and industrial capital’.22 
3. Therefore, we need to reinterpret Adam Smith too. To my mind, what he advocated 
was neither liberalism in general nor general liberalism. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, for instance, his polemics targeted not only Hobbesian philosophy, but also 
the Anglo-Dutch political economist Bernard Mandeville’s argument that private vices 
result in a public benefit. According to Smith (1759/1984, 308), such an argument 
‘seems to take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue’ and thus to be 
‘wholly pernicious’. He therefore regarded Mandeville’s liberalism as nothing but a 
‘licentious system’. He argued not for general, but particular liberalism. He did not 
advocate all kinds of self-interests but prudent pursuit of self-interests. To me, 
therefore, what he really sought to achieve in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The 
Wealth of Nations was to embed liberalism in certain moral principles. He wanted to 
embed economic conduct in a moral liberal society. 
 
                                               
 
22 On the other hand, as regards usury in England in the 17th century, Marx (1861-3/1989b, 537) 
wrote: ‘The polemics are no longer directed against usury as such, but against the amount of interest, 
and the fact that it dominates credit. The desire to establish the form of credit. Regulations are 
imposed’. Then, he added that, in the eighteenth century, even ‘[u]nrestricted usury’ was ‘recognised 
as an element of capitalist production’. 
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Second, Table 4.2 contains an argument about the changing forms of rivalry in a world 
market, which I have never explained. It implies a new interpretation on the ages of 
“colonialism” on the 16th-century world market and “imperialism” in the 19th-century 
world market. That is, I view the two as different forms of hegemonic or inter-metropolitan 
rivalry in a variegated capitalism that unfolds with the world market as its ultimate horizon 
of development. Thus, following Marx, I do not divide the world market into precapitalist 
and capitalist eras and regard colonialism and imperialism as interchangeable terms. There 
are, of course, differences between the two ages. Whilst the colonialist rivalry in the 16th-
century world market sought for commercial advantages, the imperialist rivalry in the 19th-
century world market aimed for industrial catch-up or leapfrogging. This also suggests a 
reinterpretation of mercantilism. Whilst mercantilism in the 16th-century world market was 
oriented toward commercial protection, that of the 19th-century world market sought 
industrial protection. As repeatedly accentuated, this orientation toward commercial 
protection in the 16th-century world market does not mean that the era was precapitalist. 
For, in the market, commercial supremacy implies industrial supremacy in capitalist 
manufacturing. 
In addition, we can understand “absolutist states” in a new manner. The usual view 
that are exceptional states in a transition to a capitalist era may seem reasonable – but only 
when we adopt, consciously or unconsciously, a comparativist perspective, based on 
methodological nationalism (or regionalism) and exclude the contemporary Dutch Republic 
from relevant cases (see, e.g., Anderson 1974). In other words, this interpretation only seems 
appropriate when we analyse England and France in this period in methodologically 
nationalist terms. In contrast, as illustrated above, Marx’s view of the birth of capital, the 
CMP and a bourgeois society was spatially multi-dimensional. Above all, Marx explored the 
world market not as universal market but as the concrete and complex network of home and 
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foreign markets. In particular, he thought that the network of the 14th-century world market 
was formed on a Eurasian scale. He also argued that its nodal points in Western Europe 
existed on a town-scale. In contrast, the 16th-century world market expanded abruptly when 
the Americas were discovered. Also, the European nodal points in the market began to 
acquire a national scale. In the course, the central place of an economic activity, too, was 
transplanted from the Mediterranean to the Western Europe. Along the way, important 
territorial changes occurred, particularly the separation of the Dutch Republic from Spain, 
which had an important effect on variegated capitalism in the 16th-century world market.23 
In brief, Marx’s account of the birth of the CMP is not just historical, but geo-historical. 
Specifically, as I illustrated, his account of historical world markets contains historical 
changes in territory, place, scale and network. In addition, he thought that, in the course, 
exchange on a world market and the division of labour have been dialectically efficacious. In 
contrast, even Marxist historians have been trapped in methodological nationalism (or 
regionalism) and comparativism. For this reason, they have debated only over whether the 
motive power for a transition to capitalism lay in economic base or political superstructure 
(or class struggle) in England or Europe, or over whether the power lay in exchange or 
production (see, e.g., Anderson 1974; Brenner 1976, 1977, 1982; Dodd 1946; Sweezy and 
Dodd 1950; Wood 1999/2002). By doing so, indeed, they have provided clues for Weberian 
and Braudelian polemics against Marx.  
In brief, many absolutist states in Europe were already absorbed into the variegated 
capitalist order in the 16th-century world market, where people in its heartland witnessed the 
rise of republicanism earlier than elsewhere. Thus, the age of the absolutist states should 
belong to a capitalist era. This co-evolution of different political regimes within a variegated 
                                               
 
23 Needless to say, my geo-historical reading of Marx’s historical account is based on the SRA (for the 
SRA to spatial multi-dimensionalism, Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008).  
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capitalist order is not unusual. For, even in the 20th century, it is never difficult to find out 
examples that capitalist development or neoliberalisation was accomplished under an 
authoritarian or even totalitarian regime. The PCHM is one of the examples in a variegated 
capitalist order on the 20th-century world market where its heartland already witnessed 
liberal-bourgeois democracy. Needless to say, it holds for the 21st century. China can be 
viewed as its typical example. Note here that Marx (1857-8/1986, 436) argued: ‘the plantation 
owners in America … are capitalists’. Specifically, Marx regarded ‘their existence as 
anomalies within a world market based on free labour’ (see also Marx 1861-3/1989a, 516; 
1894/1998, 790). That is, the co-evolution of heterogeneous regimes or relations holds for 
not only political, but also economic fields. And this tells us that capitalism has been 
variegated from the outset. This further means that the history of variegated capitalism, 
including colonialist and imperialist wars that occurred in each phase, should be re-
discovered and re-interpreted from a geo-historical perspective, and in line with Marx’s 
insights into the supremacy on a world market.  
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, I tried to achieve two aims. The first is to draw a conceptual map that presents 
an imperialist system as a formation (i.e., an ensemble of forms) that is inscribed by 
imperialist practices and relations. In particular, I argued that the supranational scale of a 
social formation can be understood neither in terms of horizontal (i.e., hegemonic or inter-
metropolitan) rivalry nor as vertical dominance/resistance. Needless to say, this approach 
corresponds to the critical realist and strategic-relational rubrics. The second objective is to 
draw Marx’s insights into such a supranational relation from his critique of political 
economy. If an observation is theory-laden, a reading would be the case. Indeed, my re-
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reading of Marx is inspired by Marx’s “differentially analytical and integrally synthetic” 
method for inquiry and the strategic-relational approach, particularly its advocate for spatial 
multi-dimensionalism. Based on this reading, I clarified Marx’s approach to supremacy on a 
market and the history of the CMP. It shows that Marx adopted a geo-historically concrete 
and relationalist approach to those issues. This implies that his approach and account can be 
nested in a VarCap-CPE. To develop a theory of an imperialist system in variegated 
capitalism, much more work is required.  
Yet, this thesis is concerned with the PCHM. Thus, I return to the PCHM. To 
investigate it historically, at first, I focus on East Asia in the 19th-century world market. This 
is because the effects of East Asian particularities in the variegated imperialist order of the 
world market on South Korea in the Cold War era. Here I highlight the peculiarities of 
Imperial Japan. In the 19th-century world market, Japan became the first Asian metropolitan 
state in a capitalist world market. Furthermore, because Japan is located in the third world, 
unlike the relations of Western metropolitan states to this region, it colonised its 
neighbours.24 For this reason, (post-)colonial and imperialist relations in East Asia cannot 
not be captured by the dichotomies such as ‘Global South versus Global North’ or ‘East versus 
West’. For several East Asian countries were colonised by an “East” Asian state in the Global 
“North”. In this context, I shall deal with Imperial Japan—particularly, the emergence of 
fascist strategies in the 1920s and of fascist coups in the 1930s that led to the Asian-Pacific 
War (1931-45). For they are the post-colonial legacy in South Korea. 
 
                                               
 
24 But note that Eastern Europe was colonized by West European powers (e.g., Napoleonic France, 
Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire); the USA invaded Mexico and incorporated half of it into the 
Continental USA, later invading other Latin American neighbours with a view to securing their 
subordination to its imperial reach. 
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Excursus: Extant Discourses on Imperialism and Its Cognate Terms 
 
It is challenging to outline discourses on imperialism systematically because of the 
entanglement of the concept of imperialism with other concepts such as imperium, 
colonialism, empire, world-systems, international dependency, post-colonialism, 
international hegemony, and so forth. Likewise, not all the theories and discourses on 
imperialism have emerged out of the same conjuncture. In addition, their theoretical and 
ideological foundations greatly vary. Accordingly, my review starts by categorising extant 
discourses rather complicatedly, as seen in the table 4.3. 
In the first place, five groups of classical discourses on colonialism and imperialism 
emerged. The first is racist colonialism. Upheld by conservatives and liberals alike, this 
position starts with the civilised-barbaric-savage trichotomy and, on this basis, justifies 
internationally disparate treatment among the trifurcated regions. We can distinguish two 
sub-positions here: (1) reckless racist colonialism (RRC), and; (2) paternal racist colonialism 
(PRC). The RRC overtly expresses a relentless greed for the territorial expansion and 
economic prosperity of the privileged nations (e.g., Cecil Rhodes). The PRC advocates only 
a particular type of colonialism by decorating it with a humanitarian vocation or a paternal 
discipline for the enlightenment of non-civilised nations. Specifically, according to this logic, 
even colonialism can be a humanitarian intervention in, or a moral commitment to, non-
civilised peoples, if it gives them liberty or guides them to civilisation (Mill 1859/1984). In 
this way, the PRC romanticises colonialism as the ‘white man’s burden’ (Kipling 1899) or the 
‘strenuous life’ (Roosevelt 1899/1999) for not themselves, but others. The other four groups 
are anti-imperialist discourses, all of which rely on distinctive political-economic theories of 
capitalism, though not all the discourses acknowledge a special nexus between capitalism and 
imperialism (e.g., Schumpeter denies such a relation; see table 4.4). Also, they often highlight  
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Table 4.3 Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and Marxist Discourses on Imperialism 
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the relations between imperialism and a particular social class in a metropolitan society rather 
than inter-civilisational relations. Table 4.4 summarizes and compares their distinctive 
features. 
In the second phase, as conjunctures became more complex, the discoursal topography 
of this phase became more differentiated. Nonetheless, we can discern a distinctive tendency 
here, namely, the withering or disappearance of classical imperialist discourses and 
emergence of new discourses. First, as the colonialist era ended, racist colonialism largely  
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Table 4.4 Hobson, Schumpeter, Veblen, and Lenin on Imperialism 
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disappeared from official discourse. Yet, strictly speaking, the RRC disappeared and the PRC 
remained in disguise and has been re-articulated with other justification for imperialist 
interventions. Recall, for example, that the civilised-barbarism-savagery trichotomy of the 
colonialist era was almost entirely translated into a new trichotomy in the developmentalist 
era, that is, the division of the world into developed, developing, and underdeveloped 
nations. Recall also that developed political-economic systems and life styles were depicted 
as goals that newly decolonised (i.e., developing or underdeveloped) nations should catch up 
with as fast as possible. Indeed, in this situation, developed nations, particularly the US, 
intervened in the development of the “third world”. Eurocentric and liberalist literature on 
development also argued by implication that colonial rule helped to prepare the 
preconditions for the modernisation of the third world—‘modernisation’ as a substituting 
term for civilisation. Thus, the PRC did not become extinct but was concealed. Although, 
because developmentalism is not a theory of imperialism, I omit it from figure 4.1, the PRC 
permeated developmentalist literature. The emergence of “third worldism” in this phase is 
relevant to this version of the PRC that lurked in the liberal developmentalism. 
Second, the upheaval of mainstream international relations (IR) and international 
political economy (IPE) due to the behavioural revolution and scientific realism in political 
science also influenced the collapse of classical discourses. For example, (1) Morgenthau’s 
(1948) state-centred realist theory of imperialism, (2) Waltz’s (1959, 1979) neorealist or 
structural-realist theory of war, and (3) (neo)realist and/or (neo-)liberalist advocacy of, and 
criticism of, the beneficial role of a hegemon in stabilising international commercial and 
financial arrangements (Gilpin 1975, Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Keohane 1984) were, 
overall, attempts to substitute mainstream IR and IPE theories for classical discourses. Thus, 
in this phase, not only Marxist theories, but other classical discourses too, became less and 
less influential (cf. Callinicos 2009; for an exception to the retreat from a Marx-Leninist 
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theory of imperialism, see Poulantzas 1975). Third, it is also noteworthy that many 
ideological (as opposed to scientific) attempts to define bipolar superpowers (i.e., the US and 
the USSR) as contrasting empires emerged (e.g., ‘empire by invitation’ versus ‘empire by 
force’ and ‘benign imperium’ versus ‘malign imperium’; see Lundestad 1986; Brzezinski 
1986). Doyle’s (1986) liberal and transhistorical theorisation of an empire, which criticises 
not only classical discourses, but also Waltzian neorealism, too, is not irrelevant to this trend. 
Lastly, varieties of radical or critical discourse are one of the distinguishing features of this 
phase. The examples of this group include: (1) dependency theory and the modern world-
system theory in comparative and regional studies; (2) the neo-Gramscian approach in IR 
and IPE, and; (3) post-colonialism and cultural imperialism in literary studies (e.g., Cardoso 
and Faletto 1979; Prebisch 1950; Wallerstein 1974; Cox 1981, 1987; Said 1978). 
Lastly, in the third phase, the discoursal topography has become even more uneven. 
On the one hand, all groups of discourse in the second phase, except for dependency theory 
and the demonisation of the Soviet Union, have remained and even been further elaborated 
in the third phase. On the other, classical discourses have been revitalised. Needless to say, 
this discoursal complexity reflects the conjunctural complexity of this phase. Firstly, this 
phase started with declarations of the end of the Cold War and the opening of a new world 
order in which the US remained as the unipolar superpower. Subsequently, on the one hand, 
US-led neoliberal globalisation was accelerated; on the other, the end of history and the end 
of nation-states were in turn declared in some academic circles (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; 
Ohmae 1995). In opposition to such optimistic hyper-globalisation theses, some expected 
the emergence of new kinds of inter-metropolitan and inter-civilisational cleavages (e.g., 
‘capitalism against capitalism’ and the ‘clash of civilisation’; see Albert 1992; Huntington 
1996). Then, 9.11 irrupted unexpectedly from clear blue skies and the global war on terrorism 
followed. During this period and afterwards, China surged economically, politically, and, to 
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some extent, militarily to become the second superpower and, in addition, the economic 
crises, which proceeded from, particularly, neoliberalism and financialization affected Latin 
America, East Asia, Russia, the North Atlantic regions, and so forth. In their different ways 
all of these have cumulatively shaped a new discoursal topography of imperialism and its 
associated topics. This has led to an explosive resurgence of interest in these topics. 
In this situation, much attention, rightist and leftist alike, is paid to the American 
empire or its neo-imperialism. Also, in addressing it, the PRC has patently reappeared 
through neocons’ outspoken eulogy for the British empire and/or hymn to the American 
empire (Boot 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Ferguson 2002, 2004). Political realism, which had 
rather defensively spoken for the US hegemony in the second phase, evolved into a more 
offensive form—in a nutshell, even a preventive war can be one of the rational choices of the 
great power, and a hegemonic war is one of the unavoidable destinies of a hegemon 
(Mearsheimer 2001). Some liberals take an ambivalent position, which Hobsbawm (2003) 
called ‘an imperialism of human rights’ in order to identify ‘those who hate the ideology 
behind the Pentagon, but support the US project on the grounds that it will eliminate some 
local and regional injustices’ (e.g., Mallaby 2002; Ignatieff 2003a, 2003b; see also Ferguson 
2004, 5). On the other hand, not only liberal IR theorists and sociologists (Johnson 2000, 
2004, Nye 1990, 2003, 2004, Mann 2003), but even a few conservative IR theorists (e.g., 
Bacevich 2002) deplore the American militarism, unilateralism, and moral exceptionalism of 
the reigning militarist neocons, and further foresee the downfall of the hubristic and 
imperious empire.  
In this phase, critical, radical, and Marxist discourses are becoming complicated. 
Representative examples include: (1) basically Braudelian, world-systemic analyses of 
hegemonies, economic crises, hegemonic transitions, the decline of the American power, and 
the upsurge of China (Arrighi 1994, 2009; Wallerstein 2006); (2) a radical hyper-globalisation 
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thesis, or an autonomist, optimistic and prophetic diagnosis of a borderless and centre-less 
empire (Hardt and Negri 2000); (3) Marxian economic analyses of the relation between a 
tendential fall in a profit rate in metropolitan states and the advent of this new phase of 
capitalism (Brenner 2006; Duménil and Lévy 2004); (4) Marxist analyses of the American 
empire, and/or neo-imperialism (Bello 2005; Callinicos 2009; Gowan 1999; Harvey 2003, 
2009; Panitch and Gindin 2012; Wood 2003), and (5) a Veblenian critique of classical 
Marxism on financialization and imperialism (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). Of course, although 
this trend shows the revival of Marxist theory, it involves more than mere recitation of 
classical theories. For example, Arrighi attempted to synthesise Braudel, Marx, and even 
Adam Smith. Harvey is trying to articulate his historical-geographical materialism with 
Arrighi’s distinctive take on world systems theory. Callinicos, surprisingly, seeks to reconcile 
classical Marxist theories and Waltzian neorealism. My efforts to put (post-)colonialism and 
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5. East Asia in the Variegated Imperialist Order of the 19th-
Century World Market: Imperial Japan, Korea and 
Manchukuo 
 
Based on the theoretical considerations in Part I, here I start my investigation of the PCHM. 
First, however, I outline its historical background. Let me recall that my investigation 
highlights social relations on a supranational scale. Here my work gives key clues to 
understanding the social relations relevant to the PCHM. Specifically, it addresses five issues. 
First, I explain East Asian particularities in an imperialist system within the variegated 
capitalist order of the 19th-century world market, focusing on the distinguishing features of 
Imperial Japan. Second, in the light of the latter’s exceptional features, I also elucidate early 
industrialisation in the Korean peninsular under Japanese rule. Notably, I refer to Korea’s 
social formation in the period as colonial capitalism, and then reveal its distinctive features. 
Third, I refute claims that the experience of colonial capitalism directly contributed to South 
Korea’s re-industrialisation since the 1960s without, however, denying that the legacy of 
Imperial Japan had an important role in this process. Instead, I argue that the legacy should 
be found in the post-colonial, that is, cultural aspects of Imperial Japan. Fourth, to identify 
these aspects, I examine Meiji Ishin (1868-1912), Taishō democracy (1912-26) and the rise 
of fascist militarism in the earlier phases of the Shōwa era (1926-45).25 In doing so, I highlight 
the two strategic coups of two fascist fractions in the Army of Imperial Japan—that is, the 
building of Manchukuo in 1932, and Shōwa Ishin in 1936. Lastly, I illustrate how the fascist 
                                               
 
25 The Shōwa period ended in 1989. We can divide it into two phases: first, one before the end of the 
Second World War, and; second, the other after the end of the war. Also, we can divide phase one 
into two sub-phases: first, one before the rise of fascist militarism in the 1930s, and; second, another 
from 1931 when the Manchu Incident occurred until 1945 when Imperial Japan itself collapsed. Here 
I deal with the first phase of the Shōwa period. 
   NNV=
militarism of Imperial Japan influenced Park Chung Hee’s fraction in South Korea and Kim 
Il-Sung’s fraction in North Korea. In this context, I also show that their regimes had 
intriguing commonalities. A final point is that my investigation is not only historical, but 
further geographically sensitive. Accordingly, my narrative of the history here does not follow 
‘the normal flow of the linear text’ (Soja 1989, 1). Instead, in order to ‘spatialize the historical 
narrative’, I several times inserts ‘“lateral” connections’ into the flow of historical time (ibid). 
That is, my narrative of the history contains spatial shifts from one place, territory or scale to 
another. 
 
5.1 The Particularities of Imperialist Relations in East Asia 
 
Nowadays, imperialist relations or their legacies are usually discussed in terms of two 
dichotomies: “The Global South versus The Global North” and “The East versus The West”. 
Yet, imperialist relations in East Asia cannot be grasped through such dualisms. This is 
because, on the one hand, although East Asia belongs to the Third World, it is located in the 
northern hemisphere; and, on the other, and more importantly, it is because several countries 
in East Asia were Japan’s colonies. In East Asia, therefore, the legacies of Western imperialist 
forces and Imperial Japan have been complicatedly entangled. These complexities originated, 
of course, from East Asian regional particularities in an imperialist system within the 
variegated capitalism of the 19th-century world market. As Marx (1858/1983, 347) observed, 
the 19th-century world market absorbed not only California and Australia, but also China 
and Japan into its inside. By doing so, ‘bourgeois society … for the second time experienced 
its 16th century’ (ibid). On the other hand, although Marx did not observe it, the world 
market also witnessed the belated emergence of a non-Western metropole in East Asia for 
the first time in the history of capitalism. Specifically, in 1895, Japan transformed itself into 
   NOM=
an imperialist force by colonising Taiwan as the result of its victory in the First Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-5). Since then, Japan continuously expanded its territories by way of colonisation 
and the building of puppet states in East Asia until 1945 (see Map 1). Thus the contemporary 
history of China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and so forth is entangled in 
complicated ways, varying by case, with Imperial Japan. This is why we need to take into 
consideration Imperial Japan and its effects on other countries in East Asia. In short, when 
exploring East Asian capitalism and even socialism historically, the complex relations among 
the Western imperialist forces, Imperial Japan and their victims should be considered. This 
is also why modern world-system theory, dependency theory and post-colonial studies 
cannot be applied without further reflection to East Asia (for more details on these theories, 
see the excursus in Chapter 4). 
 
Map 5.1. The Japanese Empire’s Evolution (1914, 1936, 1942) 
 
Source: Fleisher (1945, 88) 
 
Therefore, let me identify the basic features of Imperial Japan that distinguished it from 
Western imperialist powers. To begin with, Japan was, initially, nothing but one of the Asian 
victims of Western imperialist forces in the 19th-century world market (for an overview 
about Japan’s strife with the ‘black ships’ of Commodore Matthew Perry from the US, the 
reluctant opening of its harbours and the unfair treaties that it was forced to sign by Western 
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states, see Nish 2009, xi-xiii; Jansen 2002, 274, 312-7). The primary concern of state managers 
in Japan in the late 19th century was thus to restore Japan’s national sovereignty which was 
seriously impaired because of its military inferiority to Western imperialist powers (Barnhart 
1987, 17). This led Japan to rush eagerly toward embracing Western civilisation and sciences. 
Thereby Japan was able to become the first Asian country that achieved a Western type of 
modernisation. For example, regarding the military aspects of Western imperialist powers, 
Japan learnt from the British Royal Navy and the French Army in the 1860s. Following the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1, however, when Prussia defeated France, Japan started taking 
models for its constitutions, political regime and Army from Germany. Based on this 
innovation, Japan opened the harbours of Chosen (i.e., the feudal kingdom in the Korean 
peninsular from 1392 to 1897) militarily in the same way that the US squadron had employed 
to open Japan’s harbours. This led to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) in the Korea 
peninsular. By winning the war, Japan took not only reparations and compensations for war 
losses, but also Taiwan from China. This enabled the expansion of Imperial Japan’s armed 
forces. Based on the military expansion, Japan went on to win the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
5) too. Consequently, in 1905, Japan obtained an opportunity to build a railway in 
Manchuria. It also colonised Korea in 1910 (on Japan’s military history, see Edgerton 1997). 
Basically, in this context, Imperial Japan was distinctive compared to Western 
imperialist states. In the 19th-century world market, the latter sought to find their colonies 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which were later categorised as the third world. Yet, Japan 
geographically belongs to the Third World. For this reason, as an East Asian metropole, 
which emerged rather belatedly in comparison with Western metropoles, it colonised its 
neighbouring countries (Cumings 1998, 218). In particular, Japan is an island country 
located at the eastern end of Far East Asia. Accordingly, it sought to advance into the East 
Asian continent, particularly the Chinese mainland, and, in this context, regarded the Korean 
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peninsular, which is located between China and Japan, as a strategic bridge for its continental 
expansion. This is why the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War occurred 
in, or in the seas around, the Korean peninsular. For the same reason, Japan did not merely 
take Korea as an agricultural supplier, it also used it rule to rapidly industrialise Korea. In 
particular, it linked Korea’s agriculture, industry and infrastructure to both the Japanese 
archipelago and Manchuria. Further, as noted, Japan viewed itself as one of the victims of the 
Western imperialist forces and declared that its empire would protect its East Asian 
neighbours from the threats of Western imperialist forces. All these features were peculiar to 
Imperial Japan. Below, I shall elaborate not only on the creation and mutation of the empire, 
but also on its puppet state (i.e., Manchukuo). Before that, however, let me discuss more on 
the early industrialisation in the Korean peninsular and its effects on the South Korea’s 
industrialisation since the 1960s. 
 
5.2 The Specificities of the Early Industrialisation in the Korean Peninsular 
 
As mentioned, Japan was opened to foreign influence by the squadron from the US in 1853-
4. After the incident, the island country learnt from the UK how to build a modern navy. In 
this context, by using the same military offensive that it had suffered at US hands and, 
specifically, employing a warship manufactured in the UK, Japan opened Korea’s harbours 
in 1875-6. Korea was then forced to sign several treaties, which were unfair, not only with 
Japan, but also with the US, France, Germany, and other powers. Thereby Korea, too, came 
to be forcibly woven into the 19th-century world market even before its annexation into 
Imperial Japan. Moreover, after the opening of its harbours and its annexation, Korea was 
rapidly industrialised. That is, whilst states in the economic heartland of a world market were 
transformed into a capitalist society by obtaining colonies, Korea achieved this by becoming 
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a colony. To fill in deficiencies in agricultural products, followed by the rapid 
industrialisation in the Japanese archipelago, the Japanese General Government of Korea and 
Japanese landlords were, of course, zealous in raising agricultural productivity in the Korean 
peninsular and importing agricultural products into Japan. In turn, Korea should import 
crops from Manchuria to fill gaps in its agricultural output. In addition, for Japanese 
capitalists, Korea was a new investment destination. Thus, they built industrial facilities (see 
pictures 1 and 2) in their adjacent country to gain a comparative advantage in a competition 
with, or to supply components to, companies in the Japanese archipelago. In this context, the 
Japanese General Government of Korea started infrastructure construction for all of them. 
Of course, it was also to make links from the island country, through the peninsular, toward 
the continent. The capital relation in the Korean peninsular thus largely consisted of Japanese 
capitalists and Korean workers (for the exceptional emergence of Korean capitalists, see 
Eckert 1991). This not only introduced the inherent contradictions and antagonisms of 
capitalism that Marx identified but also generated latent national hostilities. This geo-
historical specificity was the seedbed from which nationalist and, further, even jingoist 
socialism emerged in the Korean peninsular.  
The social formation of Korea in the early 20th century can be thus viewed as colonial 
capitalism. Marx (1857-8/1986, 436) argued that even plantation owners in a colony can be 
regarded as capitalists, insofar as their products were circulated in a capitalist world market 
that, in its economic heartland(s) is based on free labour. If so, Japanese landlords in the 
Korean peninsular, too, functioned as capitalists, because they circulated Korean crops into 
Japan. Yet, these Japanese capitalists were neither landlords, nor plantation owners. They 
were industrial capitalists, and accordingly, Korean workers employed by them were 
industrial workers. They were, of course, overworked and exploited even more than Japanese 
workers. Yet, they were, certainly, formally free labourers, because the feudal social system of  
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Picture 5.1 Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company 
 
Source: The Bukyung Modern Historical Materials Research Institute 
 
 
Picture 5.2 A Panorama of the Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company 
 
Source: The Busan Museum 
   NOR=
Korea was already dismantled in a process that Chosen (i.e., the feudal kingdom in the 
Korean peninsular) collapsed since the opening of its harbours. That is, many Koreans during 
the colonial era could manage their lives, only when they sold their labour power to 
capitalists, regardless of whether the capitalists were Japanese or Korean. Also, while Koreans 
could run businesses in the peninsular, provided that they cooperated with Japanese rule, and 
some Korean capitalists even invested in industrial facilities in Manchuria, the dominant 
capitalists during the era were Japanese. 
 
Picture 5.3 A Panorama of Heungnam Industrial Area 
 
Source: Chugan’gyŏnghyang (11 July 2017) 
 
Picture 5.1 and Picture 5.2 show a facet of the early industrialisation in the Korean 
peninsular. Chosen Spinning and Weaving Company, which was established by Japanese 
capital in 1917, built a spinning and weaving factory in Pusan (i.e., currently, the second 
biggest city in South Korea). It was the first and biggest textile factory in the history of Korea. 
The female workers were Koreans. The factory includes 54 buildings, including a hospital and 
a dormitory for workers. Picture 5.3, which shows the landscape of an industrial region in 
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Hungnam (a city in the northeastern coast of the peninsular) in 1930s, also indicates the 
strategic industrialisation in the Korean peninsular. Japan created several sizeable industrial 
estates in the eastern coastal cities of what is currently North Korea. This occurred first 
because those coastal cities were easily linked to the Japanese archipelago; and, second, 
because Japan wanted to produce items there necessary for its advance into the Chinese 
mainland from the Korean peninsular. This also enabled even Korean capitalists to invest in 
Manchuria in the 1930s. For, as indicated, Imperial Japan’s territorial expansion was 
accompanied by its industrial expansion and Korea also became an industrialised capitalist 
society even in the early 20th century. Yet, in the light of Weber’s (1920/1978, 164-6; 1981, 
207-9) typology of capitalism, it was not purely rational capitalism, because it was for the 
interests of Imperial Japan. Nor was it entirely political capitalism, however. In the Korean 
peninsular during the era, the capitalist businesses into which largely Japanese merchant 
capital and interest-bearing capital were investing employed formally free labourers.26 This 
suggests that Imperial Japan’s colony differed from Western Europe’s colonies that Marx or 
Weber were able to examine. 
 
5.3 The Contribution of Imperial Japan to South Korea’s industrialisation since 
the 1960s 
 
                                               
 
26 Let me recall here that I periodised the era of Imperial Japan into “Meiji”, “Taishō” and “Shōwa” 
periods. Likewise, the era in which Korea was under Japanese rule can be also divided into three 
periods. In its third phase, particularly from the occurrence of the Second Sino-Chinese War (1937) 
to the end of the Asian-Pacific War (1945), not only was forced labour prevalent, but young women 
were also mobilised as “comfort women” (i.e., sex slaves). Thus the link between formally free Korean 
labourers and Japanese capitalists, which I discuss here, occurred in the first two phases of Imperial 
Japan’s colonial management. 
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All the claims about the contribution of Imperial Japan to South Korea’s industrialisation 
since the 1960s have focused on the exceptionalism of Imperial Japan and Korea. Many have 
thus claimed that industrial facilities and infrastructure built in the colonial era functioned as 
a foundation for South Korea’s re-industrialisation since the 1960s. It has even been argued 
that the Korean economy during the imperial period benefitted from export expansion and 
the lessons of the colonial experience (Kohli 1994). However, the industrial facilities and 
infrastructure could only play their roles in spatiotemporally specific contexts. That is, they 
could function properly (1) before Korea was partitioned into northern and southern parts 
and (2) when it was articulated economically with the Japanese archipelago and Manchuria. 
For their normal operations presupposed the geo-historically specific articulation within 
Imperial Japan—including the Japanese archipelago and its colonies—and further 
Manchuria. In contrast, in 1945, the colonial relation between Imperial Japan and Korea was 
dismantled. The Japanese economy was disarticulated from Korea. Also, from the same year 
onwards, the Korean peninsular was partitioned by the USSR and US. The Cold War 
dismantled the relation between China and South Korea. For this reason, immediately after 
its liberation, South Korea came to be, practically, an isolated island in Far East Asia until 
1965 when Japan and South Korea re-established their diplomatic relation under the 
intervention of the US. 
More importantly, we need to recognise that the facilities and the infrastructure were 
substantially destroyed during the Korean War (1950-3)—which also gave a great 
opportunity to Japan because, for the duration of the war, it provided items needed for the 
war. In particular, the US ‘spent nearly three billion dollars in Japan for war-related goods 
and service’. The amount ‘was comparable to those of Marshall Plan on Western Europe’ 
(Dingmans 1993, 41). Thus, whilst the Korean war revitalised the Japanese economy, it 
seriously damaged both North and South Korea. In particular, because of North Korea’s 
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sudden offensive, industrial facilities and the built environment throughout South Korea, 
except for a small part of its southeastern area, were destroyed or occupied by North Korea 
in the first 3 months after the invasion. In addition, to drive back North Korean and, later, 
Chinese troops, the US Air Forces carried out an extensive bombing in not only North Korea, 
but also South Korea. The bombing of the Korean peninsular was done under the control of 
Curtis LeMay who was later appointed in United States Air Force Chief of Staff (1961-5). He 
was also the commander who took the lead in the firebombing of Tokyo in 1945. Notorious 
for his own saying: ‘There are no innocent civilians. … So it doesn’t bother me so much to 
be killing the so-called innocent bystanders’, he ordered the bombing of even South Korea’s 
infrastructure and South Korean “people in white” in case the enemy might use the 
infrastructure and because it was difficult to distinguish South from North Koreans (Kim 
2008, 2012a, 2012b; Pape 1996). As a result, the war brought about total ruin in the Korean 
peninsular. Hence, after it ended, both North and South Korea had to be re-industrialised, 
albeit in their own ways. Lastly, a claim that South Korea learnt the importance of export 
from Korea’s colonial experience is nothing but a factual fallacy. Park Chung Hee and 
colleagues did not stem from the industrial capitalist class. Indeed, Park did not even know 
the importance of export. Export-led industrialisation was nearly forced by the US in the 
mid-1960s (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, I still believe that the historical legacy of Imperial 
Japan was highly influential in South Korea’s re-industrialisation, although the legacy was 
neither colonial nor tangible. Instead, it was post-colonial (i.e., cultural) and intangible. 
Moreover, the cultural legacy was to an autarkical strategy rather than an export-oriented 
strategy and, indeed, went well beyond issues of economic strategy. To understand the 
cultural aspects of Imperial Japan’s legacy, we need to move our focus from the Korean 
peninsular to the inside of the Japanese archipelago. Then, we also need to broaden the focus 
to not only Imperial Japan, including Korea, but also Manchuria.  
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5.4 Meiji Ishin (1868-1912) 
 
Meiji Ishin stemmed from the backlash of “samurai” in a few rural areas in Japan against not 
only Western imperialist forces, but also the Shogunate regime that had failed to guarantee 
Japan’s territorial and economic security. Its initial motivation was thus nativist, though it 
led to a comprehensive embrace of, and inclusive learning from, Western forces for practical 
reasons. Also, as seen in the first of its three slogans (i.e., “Enrich the state; strengthen the 
military”),27 Meiji Ishin was inextricably tied to military purposes. Japan’s military inferiority 
to Western imperialist states implied its industrial inferiority too. For this reason, the 
industrialization that the imperial government initiated was aimed at manufacturing new 
weaponry such as warships and rifles. This implies that Japan sought import-substituting 
heavy-chemical industrialisation from the outset. Based on it, and copying the British Naval 
and German Army organisations and tactics, Japan could win the first Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-5), thereby weakening China’s political influences on Korea and, further, colonising 
Taiwan in 1895. The substantial indemnity acquired from China was also used to strengthen 
the Japanese military and this contributed in turn to Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-5). As a result, Japan could advance on Southern Manchuria by obtaining a right 
to build a railway in the region and, conversely, it could weaken Russia’s political influences 
on Korea, which it went on to annex in 1910. In these regards, Meiji Ishin was militaristic and 
colonialist from the outset (for Japan’s early industrialisation, see Barnhart 1987, 17, 22; cf. 
Sassada 2013, 23-5). 
                                               
 
27 The other two slogans were, respectively, “encourage production; flourish industry” and “effloresce 
civilisation”. 
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Meiji Ishin was also a political project for building a modern nation- and national state. 
It was thus inseparable from the emergence of Japanese nationalism as well. For instance, as 
soon as the imperial government was established, state managers sought to forge the Japanese 
population into a nation and to form Japan as a national polity. This had two preconditions. 
On the one hand, they needed to incorporate not only the lowest class of people in a feudal 
order, but also natives in islands, who were previously uncontrolled by the shogunate 
authorities, into a Japanese nation; and, on the other, they were needed to get the newly 
created nation to pledge allegiance to the emperor-centred national polity. The geographical 
range of the national polity abruptly went far beyond the local boundaries that feudal lords 
had de facto governed. The symbolic centre, that is, the emperor, was hardly recognised by 
laypeople. For these reasons, the imperial government created a distinctive politico-religious 
system. For instance, based on Shinto (the indigenous religion of Japan), the government 
manufactured a nominally unreligious ritual system of “State Shinto”—which was abolished 
by the US immediately after the end of the Second World War. Based on the State Shinto, it 
fabricated the image of “Tennō” (literally, emperor from/in heaven, i.e., emperor of Japan) 
as the highest priest and a demigod who takes charge of ancestral rites and other national 
rituals in line with State Shinto. For this reason, soon after the end of the Second World War, 
emperor Shōwa was forced by the US to declare publicly that, indeed, he was not a god. In 
doing so, the imperial government used a few Confucian concepts such as ‘kingly way’ (i.e., 
rule based on monarch’s generosity as opposed to a ‘hegemonic way’ based on military 
apparatus), ‘loyalty’ and ‘filial piety’. Thus the emperor now became a traditionally ideal 
monarch, which fitted laypeople’s normative sense and thereby guaranteed fealty. In 
addition, it drew the enthusiastic commitment of the Buddhist circles to the creation and 
spread of the new politico-religious system (for the making of the emperor, see Fujitani 1996; 
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for the relation between the Buddhist circles and Japan’s military expansion, see Doak 1995, 
177-82; Sharf 1993; Victoria 1996). 
The emergence of Japanese nationalism was also associated with Japan’s international 
relations. First, Japan had to re-define its national status in the modern world, which was 
construed through the framework of ‘civilisation vs. barbarism’. Japanese intellectuals 
suggested a distinctive self-construal by introducing a third category between ‘civilised’ 
Europe and ‘less-civilised’ Asia and, then, inserting Japan into it. The discourse of ‘escape 
Asia; enter Europe’ that obtained in Japan at the time shows this. In the framework, Japan 
was close to, or, at least, oriented toward, Europe regarding civilisation, whereas it was 
geographically located in Asia. Second, the emergent nationalism of Japan also explains why 
the Meiji government gave attention to, particularly, Prussia among Western states. Simply 
speaking, the large number of emissaries that the imperial government dispatched to the US 
and Europe from 1871 was inspired by Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, 
its subsequent unification of the German nation, and the establishment of the German 
Empire in 1871. For this reason, the Meiji government renovated the Japanese Army based 
on the German Army and, further, came to enact the Meiji Constitution of 1889 based on the 
German Constitution with the help of German scholars. 
 
5.5 Taishō Democracy (1912-26) and the Decline of the Military  
 
After the death of emperor Meiji in 1912, this militaristic, colonialist and nationalist 
modernisation of Japan encountered a crisis. It was because of the effects of world-historical 
events, which broke out in Europe in the 1910s, such as the First World War, the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and the German Revolution of 1918, on the Japanese Empire. Their 
influences on Japan in the 1920s can be summarised as follows:  
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1. State managers, inter alios, military officers in Japan came to be deeply shocked by the 
First World War for the four reasons. First, the First World War took a completely new 
form—that is, a total war. Second, compared to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 
and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) that Japan had won swiftly, the new form of war 
was protracted. Third, Japan belonged to the winner group in the First World War even 
though Japan had no direct interest in it. It was obliged to join in according to the terms 
of the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty that both sides signed in 1920 to foil Russia’s 
southward move into East Asia. This meant that it was hard for neutrals, such as Japan, 
to exist in the new form of war that was likely to develop on a world scale. On the other 
hand, given that Japan shifted its attention from the French to the Prussian Army after 
the Franco-Prussia War, the Japanese Army was agitated by observing that Germany 
lost the war. This prompted the Japanese military to entirely rethink future state 
strategies and programmes. Among other actions, it dispatched many military officers 
to Germany even after the end of the war to learn new military operations and explore 
how Germany prepared for, and why it defeated in, the war. 
2. The start and end of the First World War brought about, respectively, the rapid growth 
and then sudden sluggishness of the Japanese economy. In the process, some Japanese 
capitals, which colluded with corrupt bureaucrats and politicians, grew into monopoly 
capitals. In addition, the economic stagnation in the 1920s was combined with the 
intellectual repercussion of the Russian Revolution (1917) and the German Revolution 
(1918-9). This caused the rapid surge and spread not simply of liberal-democratic 
aspiration but also socialism, communism, anarchism, anti-war movements, labour 
militancy and the solidarity between labours and peasants. It is in this context that, 
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whereas the Meiji era has been summarised as Meiji Ishin, the Taishō (1912-26) period 
has been expressed as Taishō Democracy. 
3. The global order established after the First World War ended obliged Japan to 
downscale its military. In addition, the aforementioned social atmosphere of Taishō 
democracy also contributed to the weakening of the social influences of the Japanese 
military. Finally, these circumstances also influenced colonies in the Japanese Empire. 
For instance, stimulated by Woodrow Wilson’s principles for national self-
determination in 1918, Koreans launched a nation-wide non-violent independence 
movement on the first day in March 1919. Yet, after this was repressed by Japan, and 
as it was increasingly recognised that Woodrow Wilson’s principles did not apply to 
Korea because it was a colony under the rule of Japan, which belonged to the winner 
group in the Great War, two political trends emerged in Korea from the 1920s: first, 
the influx of Soviet-friendly communism into, and the spread of labour movements in, 
Korea, and; second, the reinforcement of armed struggles, based in Manchuria.  
 
In brief, from a Japanese military perspective, the 1920s meant that Imperial Japan was 
getting out of shape. Amongst other points, although every country in the variegated 
imperialist order of the 19th-century world market was liable to be involved in a total war on 
a world scale, Japan was unprepared for the war technologically, militarily and economically. 
In particular, such a war would require the mobilization of an immense amount of war 
materials for a protracted period and this would require an astronomical amount of military 
expenditure. To prepare for such a war, Japan needed economic, industrial and technological 
advance. Domestically, however, the Japanese Diet and government were corrupt. 
Furthermore, internationally, they were incompetent, acquiescing in US and UK calls to 
downscale the Japanese military. The free market seemed anarchic. The Japanese bourgeoisie 
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was greedy. Workers and farmers suffered from economic difficulties. The making of a civil 
society and, further, the surge of leftist ideologies in the society resulted in social disorder. 
Resistance from colonies, which the Japanese military strived to retain, was growing. Lastly, 
the social power of the military was getting eroded. In this situation, from the early 1920s, 
young military elites in the Japanese Army became fascinated by far-right ideologues and 
their state reformation programmes. 
 
5.6 Young Elites in the Japanese Army of the 1920s 
 
They particularly adored Tanaka Chigaku (1961-1939) and/or Kita Ikki (1883-1937). Their 
thoughts were based on the syncretism of Nichirenism (i.e., a lay-oriented and nationalistic 
sect of Japanese Buddhism), ultranationalism, militarism, state socialism and pan-Asianism. 
Their thoughts were thus basically religious, and the religion was linked to State Shinto. In 
this context, an ultranationalist devotion to Tennō as the incarnation of a national polity, a 
non-Marxist, militaristic and socialist revolution from above, and the building of a Buddhist 
paradise were highlighted in their thoughts. On this basis, in the 1930s, sometimes accidental 
and other times pre-mediated military coups were committed one after another by the 
Japanese Navy and Army. Among them, we should focus on two factions in the Japanese 
Army: that is, first, the Kōdōha (i.e., Imperial Way) faction, and; second, the Tōseiha (i.e., 
Control). The Imperial Way faction denied even the necessity of the Japanese Diet. It thus 
called for the direct ruling of Japanese emperor to care about poor laypeople, such as farmers 
and workers. In February 1936, young military officers in the faction occupied the Diet with 
their troops and assassinated occupants of some of the highest posts in the Diet and 
government. This military coup, which occurred in the Shōwa period, has been referred to as 
“Shōwa Ishin”. Yet the coup proved a failure in just four days. After the occupation of the 
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Diet, the troops waited for approval from Shōwa. Yet, Shōwa made an order to quell the rebel. 
The suppression of the rebel was done by the Control faction. It led to the extinction of the 
Imperial War faction itself in the Japanese Army. In addition, the fascist ideologue, Kita Ikki, 
too, was convicted and executed for inciting the troops to wage the coup. Yet, an intriguing 
point here is that, ideologically, the Control faction had much in common with the Imperial 
Way faction. As regards domestic politics, however, a major difference between the two 
factions was their attitude toward the Diet. The Control faction accepted a need for the formal 
control by the Diet over the military. In this context, their political strategy was also different 
from that of the Imperial Way faction. That is, while the Imperial Way faction coup can be 
interpreted as a failed “war of maneuver”, the Control faction waged a multi-staged and 
territorially complex coup. The Manchurian Incident (1931), the building of Manchukuo 
(1932), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and the Pacific War (1941-5) should be all 
understood in terms of its political strategy. That is, while the Imperial Way faction failed to 
transform the Japanese Empire into a fascist one, the Control faction really succeeded in 
doing so. The Control faction sought to change the internal order in Imperial Japan. It also 
aimed to change the regional order in Asia. On this basis it also wanted to change the world 
order. To understand its strategies, it is required to discuss on a person called as the 
“mastermind of Manchukuo” and the “maverick of the Japanese Army”, that is, Ishiwara 
Kanji. For, although he retired from the Army immediately before the Pacific War because of 
his conflict with Tojo Hideki (a former four-star General in the Army, former Prime Minister 
of Japan during the Pacific War), he was the key strategist of the Control faction.  
Ishiwara was baptised in the early 1920s into Nichiren Buddhism by participating in a 
religious organisation, Kokuchūkai (i.e., a society that wants to be the pillar of a state), which 
was founded and led by the far-right ideologue, Tanaka Chigaku. After that, then-lieutenant 
Ishiwara was sent to Germany to study total war and new military operations. On his return, 
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he taught military science at the Military Academy of Japan. He thereby gained a growing 
reputation for his view of war and Japan’s future strategies, becoming a key figure in the 
Control faction. As seen in his book, On the Final World War (1940), his thought was not 
very complicated. In his view, first, the world after the end of the First World War was divided 
into four regions, i.e., Western Europe, a Soviet bloc, the US and Japan. Second, Western 
Europe and a Soviet bloc would be eliminated from the competition for global hegemony. 
Third, a final war between the US and Japan leading Asia would occur in the mid-1960s.28 
Influenced by Nichirenism, Ishiwara aimed to build the Buddhist paradise in the world. Yet, 
from his perspective, Japan was entirely unprepared for the total war. To prepare for this, 
Japan had to achieve the highest level of industrialisation. In particular, neutrals could hardly 
exist in the total war. Thus, Japan should not depend on importing natural resources and 
other materials from countries that might participate in the war as Japan’s enemy. For this 
reason, Ishiwara thought that Japan required to build an autarkical economy. This was 
impossible solely within the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsular. In addition, the 
Japanese Diet and civil society in the 1920s were eroding the military’s social power. 
Moreover, to win the imperialist competition, Japan needed to draw enthusiastic supports 
from Asian people. Yet, in the 1920s, resistance against Japan in its colonies was strengthened. 
To solve these problems simultaneously, Ishiwara planned to build a puppet state, that is, 
Manchukuo. The multi-staged coup of the Control faction thus started by expanding Japan’s 
territory itself.  
 
5.7 The Building of Manchukuo (1931-1945) 
                                               
 
28 Ishiwara was thus critical of the Pacific War on the ground that Japan was still unprepared for it. 
This created conflict with his higher officer Tojo Hideki, leading to his retirement immediately before 
the war. Then Tojo became Prime Minister of Japan and waged the war. 
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The Manchurian Incident broke out in this context. Dispatched into the Kwangtung Army 
in Manchuria, Ishiwara and his colleagues blew up the Manchurian railway that they should 
protect. Then, blaming Chinese warlords for the explosion, they attacked them without 
permission from the Japanese Diet, the Japanese government, the headquarters of the 
Japanese Army and, indeed, even commanding officers in the Kwangtung Army. Their troops 
continuously won the battles with Chinese warlords, thereby occupying Manchuria, the size 
of which was far greater than the Japanese Archipelago. Then, on 1 March 1932, the 
Kwangtung Army established the puppet state of Manchukuo. This had such profound 
consequences that this state has been represented as the ‘black box' of the modern history of 
East Asia. The Kwangtung Army used Manchukuo as follows. 
 
1. Manchukuo was a key factor in the political-military strategy of the far-right factions 
in the Japanese Army. First, as regards Japan’s politics, Manchukuo was a key element 
in the territorially complicated, multi-stage fascist coup. That is, the strategy of the 
Control faction can be divided into the following stages: (1) expanding Japanese 
territory into Manchuria, thereby stimulating external enemies at the same time as 
oppressing internal conflict in Japan; (2) building a fascist fortress in the region, 
thereby obtaining a laboratory for economic, industrial, political and military 
experiments, and (3) re-articulating that fortress with Japan and its colonies. In this 
way, the Kwantung Army transformed Imperial Japan itself into a fascist empire. In this 
respect, while Shōwa Ishin was a fascist coup from above, Manchukuo was a fascist 
coup that occurred from the outside inwards. It was the outward expansion of a fascist 
force and, simultaneously, its ‘countercurrent’ into Japan (Yim S-.M 2000). Second, as 
regards macroregional international politics, Manchukuo served both as a bulwark 
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against the Soviet Union and as a battlefield for the Kwangtung Army to directly purge 
anti-Japanese Chinese and Korean guerrillas. Third, globally, it was an indispensable 
foundation in preparation for the final world war.  
2. As mentioned, the Kwangtung Army conducted many political, economic, military 
and social experiments in the puppet state. In other words, Manchukuo was the Army’s 
laboratory. First, it experimented with building a state (or empire) that was managed 
in conformity with its ‘internal guidance’. In particular, it had complete authority to 
appoint bureaucrats, including those dispatched from Japan, and to attend any and all 
governmental meetings without prior notice. Second, it experimented with nation 
building as it attempted to forcibly merge Manchurians, Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians 
and Japanese into a nation under the guise of the harmony of five ethnic groups. Third, 
it undertook military experiments. Notably, it massacred many people to test 
biochemical weapons. Fourth, it tried to achieve rapid heavy and chemical 
industrialisation. In the process, Ishiwara appointed Miyazaki Masayoshi, who after 
studying political economy in Russia, worked as an expert in the Russian (or Soviet) 
planned economy. Thus Manchukuo’s “Five Years Plan of Industrial Development” 
(1937) was inspired by the first “Five-year plans for the national economy of the Soviet 
Union” (1928-32).  
 
In brief, although a few developmental statists have glamorised Manchukuo as the 
prototype of an East Asian development state, that is, the state of plan-rational, development-
oriented economic bureaucrats (Johnson 1982; 1999; Sasada 2014), it was, instead, the fascist 
puppet state of the Kwangtung Army, based on the articulation of (1) European fascism, (2) 
the planned industrialisation of the Soviet Union and (3) the Japanese far-right, militaristic 
interpretation of Buddhism, Confucianism and, further, its indigenous religion. Also, the 
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construction of Manchukuo was prepared in anticipation of the second Sino-Japanese War 
and the Pacific War. In the process, Imperial Japan eventually mutated into a ‘national 
defence state’, based on Nazi’s war state. Overall, then, Japanese fascism since the 1930s can 
be regarded as the Japanese far-right syncretism of national socialism and state socialism. 
 
5.8 Imperial Japan, Manchukuo and South Korea 
 
To explain the effects of Imperial Japan and Manchukuo on South Korea, let us revisit the 
Korean peninsular in the early 20th century. As mentioned, Japanese rule in the Korean 
peninsular can be divided into three phases. In the 1910s, Korea was ruled by Japan’s military 
police. In the 1920s, Japan abolished this apparatus and allowed formal press freedom and 
expanded educational opportunities in Korea. This occurred in part because of the non-
violent liberation movement in 1919, which was inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s principles 
for national self-determination in 1918. It was also a reflection of the rise of Taishō democracy 
in Japan. The “civilised” or “cultural” ruling of Japan caused a conflict among Koreans. On 
the one hand, even many leading figures in the liberation movement started to succumb to 
Japanese rule. On the other, the failure of the non-violent movement, the inflow of socialism 
via Japan to Korea, and discontent with the US led to the building of a Korean government 
in exile, the rise of a socialist labour movement in Korea, and Anti-Japanese armed struggle 
in Manchuria. Since the 1930s, Japan tried to annihilate Korean culture and mould Koreans 
into Japanese people. In particular, from the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan 
operated a ruling regime for the total war.  
In this context, Manchuria had diverse implications for Koreans. For instance, to some 
Koreans, the region provided a base for developing their armed struggle against Japan. For 
others, it meant a land of opportunity in which they could climb higher on a social ladder as 
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“Japanese” people. In this context, Korean capitalists invested, and built logistics companies, 
in Manchuria to make profits from the war. Likewise, many Korean youths applied for 
military school to become military officers in the Japanese Army or the Manchukuo Imperial 
Army. Park Chung Hee, too, moved from the southeastern part of South Korea to Manchuria 
in the late 1930s in order to enter one of military schools in Manchuria. In the school, he 
changed his name from Park Chung Hee to Takagi Masao and swore an oath of loyalty to 
emperor Shōwa. As the highest ranked graduate of the school, he gained an opportunity to 
be trained at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. Then, he returned to Manchukuo in 1944 
and served in the Manchukuo Imperial Army. Yet, as mentioned, he was not the only Korean 
who graduated from the military school of Imperial Japan or Manchukuo. Many Koreans 
served in the Kwantung Army or the Manchukuo Imperial Army. After Korea’s liberation 
and its partition into North and South Korea, those people formed a “Manchurian network” 
in South Korea. In the 1950s, the network was no more than a faction in the South Korean 
Army. Yet, after the military coup, led by Park Chung Hee, on 16 May 1961, the Manchurian 
network became a dominant political faction in South Korea until the late 1970s. In this 
context, the fascist strategies were present in South Korea since the 1960s. What Park Chung 
Hee and his “backroom boys” added to the fascist strategies was a strategy for becoming a 
state with nuclear weapons. As the Japanese military learnt the importance of a total war by 
observing the First World War, the Second World War taught them the importance of 
nuclear weapons. I explore this in more detail in the next chapter. Before that, we need to 
address one more historical issue, that is, the relation between Japanese fascism and North 
Korea. For it gives a key clue to understating a relation between North Korea and South 
Korea.  
 
5.9 Imperial Japan, Manchukuo and North Korea  
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Manchuria has a distinctive meaning in North Korea too, related to its political and economic 
system. Economically, North Korea pursued an immediate transition from a situation in 
which colonial capitalism had collapsed to socialism. This prompted some North Korean 
ideologues, following Kim Il-Sung, to develop their own view of historical development. At 
first, they tended to follow Marxism-Leninism or Stalinism. Yet, not long afterwards, Kim Il-
Sung and his faction advanced a new ideology. According to it, a transition to a higher stage 
in history is not determined by a material or economic law. Instead, it is achieved by human 
will and capability. In other words, history is not made by an objective law but a subjective 
mind. In this context, the ideology was, indeed, to replace economic determinism with mind-
determinism. This was because North Korea should nearly skip over the stage of capitalist 
development in the five stages of historical development that dialectical materialists 
identified. Therefore, North Korean ideologues should claim that, if human will and 
capability are sufficient, a transition to socialism will be made even without an experience of 
a capitalist development. This is North Korea’s official position on historical development, 
referred to as the juche idea, where juche means a subject. In brief, North Korea presented a 
subject as the prime mover of history. To appropriate Marx’s metaphor for Hegel’s 
philosophy, in North Korea’s ideology, Stalin is standing on his head. 
For this reason, as a next step, North Korean ideologues should impose a unifying 
principle on all personal subjects in North Korea. That is, they should present an exemplary 
subject for all North Koreans to take as their role model. In this context, they suggested the 
nationalist, anti-imperialist, socialist and revolutionary armed forces in Manchuria as the 
historically existent model. That is, they identified North Korea’s political leaders as role 
models. In consequence, Kim Il-Sung was represented as the commanding general of the 
national and socialist warriors that led to Korea’s liberation and even the end of the Second 
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World War. By doing so, he was mythologised not only as the supreme hero and father of a 
Korean nation, but also as a politico-religious figure whom all people in the world should 
admire. The takeoff message of the ideology is thus simple: to succeed in building a socialist 
paradise, all people should study General Kim’s life and then live like him. In this way, North 
Korean state managers, centred on Kim Il-Sung, built a distinctive type of political-religious 
regime. They constructed a peculiar type of warfare state that forges its population into 
socialist, nationalist and anti-imperialist guerrilla. In doing so, the state managers emphasised 
feudal allegiance and a filial duty to their devotional leader not just as a comrade but also as 
a benevolent father. Thus, although North Korea has taken an anti-imperialist position, their 
politico-religious system and, further, their totalitarian techniques, which have been used in 
controlling and mobilising people, resemble what had been already witnessed in Imperial 
Japan and Manchukuo. The same holds for their economy. For North Korea has been 
obsessed with autarky. 
It must also be noted that North Korea itself was, indeed, constructed with help from 
pro-Japanese elites in Imperial Japan. That is, not all pro-Japanese rulers who had been loyal 
to Imperial Japan were eradicated in North Korea after its liberation. Socialist state managers 
in North Korea purged landlords to obtain peasants’ allegiance toward the North Korean 
regime. In contrast, bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers survived and even 
remained in governmental organisations, insofar as they cooperated with socialist state 
managers. In addition, the state managers were enthusiastic for a collaboration with their 
former rulers in constructing a new state, because they lacked experience. Even Kim Il-Sung 
once expressed his negative comment about a claim, based on a robust anti-Japanese 
sentiment, that pro-Japanese elites should be expelled from, or punished within, North 
Korea. In brief, unlike its propaganda, North Korea was not free from the legacies of Japanese 
fascism from the outset (for more details on pro-Japanese elites in North Korea and South 
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Korea, see Ryu Seokchun and Kim Gwangdong 2013; for the influences of Japanese fascism 
on North Korea in the post-war era, Armstrong 2003; Cumings 2003; Myers 2010). What the 
state managers added to the fascist strategies is the goal of becoming a nuclear state. These 
factors explain many of the distinctive features of North Korea. That is, because Japanese 
fascism has been post-colonially inscribed in it, North Korea has been different from socialist 
states in Eastern Europe. For the same reason, Park Chung Hee’s regime and Kim Il-Sung’s 
regime resembled each other in key respects. 
 
5.10 Concluding Remarks 
 
Let me recall here that my investigation into the PCHM highlights social relations relevant to 
the model. To give some key clues to understanding the social relations, I explored some 
aspects of their complex historical background. Before proceeding, it is worth highlighting a 
few points are highlighted. First, Korea in the early 20th century was characterized by colonial 
capitalism. Yet, the social formation was entirely dismantled by its liberation, partition and, 
particularly, the Korean War. South Korea in the 1950s was, actually, an isolated island that 
could only survive based on US’s aid. In this context, in South Korea in the early 1960s, key 
social classes, such as capitalists, labourers and even landowners, were highly 
underdeveloped. In this light, South Korea’s state apparatus was over-developed. In 
particular, it retained gigantic military forces relative to its economic size. In addition, a 
faction in the military (i.e., the Manchurian network, centred on Park Chung Hee) held 
political power in South Korea since 1961. For this reason, the PCHM lacked social 
embeddedness in the social relations among capitalists, labourers and landowners. 
Conversely, the making of the PCHM was itself a process of building capital relations and 
promoting capital accumulation. In this context, as regards the creation and mutation of the 
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PCHM, a supranational scale of social relations was particularly important. These relations 
included the Park Chung Hee faction’s links to Japanese, North Korean and American state 
mangers. Although many people tend to think that in the Cold War era, South Korea, Japan 
and the US formed an alliance to counter that among China, North Korea and the Soviet 
Union, matters were not that simple. For instance, Park Chung Hee had different 
relationships with, respectively, the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Carter Administrations. 
Also, reflecting changes in his relations to the US administrations, the relation between Park 
Chung Hee and South Korean technocrats also altered. Likewise, the relation between Park 
Chung Hee and Kim Il-Sung was not simple. They were extremely antagonistic throughout 
the 1960s but, since the early 1970s, they entered a period of Détente. Park Chung Hee’s 
Yuhsin regime and Kim Il-Sung’s consolidation of absolute political power were both based 
on this compromise. On this basis, Park attempted to achieve not only South Korea’s heavy-
chemical industrialization also to possess nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Needless to say, these 
state projects led to deteriorating relations to the Nixon and Carter administrations. In brief, 
the social relations relevant to the PCHM were entangled in complex ways. Also, in my view, 
to explore those relations concretely, we need to understand Imperial Japan and its puppet 
state. For Park Chung Hee and Kim Il-Sung were the offspring of the empire. In this context, 
I addressed the creation, mutation and evolution of Imperial Japan, and further the making 
of Manchukuo. The following chapter explores how the fascist strategies were represented by 
Park Chung Hee, and refracted by the contemporary history of China, Taiwan, North Korea, 
South Korea, Singapore and so forth is entangled in complicated ways, varying by case, with 
Imperial Japan. This is why we need to take into consideration Imperial Japan and its effects 
on other countries in East Asia. In short, when exploring East Asian capitalism and even 
socialism historically, the complex relations among the Western imperialist forces, Imperial 
Japan and their victims should be considered. This is also why modern world-system theory, 
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dependency theory and post-colonial studies cannot be applied without further reflection to 
East Asia (for more details on these theories, see the excursus in Chapter 4).  
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6. The Emergence of a Chimerical Model in South Korea Since 
the Mid-1960s 
 
In this chapter, I offer a state-theoretical and, partly, regulationist analysis of the PCHM. This 
involves a genealogical analysis, and a periodisation, of the PCHM. Also, the partial 
regulationist analysis shall be supplemented in the following chapter. Before proceeding, two 
elaborations on the model are needed. First, as shown in the Introduction, the Park Chung 
Hee era had four phases. The first was the period from his military coup (May 1961) to the 
transition to a democratic regime (October 1963). The second covers the period from 1964 
to October 1972 in which South Korea’s political regime was transformed into a totalitarian 
regime. Phase three designates the period from 1972 to April 1979 when a policy paradigm 
for neoliberalising South Korea’s economy was launched for the first time. The fourth phase 
is the period for six months from April to October 1979, when Park was assassinated by the 
Director of South Korea’s CIA. Here I explore the first three phases, deferring the fourth 
phase, which is more related to the dismantlement of the PCHM than its development to 
chapter 8 (which continues the regulation-theoretical analysis). Regarding the second 
elaboration, I analyse the PCHM in terms of social relations, distinguishing between 
structural and agential relations (for the critical-realist and strategic-relational approach to 
structure, see Chapter 3). For example, the relation between the US and South Korea is a 
structural relation. Its structuration started in 1945 and the structural relation was, therefore, 
established before Park Chung Hee’s coup. In contrast, the relation between Park Chung Hee 
and the Kennedy Administration is agential insofar as Park Chung Hee sought to revise the 
US-South Korea relation, pursuing two different strategic relationships across different US 
Administrations. Given these two points, I explore how the PCHM was created and then 
mutated, evolving into a chimerical model. I then consider the state form of the PCHM. 
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6.1 Social Relations Relevant to the PHCM’s Development 
 
Here I describe the structural relations inherited by Park Chung Hee, beginning with the 
Korean War. As noted in chapter 5, the war ruined the South Korean economy. Throughout 
the 1950s, therefore, South Korea survived only with US economic aid so that, by the early 
1960s, the capitalist and working classes still remained much underdeveloped. Conversely, 
the traditional landowning class was eliminated in the late 1940s under the land reform 
implemented by the first South Korean government. Thus, even in the early 1960s, the three 
typical social classes in a bourgeois society, namely, capitalists, wage labourers and land 
owners, were all underdeveloped. In contrast, because of the war, and for South Korea’s 
national security, coercive state apparatuses were overdeveloped (for overdeveloped states in 
postcolonial societies, see Alavi 1972). Park Chung Hee seized the oversized state apparatuses 
through his military coup. Therefore, compared to state managers in the liberal-bourgeois 
democracies in the same period, Park Chung Hee could enjoy greater autonomy from 
“particular” social classes. For the emergence and development of the PCHM itself was a 
process of making and nurturing social classes more typical of bourgeois civil society. 
Nevertheless, South Korean social forces did influence Park’s policies – but as a “nation” that 
had previously been colonised by Japan and was then partitioned. In other words, South 
Koreans tended to act as an ethnically homogenous, anti-Japanese and reunification-aspired 
state population (for more details, see chapter 7).29 
                                               
 
29 In South Korea, monopoly capitals started resisting governmental policies in an organised way from 
the early 1980s. They objected to the neoliberalisation of the economy. Likewise, as an organised social 
force, starting from 1987, workers strongly influenced government policies by waging a national 
general strike (see Chapter 8). Of course, this does not imply that labour had not resisted during the 
Park Chung Hee era – but this was quite occasional and relatively unorganised (for the history of 
labour moment in South Korea, see Chang 2009; Sonn 1997).  
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Second, a lay understanding of international relations in Far East Asia during the Cold 
War era seems that Japan, South Korea and the US formed a triangular and capitalist alliance 
against the other triangular and socialist alliance among China, North Korea and the USSR. 
Yet, their relations were not that simple. 
 
1. On the structural relation between the US and South Korea. The relation between the two 
has often been described as a “bloody alliance” but it was far from an even one. Nor 
have their respective Administrations and Governments always reached a happy 
agreement on political, economic and military issues. In 1945, the southern half of the 
Korean peninsular was occupied by the US military and, for 3 years thereafter, the 
armed forces ruled South Korea. In 1948, the US transplanted liberal democracy in 
South Korea. As a result, the first general and presidential elections were held, 
respectively, in May and July in the same year, which established South Korea’s 
Government officially for the first time.30 In the presidential election, Lhee Syngman 
was elected. Although he was one of the liberation activists, his career was rather 
different from those of usual leaders of liberation movements. For, he had previously 
studied at George Washington (BA), Harvard (MA) and then Princeton (PhD). 
Furthermore, exceptionally, he was a pro-American protestant. In 1949, as mentioned, 
the government implemented a capitalist type of land reform, eliminating thereby the 
traditional landowners too. Then, the Korean War occurred. During the war, the 
wartime and peacetime operational control of South Korea’s military was handed to 
the United Nations Command. In 1979, the authority was turned to the ROK-US 
                                               
 
30 The Korean Provisional Government was launched in Shanghai, China in 1919.  
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Combined Forces Command.31 Yet, in both cases, the commander was the commander 
of United States Forces Korea, implying that operational control of South Korea’s 
military has been fundamentally subordinate to or, at least, strong influenced by the 
US. Moreover, as noted, the South Korean economy could even be managed without 
US economic aid. South Korea’s military itself, which was gigantic in comparison to its 
economy and civil society, operated thanks to this aid. In sum, as regards its economy 
and military, South Korea was deeply reliant on the US. For this reason, many South 
Korea leftists have deemed South Korea as one of the (neo-)colonies of the US.32 This 
is what I refer to as a structural relation between South Korea and the US. It was 
inherited by Park Chung Hee in the early 1960s. He sought to (re-)build a nation- and 
national state and to development the economy. Yet, his strategic actions for the 
projects should be considered in this structural context, together with other structural 
relations. Based on those, Park had strategically different relations with US 
administrations. For instance, he maintained good highly cooperation only with the 
Johnson administration, conflicting with the Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Carter 
Administrations. 
2. On the structural relation between Japan and South Korea. The collapse of Imperial 
Japan and South Korea’s decolonisation after the end of the Second World War 
disarticulated South Korea from Japan. Their diplomatic relation was re-established 
only in 1965. Thus, starting with the Park Chung Hee era, their relation started being 
                                               
 
31 The ROK is an acronym for Republic of Korea, that is, the official appellation of South Korea. On 
the contrary, North Korea is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
32 In the debate over South Korea’s social formation which was fashionable in the mid- and late 1980s, 
pro-North Korean and nationalist lefts argued that South Korea was nothing but one of the colonies 
of the US. On the country, Marxists regarded the country as a neo-colony.  
   NRM=
re-structured. First, from that time, Japanese funds started flowing into South Korea in 
the form of loans, grants and compensation. The export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) of South Korea from the mid-1960s was based largely on these funds. In 
consequence, not only financially, but also industrially, South Korea’s economy was re-
articulated with the Japanese economy in a rather subordinate way. EOI was based on 
processing trade. Hence, South Korea should import raw and auxiliary materials, parts 
and components, and so forth. Among them, high value and technologically advanced 
products were imported from Japan. The rise of the South Korean economy thereby 
contributed to that of the Japanese economy too. In this context, South Korea’s 
economy has been referred to as the “cormorant” economy (Komura 1988/1989). Let 
me explain this metaphor. In Japan or China, trained cormorants on leashes dive into 
rivers and then catch fishes by swallowing them intact. Yet, because of the leashes, these 
fish remain in the cormorants’ gullet and fishers recover them from the birds. In this 
context, the cormorant economy refers to a phenomenon that, when South Korean 
cormorants catch profits in foreign rivers, Japanese fishers will finally gain the large 
proportion of the profits.33  This shows a structured relation between the Japanese 
economy and the South Korean economy since the mid-1960s. This structural relation 
was inherited by Park Chung Hee but emerged in his era. On the other hand, Park 
                                               
 
33 Akamatsu highlighted this aspect of the regional division of labour through the “flying geese” 
metaphor. Yet, intriguingly, he did so even before the Japanese economy was re-articulated with the 
South Korean economy. In this context, whilst his claim has its own relevance from a current point 
of view, it seems to be anchored on the ideological aspiration for the prewar Japanese right-wing’s 
pan-Asianism. His claim also exaggerated Japan’s role. For, although the metaphor describes Japan 
as an independent leader in the region, the relation between Japan and South Korea has been 
subordinately articulated with the US.  
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Chung Hee was highly pro-Japanese. Therefore, he kept an extraordinarily close 
relation to behind-the-scene elder statesmen in Japanese politics.  
3. On the structural relation between North Korea and South Korea. In South Korea, it is 
often said that we have not yet achieved independence. South Korea was liberated from 
Imperial Japan and then immediately partitioned, with the two parts remaining under 
the influence of the US and Japan and the USSR and/or China respectively. That is, the 
two Koreas have both failed to build an independent nation- and national state after 
the peninsular was liberated although both have continued to plan and execute their 
respective projects and operations for (re-)building a unified state. In this context, 
North Korea has basically regarded South Korea as a colony or puppet regime of the 
US. In contrast with South Korea, in which pro-American and/or pro-Japanese leaders 
ruled, North Korea describes itself as a “nationally” legitimate state because it was built 
by the anti-Japanese armed guerrilla. Furthermore, it claims officially that North Korea 
is still waging a war against the US to liberate South Korea from control of this new 
imperialist force. South Korea makes the opposite argument. Dominant factions in 
South Korea’s politics and their ideologues have refuted the politico-religious myth of 
North Korea. For them, North Korea is lying when it claims to have eliminated 
formerly pro-Japanese elites from its government (see chapter 5). They also argue that 
Kim Il-sung was not a liberation activist, but a military official in the Soviet Army and, 
therefore, nothing but a puppet of the USSR. So South Korea has regarded North Korea 
as a puppet regime or anti-Korea organisation. Yet the relation between Park Chung 
Hee and Kim Il-Sung was more complex than the structural relation between North 
and South. For, as we will see, the two sometimes cooperated with each other for their 
own political purposes. 
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It follows that the legacy of these structural and agential relations was inscribed in 
complex ways into the emergence and development of the PCHM and, indeed, as I will show, 
different aspects were condensed in specific ways in different phases of the Park Chung Hee 
era.  
 
6.2 Toward Autarkic State Capitalism 
 
The first President of South Korea, Lhee Syngman, was corrupt and incompetent. He also 
conflicted with the Eisenhower Administration (1953-61) over his military and economic 
policies. For this reason, as time went on, the US no longer provided unconditional support 
to his Government (Park Taegyun 2009). Notably, Lhee continuously tried to prolong his 
presidency by electoral frauds, constitutional amendments, and the like. In taking this course, 
he employed not only the police force but also gangs of political thugs. In April 1960, a 
democratic revolution occurred. Some have argued that US Ambassador in Seoul asked Lhee 
to resign. Others have claimed that Lhee decided to resign on his own terms. In any case, he 
stepped down from the Presidency and became an exile in Hawaii. After the First Republic of 
South Korea collapsed in this way after 18 years, the Second Republic was established but it 
collapsed within just one year. After the democratic revolution, every kind of social demand 
erupted at the same time. Even elementary school students demonstrated on the street 
regarding their school problems. For this reason, the Second Republic has been referred to as 
the “Demo” Republic. Yet, the government did not respond to the explosion of social issues. 
Instead, inside what was a semi-presidential system, an extreme power struggle occurred 
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between President Yun Posun34 and Prime Minister Chang Myon35 (for details on South 
Korea’s Republics, see Table 6.1). In this situation, the May 16 military coup took place in 
1961. Then, the Manchurian network emerged as a politically dominant force in South Korea 
until Park’s assassination in 1979. 
The armed forces called their coup a military revolution for building a “genuinely 
democratic” political order. They overthrew the Second Republic in just 60 hours after 
initiating their military operation and transferred all the authorities of the government, the 
national assembly and the judiciary alike to the Military Revolutionary Committee. Three 
months later, the Committee changed its name to the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction (SCNR). Its chairman was Major General Park Chung Hee. Park needed to 
explain the legitimacy of his coup. He therefore first promised to rebuild a democratic regime 
by 1963. He also promised to clean up “old evil” and normalise a social order for the 
intervening two years. In this context, the SCNR liquidated the political gangs and punished 
corrupt politicians. It also nationalised private banks on the grounds that the bourgeoisie 
had accumulated their wealth illegitimately. Simultaneously, the military coup needed US 
acceptance. So, in November 1961, Park Chung Hee visited the US to meet John F. Kennedy  
                                               
 
34 During the colonial era, Yun Posun studied medical sciences in Japan. Then, to join in the liberation 
movement, he moved to Shanghai, China. After living in China for 3 years, he moved to the UK and 
studied Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh. After six years in the UK, he returned to Korea 
in the 1930s. Even then, he tended to stay at home, because there was little for him to do Japan’s 
imperial rule. In the 1940s, he participated in only Christian activities, re-starting his political activities 
only in 1945.  
35 Whilst Lhee Syngman and Yun Posun were both protestants, Chang Myon was a catholic. During 
the colonial era, he participated in educational activities as a missionary. In 1921, he moved to the US, 
and studied English Literature and Education at Manhattan College, a Catholic Colleges in New York. 
He decided to continue to undertake Catholic Mission in South Korea. After visiting the Vatican City 
and an audience with Pope Pio XI (1922-39), he returned to South Korea, where he participated in 
English education and missionary activities. 
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Table 6.1 The Periodisation of Political Regimes in South Korea 
Source: My own 
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(1) The rise of the South Korean economy, based on export-oriented industrialisation, began from the start of the Third Republic.  
(2) The leapfrogging of the economy into heavy-chemical industrialisation began from the start of the Fourth Republic. 
(3) The South Korean economy fell into a serious crisis in 1979-80, and the IMF intervened in the crisis recovery for the first time; 
(4) Although this is not the subject of this thesis, the first attempt to neoliberalise the economy was made in 1979. 
(5) In particular, in the early 1980s, neoliberal technocrats acquired power in the government of the Fifth Republic.  
(6) Yet, the comprehensive neoliberalisation was delayed until the Asian economic crisis in 1997-8 in which the IMF intervened for the second time. 
(7) This was, mainly, because of chaebols and organised labour.  
(8) That is, Park Chung Hee was relatively autonomous from particular social forces for the 1960-70s, because the social forces remained much underdeveloped; yet, since the 
1980s, even politically dominant factions have become less and less autonomous from the social forces that started being developed in the Park Chung Hee era. 
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and re-assure him of his willingness to rebuild a democratic regime in 1963. In return, Park 
gained military and economic supports for his military junta from the Kennedy 
Administration. A further promise was to begin economic development immediately after 
his coup, even though, indeed, he had no plan at that time. Thus, the SCNR had to examine 
swiftly the accumulation strategies of previous administrations in South Korea, particularly 
the five-year plan of the short-lived Second Republic, which was never announced because 
of Park’s coup. It must therefore promulgate its own strategy urgently (for the five-year plan 
of the Second Republic, Satterwhite 1994).  
The first five-year economic plan of the SCNR was officially released in January 1962 
after several draft plans had been announced, discussed and revised for approximately eight 
months. The SCNR announced that the plan aimed for a ‘guided capitalist system’ 
(Taehanmin’gukchŏngbu [The Government of South Korea] 1962; see also Kim 2004, 78-
82). Specifically, the plan emphasized the following points: first, it aimed at state-guided 
industrialisation; second, this was basically oriented to import-substitution; third, the state-
supervised, import-substituting industrialisation aimed to develop heavy-chemical 
industrialisation; fourth, as regards investment funds for this project, domestic funds were 
preferred to foreign loans, although the latter were also regarded as important, and, fifth, the 
following sequence of intermediate goals towards the main objective of industrialization was 
highlighted: (i) securing energy resources, such as electricity and coal, (ii) agricultural 
development, (iii) the expansion of basic industries and social overhead capital, (iv) a rise in 
employment and land development, and (v) export promotion (see Cho Gapche 2005; Lee 
byŏngch’ŏn 1999; Park T’aekyun 2000b; Taehanmin’gukchŏngbu 1962). Overall, then, the 
plan was oriented toward a self-sufficient or self-reliant economy. In particular, from the 
outset, the SCNR aimed to build fertilizer plants, a petroleum refinery, boost cement 
production, construct integrated steelwork, produce general-purpose machinery and 
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equipment, and engage in shipbuilding and automobile production. In addition, the 
industrialisation should be based primarily on domestic funds. In this regard, the 
accumulation strategy differed markedly from the trade-oriented or export-led one that has 
been recognised as an economic strategy for South Korea’s industrialisation. According to 
Park Huibeom who was an economic advisor to Park Chung Hee, the plan consulted 
Egyptian and Indian models under, respectively, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru 
(Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999, 145). To borrow Callinicos’s (2009, 183) analyses of the Egyptian and 
Indian models, this means that Park Chung Hee’s first accumulation strategy referred to ‘the 
most ambitious’ models of import-substituting industrialisation—that is, ‘autarkic state 
capitalism’ which ‘copy the bureaucratic command methods of Stalinist Russia in order to 
build up their own heavy industrial base.’ Why and how did this happen, however? 
 
6.3 The “Last Soldier of Imperial Japan” 
 
To answer the question, we need to examine who formulated the plan. The leading figures in 
making the plan were Park Chung Hee himself (Chair of the SCNR), Yu Wonsik (Chair of 
the Financial and Economic Committee of the SCNR) and Park Huibeom (an economic 
consultant to Park Chung Hee). As noted, Park Chung Hee was very pro-Japanese. In the 
1940s, he was trained in Manchuria and then Japan as a military officer. Then he returned to, 
and worked for, Manchukuo until the end of the Second World War. In November 1961, he 
re-visited Japan on his way to meet the Kennedy Administration after his coup. This was an 
opportunity to meet Japanese political leaders as a new political leader in South Korea—
though the diplomatic relation between the two countries had not yet been re-established. In 
the meeting, Park amused elder statesmen in Japanese politics, such as Kishi Nobuske (Prime 
Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960), by politely calling them senpai (a Japanese appellation 
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that refers to a person who took a higher rank in schools and other organisations). This was 
because many elder statesmen in Japanese politics had been previously high-ranking 
bureaucrats in Manchukuo. For instance, Kishi was one of the key figures who made the “Five 
Years Plan of Industrial Development” in Manchukuo. 36  Since the 1920s, Kishi was an 
admirer of the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union and, since the early 1930s, he was 
notorious for his celebration of Nazi Germany as a model for Japan (Driscoll 2010, 267 ff.). 
After the end of the Second World War, he was convicted as a Class A war criminal and 
imprisoned. Yet, the US finally judged him as the best politician in terms of its interests and 
allowed Kishi to become Prime Minister in the late 1950s.37 Park Chung Hee showed his 
respect for such a figure as a former senpai. 
In the official banquet, Park expressed his thanks to the schoolmaster (i.e., former 
major-general Shinichirō Nagumo) at the Manchurian military academy, who was among 
the guests. Specifically, Park was given a standing ovation from Japanese politicians, 
including the Prime Minister, Hayato Ikeda (1960-4), when he said: “Because of your 
recommendation, I could attend the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, and because of that, 
eventually, I can be here at the moment”. In addition, he surprised Japanese politicians by 
declaring that, “I am just a military officer who has no knowledge of the economy and the 
politics; yet, I most respect the father of Japan’s modernisation, Yoshida Shōin”. For Yoshida 
Shōin, whom Japanese conservative politicians, including the incumbent Prime Minister Abe 
                                               
 
36 Let me recall that the key planner of Manchukuo’s industrial policy, Miyazaki Masayoshi, studied 
political economy at the Saint Petersburg State University and then worked in the South Manchuria 
Railway Company as an analyst in the field of the Soviet economy.  
37 He is still a symbolic figure in Japanese politics. For instance, Prime Minister of Japan Eisaku Satō 
(1964-7 and 1970-2) is, indeed, Kishi’s younger brother. Incumbent Prime Minister of Japan Abe 
Shinzō is his grandchildren. He had been an influential person behind the scenes of postwar Japanese 
politics until his death in 1987. 
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Shinzō, continued to follow ideologically, was the samurai who not only rebelled against the 
Shogunate regime but also campaigned enthusiastically to occupy Korea. In this way, Park 
Chung Hee made the Japanese statesmen nostalgic for their days in Imperial Japan and 
Manchukuo (for more details on Kishi Nobuske and Park Chung Hee, Kang Sangjung and 
Hyŏn Muam 2012). After the end of the Second World War, Japanese “samurais” who were 
responsible for the Second World War committed suicide or were liquidated by the US—
though economic bureaucrats, who served them, could survive selectively in line with the 
interests and foreign policies of the US. In this situation, a Japanese samurai seemed to have 
risen again in South Korea and, following his coup, had returned to Japan as his country’s 
new political leader and talked about his own ishin (restoration) in front of Japanese 
politicians. In this context, Okazaki Hisahiko (former Japanese Ambassador and former 
diplomatic and security advisor to several Prime Ministers of Japan, including Abe Shinzō) 
extolled Park Chung Hee as ‘the last soldier of Imperial Japan’ (Okazaki 1980, 116; quoted in 
Moore 2007, 91). In the same context, Ōno Banboku (one of the elder statesmen who 
controlled Japanese politics behind the scenes) called Park Chung Hee “my son”. Specifically, 
participating in the presidential inauguration of Park Chung Hee as Japan’s special envoy, he 
told the local press that he visited South Korea to celebrate a ceremony for his son (Han 
Honggu 2012a). 
 
6.4 Park Chung Hee’s “Backroom Boys” 
 
Yu Wonsik was also an important figure, because he led the making of the first five-year plan. 
Yet, he was not an economic expert. Before the end of the Second World War, he had also 
served for the Manchukuo Imperial Army. According to him, he met Park Chung Hee in 
Manchuria for the first time and was deeply impressed by Park’s spirit as a solider. He recalled 
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that the first meeting convinced him of Park as a comrade and a friend (Yu 1987, 104). 
Returning to South Korea, he also worked in the South Korean Army. Also, even before the 
May 16 military coup, he argued that South Korea, too, should obtain its own nuclear 
weapons and that the economy should be autarkic. According to him, he discussed with Park 
Chung Hee before the military coup on the economic issues of South Korea, and they reached 
at a sheer agreement. Also, he requested Park Chung Hee to help him take charge of the 
economic affairs after the coup. In this context, he could become Chair of the Financial and 
Economic Committee of the SCNR (Ibid, 255). Immediately after the coup, he declared that 
the military junta aimed to implement ‘a planned economy within the boundaries of a liberal 
economic system’ (Ibid, 291). He knew that the expression was an oxymoron. Yet, according 
to him, it referred to a third way between both totalitarian-planned and liberal-bourgeois 
economies. It certainly was not a “mixed economy”, which he regarded with sarcasm. He 
certainly believed that the rebuilding of South Korea should begin from the building of an 
autarkic economy. In his view, this should be centred on heavy-chemical industrialisation, 
linked in turn to military development. The final aim of the latter was obviously nuclear 
weapons. For him it was the only way that South Korea as a newly decolonised country could 
survive and rise in the international order. This view seemed to combine (1) Japan’s import-
substituting and heavy industrialisation before the First World War, (2) the autarkic 
economy, linked to the heavy-chemical industrialisation of the Soviet Union, that Japanese 
fascists had pursued since the end of the First World War, and (3) his own contemplation of 
the strategic importance of nuclear weapons in the Second World War.  
However, Park Chung Hee and Yu Wonsik had no experience in formulating an 
economic plan and therefore needed economic experts. Professor in the Department of 
Economics at the Seoul National University Park Huibeom was chosen in this context. He 
had been advocating state-led economic development, together with his intellectual 
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colleagues as a group, since the 1950s. So, it seems that Park Huibeom was the best man to 
translate the demands of Park Chung Hee and Yu Wonsik for a particular form of 
industrialisation into an actual plan. Indeed, his intellectual group was chosen by the SCNR’s 
military leaders and, among them, Park Huibeom won the biggest credence from Park Chung 
Hee and Yu Wonsik (see Park 2005; Park T’aekyun 2002). Also, according to Yu Wonsik, 
there was no discord between Park Huibeom’s opinions and theirs. This was because Park 
Huibeom was a figure who asserted even in his academic article that, as regard efficiency, the 
Nazi economy was certainly superior to modified capitalism in the Western liberal states in 
the mid-twentieth century (Park Huibeom 1968, 263). 
In brief, the previous political leaders in the First and Second Republics of South Korea, 
such as Lhee Syngman, Yun Posun and Chang Myon, studied International Politics, 
Archaeology, English Literature and Education in the US or the UK. They were also 
protestant or catholic by faith. In contrast, Park Chung Hee was educated in the military 
academies of Manchukuo and Imperial Japan and was strongly pro-Buddhist (see Chapter 
7). He was also friendly to Confucian traditionalists in South Korea. More exactly, even in 
South Korea in the 1930s before moving to Manchukuo, he had been affected by the State 
Shintoism of Imperial Japan, which contained far-right interpretations on Confucianism and 
Buddhism. Let me recall that both religions are polytheistic. For this reason, far-right wings 
in Imperial Japan had regarded Tennō as a demigod. In the same context, even in postwar 
Japan, the soldiers who died in the Second World War and Generals who were executed as 
war criminals after the war have been served as demigods in the Imperial Shrine of Yasukuni 
(Tokyo, Japan). Also, some of South Korea far-right wings have done the same things for 
Park Chung Hee.  
Given all this, it is not surprising that the SCNR’s first accumulation strategy aspired to 
state-capitalist autarky. Indeed, in July 1961, when different governmental organisations 
   NSN=
under the control of the SCNR were still suggesting alternative provisional plans, Park Chung 
Hee gave a guideline for the associated bureaucrats working for the plan. It was that the 
objective of the plan should be ‘to lay a foundation for an autarkic economy urgently’ 
(Kukkagirogwŏn [The National Archives of Korea] 2014, 51). And, in concretising the plan, 
Park Huibeom consulted both Nasser’s and Nehru’s models that referred, in turn, to the 
method of the Soviet Union. Genealogically, it resonated with Manchukuo’s model as well 
(see chapter 5). After the official announcement of the plan, Park Huibeom rather 
ambiguously referred to it as naepojeog (inward-containing) industrialisation. For him, it 
meant ‘Koreanism’, which was equivalent to ‘Nasserism in the Arab world’ (Park Huibeom 
1968, 64-65; see also Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999; Park T’aekyun 2000b). The starting point for 
realizing such a strategy was, of course, to raise funds. That is, the junta needed money-
capital. At first, it tried to obtain the funds by raising interest rates and boosting a securities 
market. Yet, the measures failed. Then, the junta enforced a sneak account squeeze and then 
imposed currency reform. These financial measures, in which Yu Wonsik took the lead, were 
so covert that only five persons had prior knowledge. including Yu Wonsik himself, Park 
Chung Hee and Park Huibeom, in the SCNR. Indeed, not even the Governor of the Bank of 
Korea knew beforehand. The US was advised just 48 hours before its announcement (Yun 
Kwangwŏn 2008). Needless to say, this prompted the ire of the Kennedy Administration. 
 
6.5 A Reaction from the Kennedy Administration 
 
According to a report that US presidential task force formulated to help the highest posts in 
the Administration, including John F. Kennedy himself, to discuss South Korean issues, 
whilst ‘US policies in Korea have succeeded in keeping the Republic solidly on the side of the 
Free World and in maintaining a minimal standard of living’, ‘they have not succeeded in 
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remedying the lack of national direction or sense of responsibility of the Korean people or 
their leaders’ (Presidential Task Force on Korea 1961, 12). This report was submitted in early 
June 1961, that is, a few weeks after the May 16 military coup. On this basis, the Kennedy 
Administration encouraged the junta to design its own economic plan. Yet, whilst one of the 
key US foreign policy post-war objectives was to prevent economic nationalism, Park Chung 
Hee’s plan and its subsequent measures seemed to go even beyond economic nationalism 
toward socialist development. A series of reports and memorandums, which were sent from 
Seoul to Washington in the period, show that the US was aware of the reason why things were 
going in such a way. American bureaucrats in South Korea reported that Park Chung Hee 
had been deeply influenced by his education at the Japanese-run Daegu Normal School—
which was well known for its heavy emphasis on State Shintoism—and military academies. 
Furthermore, they indicated that there was a group of “backroom boys” behind Park Chung 
Hee. In these reports, the latter were described as ‘nationalist’ and ‘socialist’. The reports 
argued that, for the reason, they tended to select ‘radical, totalitarian solutions to economic 
and political problems’ (see Park 2005, 678). 
The Kennedy Administration intimidated Park Chung Hee into revoking the account 
freeze with a threat that it would otherwise retract the military and economic aids, except for 
minimum assistance. It also sought to purge Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys. In addition, 
it wanted to alter the first five-year plan into one based on Rostow’s developmentalism. Park 
Chung Hee had no option but to accepting all these demands because of the aforementioned 
structural dependency of South Korea on the US. For example, approximately 72 per cent of 
South Korea’s national defence expenditure in 1962 came from US aid 
(Han’gukkaebaryŏn’guwŏn [Korea Development Institute] 1991, 119; Park T’aekyun 1999, 
152). Without such economic aid, Park could not manage even the South Korean military, 
which was a key supporter for his rule. As a result, the account freeze was lifted. Park 
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Huibeom, Yu Wonsik and others were all expelled from the corridors of power (Kimiya 1991; 
2008; Park T’aekyun 1997; 2000a; 2000b; Chang, Jun’gap 2011; Haggard, Kim and Moon 
1991). Also, the direction of the first five-year economic plan was converted. Park Huibeom 
(1963, 167-8; quoted in Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999, 151-2) argued that there were no economic 
reasons for the account squeeze to be revoked. In this regard, he described his experiences as 
a ‘harrowing failure’. Immediately after the failure, Yu Wonsik (1987, 340) lamented: ‘The 
South Korean economy came to turn its orientation from an autarkic economy to a colonial, 
dependent economy. Now, the revolution is over. From now, a reactionary age is coming’. 
  
6.6 The Reactionary Age? 
 
This period commenced with a transition to a liberal-democratic regime and with the 
introduction of trade-oriented developmentalism to South Korea. This period corresponds 
to the second phase of the Park Chung Hee era. The transition to liberal democracy followed 
the agreement between the Kennedy Administration and Park Chung Hee; a trade-oriented 
developmentalism was implemented after the strife between the two on the first five-year plan 
and the junta’s planned financial measures (for a further discussion on the influences of 
Rostow on South Korea’s economy, see Park T’aekyun 2002). In this context, in October 
1963, there was a presidential election, which Park Chung Hee won by 1.5 per cent, and in 
December of the same year, the supplementary plan of the first five-year plan was made 
public. The revised plan, which was released in February 1964, was influenced by Walter 
Whitman Rostow’s theory of modernisation. Hence, first, the plan came to pursue export-
oriented industrialisation. Second, it highlighted importing raw materials and capital goods 
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freely from other countries.38 Third, it argued that the industrialisation should be based on 
foreign funds. Fourth, it sought to nurture light industry instead of heavy-chemical industry. 
In brief, the plan was oriented toward inserting the South Korean economy into the world 
market rather than pursue autarky. The economy showed a rapid growth from this time. Yet, 
not all the details in the first five-year plan were entirely revoked. That is, although Rostowian 
developmentalism reoriented the plan in a liberal direction, several measures for an import-
substituting and heavy-chemical industrialisation remained, albeit partly. For this reason, 
whilst it was from the early 1970s that heavy-chemical industrialisation was driven again in 
South Korea, it was in 1962 that the first industrial complex for heavy-chemical 
industrialisation was built. Also, from this phase, South Korea imported raw materials and 
capital goods that were necessary for manufacturing exports. In particular, low customs 
duties were levied on imports for manufacturing exports to lower the prices of exports. On 
the contrary, a home market for durable consumer goods was strictly protected. In many 
fields, importing foreign consumer goods were hindered. Thus, the supplementation of 
Rostowian developmentalism to the autarkic strategy incubated a dualistic structure of the 
PCHM from this period (cf. Lee byŏngch’ŏn 1999).  
A starting point to fulfil the new strategy was, of course, investing money-capital in the 
newly planned capitalist circulation. In this context, Park Chung Hee visited West Germany 
in the winter of 1964 to get commercial credit from the government. In the same context, the 
rapprochement between Japan and South Korea in 1965 was particularly important. For, by 
normalising diplomatic relations with US backing, Park Chung Hee obtained compensation 
for Japan’s colonial rule, aids, grants and loans, which were utilised for the industrialisation, 
                                               
 
38 As regards the rise of the South Korean economy, what market-fundamentalists stressed on is this 
aspect of the economy. According to their claim, whilst the economy was export-oriented, it was, 
simultaneously, based on free importation (see Chapter 1).  
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though this measure angered South Korean nationalists, particularly university students and, 
in turn, led to Park’s political crisis in the mid-1960s. Furthermore, re-establishing 
diplomatic relations enabled Japanese capital goods and technologies to flow into South 
Korea. Thus, from this period, the “fisher-cormorant” relation between the Japanese and 
South Korean economies started being structured. 
A further important factor was the Vietnam War. As indicated, the South Korean 
Military was so big that it could not be maintained without the US’s financial assistance. 
Hence, since the end of the Korea War, the US had been continuously asking the South 
Korean administrations to downsize the military to facilitate economic development. Yet, 
Park Chung Hee decided to dispatch a huge contingent of South Korean troops to the 
Vietnam War, amounting to a total of 300,000 Korean soldiers from 1964 to 1973. On the 
one hand, this was a strategic choice to maximize economic aid from the US. In this regard, 
Park Chung Hee tried to develop institutions and laws related to conscription. At the same 
time this was also Park Chung Hee’s reply to the public backlash against his relation to Japan. 
For conscription would bring young students under military control. 
On this basis, Park Chung Hee enjoyed a honeymoon period with the Johnson 
Administration (1963-9). In the second phase of his era, Park maintained a liberal-
democratic regime. He also followed the trade-oriented economic strategy. And he sent many 
South Korean troops to Vietnam. Thereby the South Korea’s economy was subordinately re-
articulated with the Japanese economy. The cheap consumer goods started being 
manufactured in South Korea, and then sold in Western markets and Vietnam during the 
war. This enabled the economy to begin its take-off (for the links among the US, South Korea 
and Vietnam, see Woo 1991, 93-6). 
 
6.7 American Advisors and Neoclassical Economists 
   NSS=
In this phase, the key figures in economic affairs were also changed. As noted, in the first 
phase, Park Chung Hee himself and his backroom boys, who aspired to build autarkic state 
capitalism, played a leading role in making the economic strategy. Yet, in the second phase, 
whilst Park Chung Hee survived, his backroom boys were expelled from the government39 
and Rostowian developmentalism were introduced. Yet, it is unclear who took charge of 
implementing this strategy within the Korean government just as it is obvious that American 
advisors were deeply involved in South Korea’s economic affairs in this phase. This is evident 
from a letter sent by the US Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown in South Korea to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on 26 August 1966. 
 
We have a very special relationship with Koreans. The Republic would not exist had it 
not been for us. We make possible its military establishment. We participate in all 
major economic decisions of its Government. In the central sanctum of the Economic 
Planning Board there are always Americans. Each provincial Governor has an 
American advisor. We have unusual intelligence liaison arrangements. The American 
military review and pass on virtually every aspect of the Korean defense budget … 
Everywhere one goes in Korea there are Americans in key places (Brown 1966).40 
 
                                               
 
39 For this reason, Yu Wonsik criticised Park Chung Hee from the second phase until his death. He 
argued that Park Chung Hee betrayed their “revolution” to sustain his own political power. 
Conversely, Park Huibeom returned to the government in 1968 – but as Minister of the Ministry of 
Culture and Education rather than someone in charge of economic affairs. 
40 This is not private correspondence. It was shared with Dean Rusk (Secretary of State), Nicholas 
Katzenbach (Attorney General), Walt Whitman Rostow (Counsellor of the Department of State) and 
other key figures in the Department of State in the Johnson Administration (Ibid). 
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In brief, the “takeoff” of the South Korean economy was not accomplished by South 
Korean economic technocrats. For, in the second phase of the Park Chung Hee era from 
which the South Korean economy started showing its rapid rise, Americans occupied the 
space from which Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys were expelled. Also, from this phase, a 
group of neoclassical economists, which was later called the Sogang School, started working 
in high office in the government. For instance, Nam Duck-woo, the School’s leader, 
participated in policy-decisions as a counsellor from the mid-1960s. In 1969, he was 
appointed as Minister in Department of the Treasury. Then, many economists from the 
school participated in the government until Park’s assassination. Yet, the heavy-chemical 
industrialisation in the 1970s was not designed by them, because it was secretly prepared by 
a second generation of Park Chung Hee’s backroom boys. That is, the evolution of the PCHM 
to a mature chimera was the other group of economic technocrats that was organised in the 
early 1970s. 
 
6.8 The Evolution of the PCHM into a Mature Chimera 
 
The third phase of the Park Chung Hee era began in 1972. The transition was triggered by 
the Nixon Doctrine in 1969.41 As noted, Park Chung Hee somewhat conflicted with the 
Kennedy Administration because of his accumulation strategy and then enjoyed a 
honeymoon period with the Johnson Administration for reasons and benefits noted above. 
In this context, the Nixon Doctrine signified that the new US Administration violated the 
prior agreement between the Johnson Administration and Park Chung Hee. In particular, 
                                               
 
41 The Nixon Doctrine was nonetheless a proximate cause for a transition into a totalitarian regime. 
For Park Chung Hee had laid a foundation for such a totalitarian regime in the 1960s. 
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the Nixon Administration decided to downscale the United State Forces Korea. This 
prompted Park Chung Hee to secretly organise a task force team in the Blue House (the 
executive office and official residence of the President of South Korea), and then order it to 
prepare a plan for a nuclear weapon in 1971 or, at latest, early 1972 (Jungangilbo 
Teukbyeolchwijaetim 1998, 260-1; see also Eom Jeongsik 2013; Jo Cheolho 2000). This 
military project was linked to his new accumulation strategy. For the task force team planned 
the project for heavy-chemical industrialisation as a preparatory stage for the military 
strategy. It was linked to a plan for the development of a surface-to-air missile system and, of 
course, this was expected to be linked to a nuclear weapon. The leader of the task force team 
was O Won Chol and, although he was not an economic expert, he continued working as a 
senior presidential secretary for economic affairs until Park Chung Hee’s assassination. After 
reading chemical engineering science at university, he served as a technical officer in South 
Korea’s Air Force until he was promoted to major. After that, he worked as a plant manager 
at an automobile company until Park’s military junta summoned him to work for it. In 
particular, in the first phase of the Park Chung Hee’s era, he took responsibility for 
formulating the chemical side of the heavy-chemical industrialisation strategy. He then drew 
Park’s attention again in 1970 when the latter was searching for a method to development a 
munitions industry. O Won Chol, who was as a secretary to Vice Minister in the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, proposed a plan to build parts factories for the development of such 
an industry, and it was accepted by Park Chung Hee. In this context, he was appointed in the 
next year as the leader of the task force team for a heavy-chemical industrialisation strategy 
associated with the munitions industry. It therefore happened that Park Chung Hee’s 
economic strategy in phase three was led by a second generation of his backroom boys. Yet, 
before announcing the new economic plan, Park Chung Hee waged a self-coup. 
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In July 1972, North Korea and South Korea abruptly announced that Kim Il-Sung and 
Park Chung Hee agreed on three principles for the reunification of two Koreas: first, 
independence; second, peace, and; third, national coherence. It was the first joint 
communiqué of the two Koreas since their division in 1945. Three months later, Park Chung 
Hee dissolved South Korea’s national assembly and promulgated martial law. 
Simultaneously, he announced the revision of the Constitution on the pretext of preparing 
for reunification and defending national security. Park Chung Hee declared this political 
measure as Yushin. It was a Korean pronunciation of Ishin (restoration). The new 
Constitution authorised him to invalidate even the new Constitution itself. It gave him 
absolute power and, in this regard, it has been argued that it resembled the failed military 
coup of the Imperial Way faction in the Army of Imperial Japan, that is, the Showa Ishin. For 
the latter was a project to provide Tennō (Emperor of Japan) absolute political power (Han 
Honggu 2012a; Kim Dŏngnyŏn 2015). Before the official announcement of Yushin, Park 
Chung Hee twice informed North Korea of his plan. In contrast, the US was notified of his 
decision 24 hours before the announcement (Park Myŏngnim 2011). For the 24 hours, the 
US remonstrated with Park Chung Hee, especially as it learnt that hist manifesto for the 
October Yushin contained strong criticism of the foreign policies of Japan and, particularly, 
of the Nixon Administration. The Administration accepted it as ‘offensive’ and asked Park to 
meet the US Ambassador before the announcement. Park declined even the visit of the US 
Ambassador to the Blue House. Although, because of the remonstration of the US, Park 
removed criticisms on the US’s foreign policies, he still announced the October Yushin. 
Immediately after Park’s proclamation, the Nixon Administration declared it was irrelevant 
to the US (for on the 24 hours before Park’s announcement of Yushin, see Hong Seokryul 
2013, 38-47). Thereby, Park transformed South Korea’s political regime into a totalitarian 
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one. Three months later, Park proclaimed his projects for “heavy-chemical industrialisation” 
and “the scientification of all nationals”.  
Before its official announcement, the project was unknown to any of the Minsters in 
the Park Administration. The project was not contained in the third five-year plan (1972-6). 
It was a secret project inside the Blue House. Approximately 20 days after the announcement, 
Park summoned the Ministries to the Blue House. In front of them, O Won Chol gave a four-
hour briefing about the details of plan. In response, Nam Duck-woo pointed out the 
difficulties of financing. Yet, according to O Won Chol (2006, 149, 215-27), Park Chung Hee 
interrupted Nam by saying that, “I am not telling you that I am going to declare war; 
nevertheless, are you saying that you can’t help me?” Nobody felt able to disagree with Park 
Chung Hee. Park ordered Nam Duck-woo and others to find methods to obtain money-
capital and the meeting ended. From then, more loans were introduced, and simultaneously, 
forced savings implemented. Hence, the heavy-chemical industrialisation as the key 
accumulation strategy in the third phase of the Park Chung Hee era was, indeed, propelled 
by a consideration for not ‘comparative advantages’ nor ‘economic validity’, but 
‘technological necessity’ and ‘technical possibility’ (Kim Hŭnggi 1999, 217, 267). 
Based on the heavy-chemical industrialisation, the South Korean economy continued 
to grow rapidly during the 1970s as well (see figure 6.1). But this came at a cost. It generated 
a serious inflation, which the government tried to moderate, even as the oil crises in 1973 and 
1979 aggravated the high inflation. For instance, the wholesale price index in 1974 rose by 
42.2% (Song Hŭiyŏn 2003, 66). In 1979, the PCHM itself fell into a crisis and the IMF 
intervened in the South Korean economy for the first time (see figure 6.1). Also, Park Chung 
Hee’s political, economic and military strategies increasingly exacerbated his relation to the 
Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations. For example, Donald Gregg, who served as an CIA 
agent in Japan (1964-73) and South Korea (1973-5), and was later appointed as US 
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Ambassador to South Korea (1989-93), said in October 1976, that: ‘[I]f President Park runs 
for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his 
term’. That is, in the late phase of his era, Park Chung Hee was regarded as one of the targets 
of CIA’s ‘murder policy’ in the 1970s (McGuire 1976, 34). 
 
Figure 6.1: Growth Rate (Korea, 1961-2013) 
 
Source: Economic statistics system, the Bank of Korea  
 
Here we can discuss briefly on South Korea’s chaebols (the large industrial 
conglomerates of South Korea, such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG and the like). The making of 
chaebols commenced with heavy-chemical industrialisation, though some already existed 
from the 1950s. That is, the businesses, which survived into the industrialisation, were later 
transformed into chaebols. An intriguing point here is that, just as Yushin is a Korean 
pronunciation of Ishin, chaebol is a Korean pronunciation of a Japanese term zaibatsu. That 
is, Yushin and Ishin are different pronunciations of the same Chinese characters, which mean 
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characters, which literally mean “financially powerful family or faction”. In Japan, the term 
originated from the Meiji period. Then, the first generation of zaibatsu grew up with the first 
Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Its later generation emerged with 
Manchukuo’s industrialisation. In this context, zaibatsu were closely linked to the Military of 
Imperial Japan, and for this reason, immediately after the end of the Second World War, The 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), which occupied Japan, attempted to 
dismantle the zaibatsu system by confiscating its assets. In brief, then, Park Chung Hee 
attempted to create in South Korea in the 1970s what the US had disorganised in Japan in the 
late 1940s. For this reason, chaebols had had a similar system for corporate governance42 and, 
likewise, although Samsung, Hyundai and LG are known as companies that manufacture 
mobile phones, cars, home appliances and the like, they have been simultaneously logistics 
companies.  
 
6.9 The State Form of the PCHM: Chimerical Warfare Pre-National State 
 
Based on previous work, here I offer a state-theoretical and regulationist form-analysis of the 
PCHM. Similar analyses of North Atlantic Fordism define the state form as Keynesian welfare 
national state (KWNS). Also, according to them, such a state has been tendentially 
transformed into a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime in a post-Fordist era (see, 
e.g., Jessop 2002). From the same perspective, the East Asian newly industrialised economies 
of the Cold War era, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are viewed as 
East Asian Exportism. In the same context, the state form of the Exportist model is defined 
                                               
 
42 In this context, chaebol’s corporate governance was one of the key issues in the policy programme 
that IMF suggested as a reply to the East Asian economic crisis in 1997-8. That is, what was dismantled 
in Japan in the late 1940s was reformed in South Korea in the late 1990s.  
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as a Ricardian or Listian workfare regime. Specifically, the state form of South Korea and 
Taiwan is regarded as a Listian workfare national regime (Jessop and Sum 2006, 152-85). My 
work, too, is based on the SRA-based state theory and the RA and, insofar as it concerns the 
South Korean economy, that is, a variant of the East Asian newly industrialised economies, it 
basically resonates with the non-Eurocentric regulationist analysis of Exportism. Yet, in this 
thesis, I have attempted to concretise the analysis of the South Korean model by taking a 
supranational scale of social relations into account. In other words, I have attempted to put 
the model in its place in an imperialist system within variegated capitalism in a world market 
and, thereby, to offer a relatively concrete and complex understanding of the model. 
 
Table 6.2 The Chimerical Warfare Pre-National State 
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In this context, I re-define the state form of the PCHM as an Autarkic/Rostowian 
warfare pre-national state. On this basis, I simplify it as a chimerical warfare pre-national 
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state (CWPS). Thus far, I have sufficiently illustrated why the macroeconomic policy of the 
PCHM can be referred to as chimerical. In the first phase of his era, Park Chung Hee was 
quite unaware of the economic effects of export expansion. In its second phase, his autarky-
aspired strategy was supplemented by the libertarian and trade-oriented economic strategy. 
In this third phase, Park Chung Hee himself tried to combine autarky-inspired heavy- 
chemical industrialisation with the export-oriented strategy. This seems to reflect his direct 
experience of the beneficial influence of export growth on the South Korean economy.43 For 
this reason, it seems evident that the PCHM was evolving into a chimerical model. Yet, why 
should its social policy be viewed in terms of warfare? 
 
6.10 The CWPS as a “Warfare” or “Garrison” State 
 
My suggestion reflects a basic belief that the social policy regime of South Korea during the 
Park Chung Hee era is better understood in term of a ‘warfare state’ (Edgerton 2006) or 
‘garrison state’ (Lasswell 1941) than as a welfare or workfare state. Those concepts emerged 
to highlight the unwarranted effects of a ‘military-industrial complex’ on the postwar liberal-
bourgeois states. Also, in this light, the relation between the military establishment and 
zaibatsu in Imperial Japan, and the relation between the Park Chung Hee faction and chaebol 
can be seen as a particular type of a military-industrial complex. In this context, although 
                                               
 
43 Whilst he discovered the effect of export promotion on the economy after his experiences in the 
1960s, it seems that he was not aware of the effect of high inflation on the economy. For, 
notwithstanding a serious level of inflation in the 1970s, he had a deep attachment to investment and 
export growth during the period. In the late 1970s, even nearly all economic experts in the Bank of 
Korea, his Cabinet and the government-run research institute simultaneously warned that the massive 
amount of investment, the oil shock and the high inflation were seriously harmful to the economy, 
Park Chung Hee himself continuously argued for investment and export growth. 
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Eisenhower’s farewell speech (1961) warned that the ‘conjunction of an immense military 
establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience’, such a nexus was 
not that new in East Asia. Let me also recall that Eisenhower (Ibid) warned: ‘In the councils 
of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise 
of misplaced power exists and will persist’. On the contrary, in Imperial Japan, particularly 
since the 1930s, and in South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era, the fascist and 
militaristic factions themselves directly seized political power and, then, strategically nurtured 
big businesses, which, inter alia, served the purposes of military aggrandisement. In this 
context, South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era was more genuinely warfarist than the 
Western states. Indeed, Park Chung Hee mobilised the whole society for military 
aggrandisement and, in this context, social policy was also subordinated to military policy. 
More precisely, social policy was subordinated to economic policy and this, in turn, was 
subordinated to its military policy. Let me recall that Park Chung Hee’s heavy-chemical 
industrialisation was based on a calculation of not economic validity, but technical necessity 
and technological possibility for military aggrandisement. For this reason, it was announced 
without taking account of financial issues. As noted, approximately 20 days after Park Chung 
Hee’s official declaration of heavy-chemical industrialisation, its economic and financial 
impact started being discussed for the first time.  
In this context, I refer to the social policy regime of the PCHM as a warfarist regime. 
Yet, it also had its own detailed characteristics. First, as Jessop and Sum (2006; see also Jessop 
2002, 145) argue, the ‘familial’ unit had an important role in the social policy regime. In other 
words, in the regime, the role of families and, particularly, of a breadwinner in a patriarchal 
and extended family were essential. Yet, a proviso is required here. In the warfarist regime of 
the PCHM, not only male, but female workers also functioned as breadwinners. As noted, 
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Park Chung Hee launched heavy-chemical industrialisation from the early 1970s, with adult 
males preferred to female workers. Yet, in light industries, which were launched from the 
mid-1960s, most workers were young women. Accordingly, the female workers who moved 
from rural agriculture to industrialising cities also served as breadwinners for their extended 
families in their birthplaces, at least until they married.44 Yet this served patriarchal ends. For 
it was common for the wages of only primarily educated young female workers to be used for 
the high(er) education of their brothers because of the cultural preference for boys over girls. 
In other words, it was because the extended families in rural areas wanted their sons, who 
were expected to succeed to the familial patrimony, to become white-collar workers in cities 
after being more educated than their female siblings.  
The social policy of the PCHM can be also regarded as work-oriented. For this reason, 
it might be viewed as workfarist. This is in contrast with neoliberal usage of the term, where 
it implies a ‘mandatory work programme for welfare recipients or, more generically, to the 
process of work-oriented welfare reform’ (Peck 2003, 85). This was not the case in the PHCM 
social policy regime. Rather, the social policy in the Park Chung Hee era was linked not to 
welfare policy but to tax and financial policies. In this sense, it can also be regarded as asset-
based. Here the asset on which the regime relied was, indeed, savings. Admittedly, in the 
South Korean economy during its rapid industrialisation, household savings had been high. 
Yet, let me recall that the wages of South Korean workers were relatively low. The gap between 
high savings and low wages were bridged by tax policy (see figure 6.2 on the next page). 
Simply speaking, as regards earned income, the Park Administration permitted a wide 
range of tax deductions. In particular, in the early 1970s when it launched heavy-chemical  
                                               
 
44 So South Korea had to discipline not only modern housewives, but also the young female labour 
power from the 1960s. To do so, the military junta created a distinctive narrative for the happiness of 
the young female workers who moved from the countryside to cities to find jobs. 
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Source: My own 
Note: A growing volume of foreign loans and the repetition of the circulation from (re-)investment 
to (re-)investment combined to stimulate economic expansion.45 The familial and asset-based social 
policy of the PCHM was thereby subordinated to its economic policy. It was also a “mobilisation” 
regime, supported by tax and financial policy. 
 
industrialisation, the Administration gradually increased the standard deduction amounts. 
Because of the path-dependent effects of this tax policy, even now, approximately a half of 
wage earners in South Korea is exempted from income taxes. By doing so, notwithstanding 
low wages, the Administration could raise the disposable incomes of wage labourers 
relatively. In this situation, on the one hand, private consumption was restrained; on the 
other, savings were half-forcedly mobilised. The money was flowed into the nationalised 
banks46 that guaranteed relatively high interest rates. It was, of course, used for re-investment 
(for more details, see Kim Dokyun 2013; 2018). I note above that the wages of South Korea’s 
                                               
 
45 On the other hand, here we must recall that savings were a key element for operating the PCHM. 
Further, Park Chung Hee had to discipline young female workers. His message was simple: “Save for 
the future happiness”. In this context, Park’s discourse, too, conflicted with US discourse insofar as 
the US continuously stimulated South Korea’s females to aspire for the abundant consumption of the 
American ladies (see Chapter 7). 
46 As noted, South Korea’s banks were nationalised immediately after Park’s military coup in 1961. 
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workers had been viewed as production costs rather than demands for the Park Chung Hee 
era, because mass production in South Korea was oriented toward mass consumption 
abroad. Here I can add one more thing to the statement. At a national level, wages were also 
a source for savings and reinvestment (see figure 6.1). In this context, the social policy of the 
PCHM was subordinated by its economic policy in a different manner from that of the 
neoliberal era. The economic policy was, as noted, subordinated by its military policy. In the 
same context, the social policy was a part of a “mobilisation” regime, and for this reason, I 
argue that the social policy regime can be characterised as warfarist.  
 
6.11 The CWPS as a Client State 
 
Lastly, the state form of the PCHM can be also viewed as a pre-national state. If we focus only 
on the scale at which the primacy of economic and social policy is located, the state form 
might be seen as national. Yet South Korea and, indeed, Korea itself have never been national 
states in a strict sense. In its medieval period, Korea (i.e., Chosun, 1932-1897) was a tributary 
state of Chinese dynasties. Immediately after the emergence of the 19th-century world market 
in which the hegemony of the Chinese dynasty in East Asia collapsed, South Korea came to 
be inserted into a subordinate position in the prevailing imperialist system within a variegated 
capitalist world market by being forced to accept a series of commercial treaties (see Chapter 
5). In 1897—that is, two years after the last Chinese dynasty was defeated by even Imperial 
Japan and, as a result, Taiwan was annexed into Japan—Korea, too, proclaimed that it was 
transformed into the Great Korean Empire (1897—1910). Yet, since then, the Empire had 
been gradually annexed into Imperial Japan. In 1910, the self-described Empire became a 
colony of Imperial Japan. 
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In brief, as an East Asian country belatedly articulated into an imperialist order within 
the variegated capitalism of the 19th-century world market, Korea had to achieve capitalist 
industrialisation as well as to build a nation- and national state. Yet it failed to accomplish 
those state projects that had been gradually for a few centuries achieved in Western Europe. 
Admittedly, Korea was decolonised in 1945. Yet, the decolonisation was not made by Korean 
people. In addition, immediately after the liberation, the Cold War began, and Korea were 
divided into two parts. In this context, South Korea had to re-launched state projects for the 
industrialisation of the South Korean economy and the building of a nation- and national 
state in an imperialist order within the variegated capitalism of the 20th-century world 
market. The PCHM should be viewed in terms of those state projects. Park Chung Hee 
accomplished industrialisation. Yet, South Korea has not yet pursued the projects for the 
building a nation- and national state.  
This is partly because of North Korea. Of course, North Korea and South Korea joined 
the United Nations at the same time in 1991. Accordingly, since then, at the level of 
international politics, they have implicitly recognised each other as nation- and national 
states. Yet, South Korea’s Constitution has still specified the territory of South Korea as “the 
Korean peninsular and its adjacent islands”. This obviously implies that North Korea is not a 
legitimate state. Indeed, by law, South Korea regards North Korea as an illegal organisation 
that illegitimately occupied the partial territory and state population of South Korea. On the 
other hand, the structural relation between the US and South Korea explains why South 
Korea is not a national-territorial state in a strict sense. Let me note again that South Korea’s 
prerogative of Supreme Command still exercises operational control over South Korea’s 
military after it was handed to the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)—although 
South Korea’s Constitution specifies the President of South Korea is Commander-in-Chief. 
Also, since 1979, when Park Chung Hee was assassinated, the Commander of CFC is the 
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Commander, United States Forces Korea (a four-star general officer in the US Army) with 
the Deputy Commander being Chairman of Republic of Korea Joint Chief of Staff. In brief, 
South Korea’s wartime operational control is still under the strong US influence. Also, until 
December 1994, South Korea did not have even peacetime operational control over South 
Korea’s Armed Forces. These imply that the SWPS was more dependent on the US. It seems, 
then, that there is, currently, no concept to grasp the relation between South Korea and the 
US. For instance, although Central and Eastern European states under the hegemony of the 
USSR had been referred to as satellite states, the concept does not apply to South Korea, 
because it reflects a geographical characteristic of the relation between those states and the 
USSR. Also, while some African states, which had been colonised by European states, were 
defined as neo-colonies in the postwar era, this concept is also inapplicable to South Korea, 
because it highlights the post-colonial dependence of the colonies on their previous 
metropolitan states, and the continuous exploitation of the metropoles. Yet, notwithstanding 
its formal independence, South Korea has been substantively “cliental”. In this context, it has 
been a distinguishable type of client state. Also, to highlight these points related to North 
Korea and the US, I define South Korea as a pre-national state.  
 
6.12 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate how and why the PCHM evolved into a 
chimerical model. On this basis, I define its state form as CWPS. In doing so, I have focused 
on a supranational scale of social relations. In my view, those relations have been rather 
paradoxical. For instance, many South Korean people still have anti-Japanese sentiments. 
They have aspired to overcome and overtake Japan by developing the economy. Yet, without 
the financial and industrial subordination of the South Korean economy to the Japanese 
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economy, South Korea’s industrialisation itself was infeasible. Also, South Korea needed the 
US to protect it from the threats from North Korea. Yet, the sovereignty of South Korea was 
impaired by the US as well. In this situation, Park Chung Hee chose not a status quo but a 
revision. Yet, in doing so, he tried to utilise the fascist state strategies by which he had been 
affected in his colonial experience. Thus, at first, he cooperated with the US to overcome 
North Korea. Later, he tried to raise his voice against the US by retaining nuclear weapons, 
based on the relative relaxation of tension with North Korea. These relations were all 
inscribed into the PCHM and, as a result, the model has its own distinguishable features.  
Conversely, my analysis not only helps us understand the PCHM more concretely but 
also offers an opportunity of better understanding the current state of affairs in South Korea. 
South Korea has already accomplished industrialisation, and it has been thus deemed as one 
of the (relatively) advanced capitalist economies. In addition, it has consolidated a liberal-
bourgeois democracy. For this reason, its state form, too, has been tendentially transformed 
into a Schumpeterian workfare post-national state. Yet, this course of development has 
showed its distinctive features, because it began not from a KWNS but from the CWPS. For 
instance, as regards a social policy regime, it has been transformed from a warfare regime into 
a workfare regime. Thereby public expenditure related to welfare policy has sharply increased. 
Also, South Korea has been transformed from a pre-national state into a post-national 
regime. In this process, attempts to complete the project for the building of a national state 
have continued. This project is also related to a project for the building of a nation-state. As 
a relatively advanced economy in East Asia, South Korea, too, has actively accepted migrant 
workers. Thus, South Korea, too, has been changed into a multicultural society. Yet, the 
major proportion of the migrant workers are, indeed, Koreans in China who have lived in the 
adjacent areas to the border between China and North Korea. Thus, the major tensions 
between Koreans and migrant workers are neither racial nor religious. Their conflicts were 
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emerged from a difference in their life styles. Also, in this context, a transition into a 
multicultural society is also related to a nationalist project. Lastly, in the light of my work 
here, we can elaborate more on the other institutional features of the PCHM. Yet, before 
doing so, one more work is also required—that is, an analysis of semiotic formations for 
normalising and stabilising the PCHM. This work shall be done in the following chapter.  
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7. A Semiotic Analysis of the Emergence of the Chimerical 
Model 
 
In the previous chapter, I explained why and how the PCHM evolved into a chimerical 
model. Based on this explanation, I also offered a state-theoretical and, in part, regulationist 
analysis of the state form corresponding to this PCHM model. On this basis, I now address 
the dominant semiotic formations that contributed not only to the normalisation and 
stabilisation of the model, but also its destabilisation. In particular, I shall introduce US’s and 
Park Chung Hee’s semiotic practices. As might be expected, while these practices do resonate 
with each other, they also involve contrasting and sometimes antagonistic semiotic themes. 
Specifically, they agreed that South Korea needs to pursue an anti-communist path of 
economic development within the capitalist bloc in the Cold War period; yet, concretely, they 
emphasized strategies and methods. Thus, just as the PCHM was chimerical and prone to 
instability, the dominant discourses regarding South Korea’s political, economic and social 
modernisation also combined different tropes in a hybrid manner with potential to open and 
deepen cleavages. To illustrate this, the following sections deal with: (1) the sedimented 
discourses before Korea’s decolonisation; (2) US macro-discourses from the late 1940s 
regarding development, civilisation and liberalism; (3) US micro-discourses since the early 
1950s promoting the superiority of an American lifestyle; (4) Park Chung Hee’s discoursal 
practices, and; (5) the cultural conflicts and unexpected byproducts in the 1970s. This 
analysis refutes claims that Asian values or Confucianism contributed to East Asian 
development. 
 
7.1 Modernisation Discourses Before the US Occupation in 1945 
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This section introduces modernisation discourses that had been sedimented before the US 
occupied the southern part of the Korean Peninsular. It begins with Korea’s medieval period 
because this is directly relevant to Korea’s ethnocentric nationalism. At this time, Choseon’s 
politics, economy and society were rooted in Sinocentric neo-Confucianism. This ideology 
belongs to a distinctive type of classicalism in terms of how it envisages an ideal society. This 
is not something to be achieved in the future but something that had already been 
accomplished in the age of Emperor Yao (i.e., a mythological Chinese emperor). This to calls 
to revive that social order represented in the present situation. Specifically, such an ideal 
society referred to a dynasty ruled by a benevolent monarch such as Emperor Yao. For, 
according to it, this kind of rule can inspire the people to love their ruler, him voluntarily, 
and accept reforms. In short, the concept “Kingly Way” (i.e., rule by benevolence) was at the 
centre of the philosophical system. This contrasts with the “Hegemonic Way” (i.e., rule by 
power), which implies that the ruling system is based on people’s fear of their monarch. 
Accordingly, neo-Confucian doctrines highlight the monarch’s and, more generally, ruling 
class’s systematic self-cultivation and self-discipline for rebuilding such an ideal social order 
here. 
In China, neo-Confucianism was prevalent in the Song Dynasty (960–1279) and the 
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). Thus, to say that medieval Korea (1392-1897) was Sinocentric 
means that it was initially Ming-centric. This is crucial for understanding not only medieval 
but also contemporary Korea because it pertains to the origin of Koreans’ ethnocentric view 
of the world. Nonetheless, the Ming Dynasty was conquered by the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1912), which was established by Manchu people. The neo-Confucian ruling class in medieval 
Korea regarded Manchurians as barbarians who did not follow Confucian ethics. It therefore 
rejected a tributary relation to the Qing Dynasty, which triggered the Qing invasion of 
Choseon in 1636-7. After the war, medieval Korea had no option but to accept a vassal 
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relationship with the new Dynasty in China. Yet, ideologically, it still venerated the Ming 
Dynasty even after it had completely collapsed. Thus Korea’s ruling class medieval Korea 
believed that, although the Ming Dynasty failed to keep the Kingly Way, they should continue 
to represent it. Their ethnocentric view of the world emerged from this context. They believed 
that the medieval Korea was “little China” that had inherited the values of the Ming Dynasty. 
Thus, for more than 200 years after the Dynasty collapsed, medieval Korea was still 
dominated by this “little Sinocentrism”, with its paradoxical form of ethnocentrism. This was 
also a source of their cultural pride and their view of those who lived in the Japanese 
Archipelago as barbarians. In was in this situation that Korea came to encounter Western 
imperialist forces from the mid-19th century. 
In particular, medieval Korea observed that even the mighty Qing Dynasty was defeated 
by the British Empire. This promoted its fear of the Western forces. Thus, immediately after 
the first Opium War (1839-42), a few envoys were dispatched to Beijing to investigate the 
consequences of the war and the impact of Western forces. After Korea had conflicted 
militarily with France (1866), the US (1871), Japan (1875), and the like, the size of the 
missions was increasingly expanded and they also visited Japan and the US in this period. On 
returning to Korea, the envoys, who experienced a Western type of modernisation, started 
arguing for gaehwa (i.e., flowering). It was a call for “enlightenment” in Korea too. Some of 
the envoys suggested the Self-Strengthening Movement in the Qing Dynasty could be copied 
to promote Korea’s modernisation. Others took the Meiji Ishin as the right model for Korea. 
Either way, from this time onwards, some of Korea’s elites started to accept the superiority of 
Western civilisation and modernisation over the traditional and neo-Confucian order. 
Moreover, explicitly or implicitly, they accepted the civilised-barbaric-savage trichotomy. For 
their argument implied that Korea was inferior to the Western World and, thus, that it should 
be modernized. This is how Eurocentric and racial views were introduced to Korea. 
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However, this prompted the ire of the traditionalist and ethnocentric elites. 
Furthermore, as repeatedly noted, Korea eventually became a colony of Imperial Japan. As 
this occurred, the ethnocentric traditionalism evolved into ethnocentric or, at least, ethnic 
nationalism. Also, in experiencing successively the colonial era, the partition of Korea by 
external forces and, then, the Korean War, ethnocentric nationalism has been gradually 
strengthened. For this reason, it has been argued in South Korea that during the course, 
ethnocentric nationalism has become a “sanctified” ideology in South Korea (for the 
sanctification of South Korea’s nationalism, Kang Chŏngin and Chŏng Sŭnghyŏn 2013). On 
the other hand, since the 1920s, socialism was introduced to Korea via Imperial Japan. This 
contributed to the rise of a non-nationalist and class-centred thinking in Korea. This is 
significant because Korea was initially industrialised in the colonial era (see Chapter 5), which 
fact lent itself to nationalist thinking. However, class-centric socialists started viewing the 
major contradiction of Korea in capitalist rather than nationalist terms. This was an 
important factor in the partition of Korea and outbreak of the Korean War following 
decolonisation. In addition, since the 1930s, an ultranationalist, state-socialist, State-
Shintoist and militaristic fascism was also propagated among Korean people with ambivalent 
effects. On the one hand, this enhanced the resistant nationalism among some Koreans; on 
the other, it is also meant even previously nationalistic people later succumbed to Imperial 
Japan. For, in the fascist regime for a total war, many Koreans tried to get recognised as 
Japanese (see Chapter 5; for the influence of fascism on Koreans, see also Kim Yerim 2009; 
Hŏ Ŭn 2010).  
In this context, at the very moment that Korea was liberated from Imperial Japan in 
August 1945, traditionalist, Eurocentric, nationalist, socialist and fascist ideologies co-existed 
and were combined in various ways, producing complex ideological cleavages. For instance, 
some people were still neo-Confucian and, simultaneously, ethnocentric nationalists so that 
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they were also anti-Japanese. Conversely, others were state-socialist and (ultra-)nationalist 
and inclined to be pro-Japanese. There were also class-centric socialists, who opposed Japan 
and America. In brief, the ideological topography in the Korean Peninsular in 1945 was highly 
complex. In this situation, the US Military occupied a southern part of the Korean Peninsular. 
This is when US semiotic practices became important, in line with its military, geo-political 
and geo-economies goals; and, as such, they also constituted the US reply to the inherited 
sedimented discourses. 
 
7. 2 American Semiotic Practices Since 1945: Macro-Discourses 
 
The discourses that the US diffused can be divided into macro- and micro-discourses. The 
former concern (1) the construal of the world during the Cold War era, (2) the construal of 
South Korea’s status in this a world, and (3) a method for raising South Korea’s position in 
the new world, that is, a politico-economic regime that South Korea should follow. These 
discourses contributed to defining South Korea’s national identity and its state projects. The 
macro-discourses emphasized three themes: 
 
• Developmentalism. The imperialist order that had prevailed within the variegated 
capitalism of the 19th-century world market in the shadow of classical liberalism under 
the British hegemony was mainly viewed in terms of the Eurocentric civilised-barbaric-
savage trichotomy. In contrast, since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, a new imperialist 
order emerged within the variegated capitalist world market that operated in the 
shadow of an embedded liberalism organized under US hegemony. And, again in 
contrast to the previous pattern, it was now viewed in terms of the Western-centric 
developed-developing-underdeveloped trichotomy. For this reason, since the late 
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1940s, South Korea was defined as an underdeveloped country in the age of 
development (for more details on the invention of development, see Esteva 2010). 
• Civilisation versus Savagery. The US nonetheless continued to use the discourse of 
civilization but it acquired a new referent and new meaning in the Cold War era. Thus 
countries in the capitalist bloc of the new world order were categorised as civilised and 
the newly decolonized colonies of the old empires were undergoing modernization; in 
contrast the Soviet Bloc was categorized as savage and intent on waging war even in the 
newly emancipated world order. In this regard, then, South Korea started being viewed 
as belonging to a civilised bloc (see below). Needless to say, this discourse was 
sometimes reinterpreted in a manner that was favourable to the USA. For instance, 
liberal analyses of the bipolar superpowers during the Cold War era contrasted the US 
as an ‘empire by invitation’ or a ‘benign imperium’ with the USSR as a ‘empire by force’ 
or a ‘malign imperium’ (Lundestad 1986; Brzezinski 1986; see also Chapter 4). 
• Liberal Democracy and Liberal Economy. Together, these two macro-discourses 
suggested “development in civilisation” was a desirable and achievable objective for the 
newly decolonised countries during the Cold War era. Hence the US championed the 
superiority of a liberal-democratic regime and a liberal-economic system over others. 
In this context, the US transplanted liberal democracy to South Korea in 1948 and 
thereby gifted workers’ and women’s suffrage rather than this being achieved through 
their own struggles (see Chŏng Yŏngjin 2015; Moon Jiyeong 2011). In the same 
context, it was also argued from the 1950s that economic development, nation-building 
and state-building should be led by the private sector (Park T’aekyun 2000a). 
 
Combined with the Korean War, these macro-discourses made the discoursal 
topography in the country in the 1950s rather distinctive. First, as frequently noted, since the 
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Korean War, class-centred, Marx-Leninist or Stalinist socialists moved to North Korea or 
were entirely purged in South Korea. However, state-socialistic or national-socialistic figures 
still survived in the South. Second, in this context, nationalists conflicted with nationalists 
(see Hong Sŏngnyul 2002). For example, traditional nationalists and fascist ultranationalists 
were both nationalistic in their own way. In particular, whilst the former was ethnocentric, 
the latter were pro-Japanese. Third, democrats conflicted with democrats. This is basically 
because many people in post-War South Korea identified democracy with anti-communism. 
Hence it was common for even ethnocentric traditionalists or genuine liberals to be purged 
in the name of democracy, that is, anti-communism. Fourth, there were several different 
imaginaries for modernisation. While some called for the reinvention of Korea’s traditional 
culture, others wanted an American style of modernization, and yet others preferred a fascist 
way. 
The discoursal strategies of Lhee Syngman—that is, the first President of South Korea, 
who ruled South Korea for 12 years (1948-60)—can be briefly discussed here in this light. 
Lhee Syngman actively utilised the discourse of civilisation to legitimate South Korea. That 
is, according to him, while South Korea was a civilised country, the North was a savage puppet 
regime of the USSR. Yet, let me recall that in South Korea, a conception of a nation has been 
basically ethno-centred. Thus, his application of the civilised-savage dichotomy for the 
Korean nation conflicted with the usual conception of a nation. On the one hand, in this 
context, even traditional nationalists were sometimes purged by anti-communist extremists; 
on the other, in the same context, Lhee Syngman created a distinctive type of nationalism—
that is, Ilminjuui. Lhee suggested the political ideology, which may be translated as “one-
nationism”,47 as the national principle that would provide the foundation for other policies. 
                                               
 
47 The ideology has been elsewhere translated as “One People Principle”.  
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Notably, Lhee defined nation in terms of loyalty to South Korea’s political regime. That is, he 
tried to change how South Koreans conceived a nation from an ethnic to a patriotic basis. 
This can also be read as an attempt to change the conception of nation from a German-style 
Volksnation to an American Staatsnation (for the different conceptions of a nation, see Jessop 
2002, 173).  
This might have occurred because Lhee Syngman was a pro-American politician. 
Against this interpretation, however, we should note that Korea was, unlike the USA, neither 
a multicultural nor multiethnic society. It was highly homogeneous culturally and ethnically. 
Thus, an alternative interpretation is that this one-nationism was Nazi-inspired. Support for 
this interpretation can be found in the fact that this ideology was developed by An Ho-Sang, 
who had studied in Imperial Japan, Germany and the UK. He argued publicly that not only 
bourgeois and socialist ideologies and state strategies were worth taking seriously in the Cold 
War era but also those of the Nazi regime (An Ho-Sang 1947/1994). In particular, he believed 
that one state population should have only one ideology, and, in this context, he also argued 
for equality in the state population. This was the ideological source of “one-nationism”. 
Based on this, Lhee Syngman declared that North Korean people in pursuit of communism 
do not belong to our nation. This shows that, as noted, even national socialists remained in 
South Korea. Unsurprisingly, Lhee Syngman’s flirtation with the Nazi ideology led to a 
conflict with the Eisenhower Administration (Lee Sŏnmi 2009, 251; Hŏ Ŭn 2004, 33-4). 
 
7.3 American Semiotic Practices Since 1945: Micro-Discourses 
 
To explain US’s micro-discourses, let me first introduce the Kitchen Debate between Richard 
Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev. In the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, the 
US chose to display the inside of an American middle-class house to Soviet politicians, 
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journalists and civilians. Given that, a month earlier, the Soviet Union had used its National 
Exhibition to boast of their Sputnik and heavy-chemical industries, this seemed peculiar. In 
the kitchen where the Kitchen Debate occurred, Nixon told Khrushchev that it was the typical 
kitchen of an American middle-class house in California. In the conversation, Nixon 
highlighted the life of American women, particularly of housewives. Nixon said, ‘In America, 
we like to make life easier for women …’. Then, Khrushchev interrupted, ‘Your capitalistic 
attitude toward women does not occur under Communism’. Nixon continued, ‘I think that 
this attitude towards women is universal. What we want to do is to make life more easy for 
our housewives’.48 As I shall detail later, Nixon’s utterance seems an elaborately calculated 
semiotic move to promote the American capitalism of the Cold War era by strategically 
highlighting show the life style of American Fordism and not just its production practices. In 
Nixon’s discourse, then, American capitalism was shown not through capitalist production 
but through capitalist consumption. Also, the major merit of the American capitalism was, 
spatially, presented through not production sites but the inside of a middle-class house, 
particularly kitchens. Further, it was not male blue-collar workers but middle-class 
housewives who were suggested as the representative figures of the American capitalism.  
For this reason, in my view, the Kitchen Debate was connected to the emancipation of 
women or promotion of women’s rights during the Cold War era. This era saw the 
emancipation, if only in part and in different ways, of women in the Soviet Union and the 
European social democracies from housekeeping or parenting duties. In these regions, this 
partial emancipation was based on the relative socialisation of housekeeping or parenting, 
which enabled women to enter into production more fully and become key agents in this 
regard. In contrast, American women experienced emancipated through the 
                                               
 
48  For the kitchen debate transcript, see the following site at the homepage of the CIA: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/16/1959-07-24.pdf 
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commodification and marketisation of housekeeping and parenting tasks. Thus, their 
emancipation was achieved by buying durable goods or labour power (i.e., nannies or 
caregivers) for housekeeping and/or caring. I am not suggesting, of course, that Western 
Women achieved full emancipation from patriarchy during the Cold War era but, between 
American and socialist systems, there was a clear difference in the way that women’s rights 
improved. What Nixon advertised in the Kitchen Debate was, indeed, the American style of 
the emancipation of women. He thought that an aspiration for such a life was universal, 
though Khrushchev objected it. Or rather, such a semiotic practice had been championed by 
American sociologists from the early 1950s. For instance, Riesman (1951) called for all-out 
bombing of women in the Soviet Union with consumer’s goods, and for this reason he called 
it the ‘Nylon War’ and ‘Operation Abundance’. Hence, one of the key factors in an American 
style of life in relevance to American Fordism was portrayed as an improvement in the life of 
housewives. For, in the American style of capitalism, the main subjects (or decision-makers) 
of consumption regarding durable goods for their houses and kitchens were housewives. For 
this reason, they were the influential subject in production but consumption. On the other 
hand, in the Kitchen Debate, Nixon told Khrushchev about American male workers as well. 
‘Our steel workers, as you know, are now on strike. But any steel worker could buy this house’ 
(ibid). 
My discussion on US micro-discourses starts with the Kitchen Debate because the 
substance of Nixon’s takeaway message in this debate was already spreading to South Korea 
by the early 1950s. In Soviet Union, this debate was an event. In contrast, in South Korea, the 
American style of life had been elaborately promoted in interlinked for many years through 
magazines, movies, radio, books, and the like. It was suggested that the core value of this 
lifestyle was “equality at home”. Also, in the US Army Military Government that ruled South 
Korea, there were local officials who had studied in the US and many published their 
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memoirs. Inter alia, they argued that the US became the centre of civilisation because of 
equality at home (Hŏ Ŭn 2014, 296-7). Unsurprisingly, living as they did in a patriarchal 
society, South Korean women, particularly housewives and young women, were captivated 
by such a life style. 
In brief, the promotion for the American style of life was targeted at women. To do so, 
the ‘genre chains’ were elaborately interlinked between various mediums (on genre chains, 
see Fairclough 2003, 31-2). The US disseminated magazines that introduced the American 
way of life to intellectuals, university students, and farmers.49 They also distributed movies 
that portrayed the life style. In addition, the US offered many Koreans visiting programmes 
to the US. Intriguingly, the main part of those programmes was visits to American homes to 
meet middle-class families rather than to visit factories or meet workers there. Fascinated by 
the materially abundant life and the relatively equal relationship among family members, the 
Korean visitors returned to the relatively underdeveloped society and circulated their 
experiences abroad in essay form. The essays show that even ethnocentric traditionalists were 
completely shocked and even overwhelmed by the abundant life, thereby leading them to re-
consider the Western type of modernisation. American stories were continuously reproduced 
through general-interest family magazines or female magazines (for such a semiotic 
advertisement for the American life, see Hŏ ŭn 2014, 301-6). In brief, the US micro-semiotic 
practices entirely occupied the field of an “idle talk”, related to everydayness.  
Picture 7 including two satirical cartoons shows how much influential US’s semiotic 
practices regarding the American style of life was in South Korea in the 1950s. In the first 
cartoon, a poor housewife is mending a blanket. As seen in the cartoon, the pattern of the 
blanket is the flat of the United States. In the second cartoon, a housewife is making a curtsey 
                                               
 
49 The same magazines were diffused in Germany and Japan after the Second World War ended. 
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Picture 7.1 An American Dream Imagined in South Korea in the late 1950s 
 
Source: Yŏ Wŏn (1959, 63; 1960, 88; drawn from Hŏ Ŭn 2014, 308) 
 
to her husband. In the cartoon, she is saying, ‘Honey, happy new year, and please buy me an 
electronic washer’, thereby surprising her husband (Hŏ Ŭn 2014, 301-6). Not only did young 
housewives yearn for the American style of life. One of the most prominent literary scholars 
in South Korea, Yang Judong (1959, 10) lamented in the late 1950s. American culture ‘is 
extravagantly and elaborately intruding into our everyday lives, irrespective of whether this 
concerns men or women, youths or olds, and urban or rural areas’. According to him, the 
American culture was ‘shaking both the material and spiritual sides of South Korean culture’ 
(ibid). This trend continued in the 1960s. For instance, in the early 1960s, an American style 
of house drawings were introduced through female magazines and, thereby such a life style 
started being more concretely imagined. In the mid-1960s, behaviour patterns to become 
modern and middle-class housewives were also specified. For instance, women’s magazines 
in the period argued that modernised housewives should have a wastepaper basket indoors 
and that they housewives should prepare coffee and cracker for guests (for more details on 
women’s magazines in the 1960s, see Hŏ Ŭn 2014). 
 
   NVR=
7.4 Park Chung Hee’s Macro-Discourses 
 
Based on earlier parts of this thesis, I now address Park Chung Hee’s macro-discourses. First, 
as one might surmise, because there were three phases in his period of rule, he did not offer 
a systemic overall discourse regarding the PCHM but changed it for each phase. In addition, 
as I shall note, sometimes, his discourses were mutually contradictory. Nevertheless, a few 
major features of his semiotic practices can be summarised as follows. First, whilst Lhee 
Syngman utilised discourses of anti-communism and civilisation, Park Chung Hee brought 
anti-communism and development to the fore. In a nutshell, therefore, the key theme in his 
macro-discourses was anti-communist modernisation or development. For this reason, his 
macro-discourses resonated with the US’s macro-discourses; yet, whilst the latter suggested 
liberalism as a method to achieve this objective, Park Chung Hee based his approach on 
fascist militarism. Yet, because he could not reveal that his strategies originated from Imperial 
Japan, he employed the discourses of democracy and nationalism. However, when he 
mentioned democracy, he used the term pejoratively to contrast a Western type of liberal-
bourgeois democracy (Kim Jihyŏng 2013, 174) with the Korean variant that he favoured. 
Thus Park employed qualified terms such as ‘administrative democracy’, ‘nationalistic 
democracy’ and ‘Korean-style democracy’.  
Administrative democracy was used in the first phase of his era. He employed the term 
to refer to his military junta. Its meaning was that in the inside of the military junta, decision-
makings were made democratically. Nationalistic democracy was proclaimed in the second 
phase of his era without further explanation. It was used in contrast with politicians in pursuit 
of liberal democracy. That is, identifying himself as a nationalistic democrat, Park Chung Hee 
criticised liberal democrats as sadaejuŭija (i.e., Korean people who act like servants of 
superpowers in an international hierarchy, or uncritically accept their institutions or 
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cultures). In Park Chung Hee’s terminology, Korean democracy referred to the Yushin 
regime (Kang Chŏngin 2011). For this reason, although he continuously argued for qualified 
democracies, his democracy was also continuously criticised by liberals. 
On the other hand, Park used the term nationalism in a confusing way. In his first 
phase, he combined the discourse of nationalism with anti-communism and administrative 
democracy. That is, he was highly antagonistic towards North Korea and, in this regard, his 
discourse of nationalism resembled Lhee Syngman’s one-nationism. In this second phase, as 
noted, he used the discourse of nationalistic democracy. In doing so, he criticised liberal 
democrats as sadaejuŭija and thereby tried to gain political support from South Korean 
ethnocentric nationalists. Yet, in this phase, Park Chung Hee was re-articulating the South 
Korean economy with the Japanese economy and also managed to obtain compensation for 
Japan’s colonial rule as well as other aid, grants and loans. In return, he accepted many terms 
and conditions that were obviously beneficial to Japan. This led to national resistance to the 
resumption of a diplomatic relation with Japan. For this reason, although Park Chung Hee 
trend to use the discourse of nationalism as a dominant ideology in opposition to the 
American style of development, it was also, paradoxically, used as a dissenting ideology in 
opposition to his pro-Japanese disposition (Chŏn Jaeho 2000).  
Park Chung Hee continued to employ the discourse of nationalism even in his third 
phase. In particular, he foregrounded the national interest. Yet, when using the term ‘nation’, 
he included North as well as South Koreans. He promised to re-unite South Korea with North 
Korea. To do so, he argued, South Korea should launch not a Western style of, and liberal, 
democracy, but ‘efficient’ and ‘productive’ democracy. It was Korean-style democracy (Kim 
Jihyŏng 2013, 178-84). In brief, Park Chung Hee’s nationalism in his first phase was anti-
communistic and was targeted only at South Koreans. The nationalism in his second phase 
was anti-American. Yet it was resisted by anti-Japanese nationalists. In his third phase, 
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nationalism acquired an ethnic grounding. Yet, based on the ethnic or ethnocentric 
nationalism, he tried to complete the building of a totalitarian political regime.  
 
7.5 Park Chung Hee’s Micro-Discourses 
 
These covered many issues such as happiness, labour, livelihood, savings, consumption and 
the like. First, from the early 1960s, a new definition of happiness was diffused by South 
Korea’s Government. In the 1950s, South Korea’s Government preached the value of a 
mental happiness through radio programmes. Yet, from the early 1960s, happiness started 
being linked to material abundance (Kim Yerim 2007, 353-6). In other words, it implied that 
to be happy, South Korea had to develop, and this resonated with US’s micro-discourses. 
Second, Park Chung Hee’s Administration created its own narrative of young women from 
the 1960s. This seems because the export-oriented industrialisation, centred on light 
industries, needed to employ young female workers. Let me recall that Park Chung Hee tried 
to launch heavy-chemical industrialisation from the early 1960s. In this context, the Park 
Administration produced thousands of cars on a pilot basis. The cars were called “new 
country”. On this basis, a young female and imaginary character was created by KBS (South 
Korean public service broadcaster). Her name was Tosun. Born in a rural area, young Tosun 
came to a city on her own. She worked diligently and lived frugally in the city, thereby 
purchasing the “new country” car. The story ends with her visit to her parents in her 
birthplace with the car. This narrative was, at first, diffused by a rapid drama and, then, 
reproduced as a movie. It had many significant meanings. For instance, in South Korea’s 
traditional society, women lived in an extended family. Yet the narrative suggested women’s 
independent life in a city. Also, it promised that diligent work and frugal life would lead to 
happiness. The happiness was specifically expressed as a car. Lives in a city was expressed as 
fatiguing; yet it was also described as sufficiently rewarding. 
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Picture 7.2 The Social Atmosphere of South Korea in the 1970s 
 
 
Note: The copyright holder of these images is unknown. 
 
This shows that South Korea’s micro-discourses in the Park Chung Hee era differed 
from those promulgated in the USA. For example, Park Chung Hee faced many difficulties 
with obtaining money-capital in his state-led industrialisation. Accordingly, savings were one 
of the key factors for operating the PCHM. Abundant private consumption was thus 
suggested as accomplishable happiness in the future. Indeed, Park Chung Hee linked to the 
consumption and, further, the American mass culture in the 1960-70s to images of 
extravagance, self-indulgence and immorality. For this reason, the Park Administration also 
diffused different discourses about housewives. That is, whilst South Korea’s women’s 
magazines boosted South Korean women’s American dream as one for their country, the 
Park Administration continued to diffuse women’s “rational” economic lives, 
“unpretentious” consumption and fondness for home products. It also created many 
government-led NGOs to diffuse his discourses. Furthermore, from the late 1960s, every kind 
of militaristic term started being used in ways that the fascist apparatuses of Imperial Japan 
and Manchukuo had utilised since the 1930s. Picture 7.2 illustrated an aspect of such a 
society. Even adult civilians were regulated by police on the streets on the pretext of having 
long hair—if it was judged as too long, police could cut it shorter. 
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7.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on previous work, we draw a few provisional conclusions. First, the semiotic practice 
is needed to stabilise and normalise a politico-economic model. Reversely, a politico-
economic success legitimates a specific semiotic formation. Second, as noted in Chapter 4, 
imperialist practices involve not only geo-political and geo-economic, but also semiotic, 
practices. Third, any specific semiotic formations can be considered in terms of macro- and 
micro-discourses. To borrow Heidegger’s terminology, they may be categorised as 
“discourses” (Rede) and everydayness-related “idle talk” (Gerede) (see Escudero 2013). In this 
context, the US diffused different practices in both fields. In official discourse, it highlighted 
development in civilisation. Specifically, it suggested political and economic liberalism as the 
right method to achieve it. In the field of “idle talk”, the US promoted a standard life style of 
a middle-class home in American Fordism. In line with the hegemonic discourses, Park 
Chung Hee, too, sought anti-communist modernisation or development. Yet, he declined to 
accept liberal democracy and economy. For this reason, he championed qualified 
democracies, such as administrative, nationalistic and Korean-style democracies, as well as 
autarkic economy. The three democracies were respectively with different senses of 
nationalism as well. On the other hand, the gossips and rumours that the US produced and 
diffused regained the American style of life could not resonate with the PCHM. For the model 
should be based on savings. For this reason, Park suppressed the diffusion of American 
culture. In this way, the semiotic practices of the US and Park Chung Hee only partly 
resonated with each other. On the one hand, taken together, they contributed to the 
operation of the PCHM; on the other, the semiotic practices contributed to the 
destabilisation of the PCHM. 
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8. Conclusion: Putting the PCHM Again in Its Place in a 
Cultural Political Economy of Variegated Capitalism 
 
Originally, this thesis began as an attempt to understand South Korean or, more broadly, East 
Asian capitalism comprehensively. It required an inclusive analysis of its emergence, 
development, crisis, transformation and current status. Yet, it is impossible for any single 
thesis to address all these topics. For this reason, I chose to focused only on the development 
of South Korean capitalism. But it was also my ambition, in this context, that the theoretical 
paradigm that informed my investigation into South Korea’s economic development should 
have the potential to be applied to further inquiries too. This was (and is) related to my 
discontent with the various theories on which the extant literature on the Asian miracle 
depends. For, generally speaking, they were devised to give a monocular focus to an aspect of 
the economic growth. Most of them were already ready to extol the growth phenomenon and 
its emergence in East Asian capitalism. Of course, each of the theories has its own rational 
kernel. Yet, simultaneously, they paid too much attention to one or another facet of East 
Asian capitalism and, in this context, in some cases, even distorted historical facts to fit their 
respective theories. Furthermore, their biased monocular focus rendered them incapable of 
explaining the crises and resultant transformation of East Asian capitalism. Let me give a few 
examples. First, market-friendly scholars have for long argued that the South Korean 
economy rapidly grew because of its market-friendly policies. Yet, when the economy fell into 
a crisis in the late 1990s, they claimed that it was, indeed, state-friendly. Second, the opposite 
case holds for statists. Third, cultural analyses of the miracle claimed that Asian values 
contributed to the East Asian miracle. However, when the economic crisis erupted, they 
remained silent about it. In addition, all three theoretical approaches are rather dissociated 
from (neo-)institutional literature on capitalist variety, diversity and variegation. Overall, 
then, my investigation into South Korea’s development should be substantively inclusive and 
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theoretically coherent paradigm. This paradigm should also have the potential for further 
research on other issues regarding the South Korean economy as well as on other variants of 
East Asian capitalism. 
In my view, a VarCap-CPE is the only theoretical paradigm suitable for such a purpose. 
In this context, I regarded South Korea’s model of development as a variant of East Asian 
exportism. Specifically, I named it as the PCHM. Yet, to apply the VarCap-CPE in my 
historical investigation into the PCHM, at least, three prior and continuing theoretical tasks 
were required. First, I needed to clarify Marx’s method and meta-theories on which the 
VarCap-CPE method depends. The latter is self-avowedly based on critical realism in general 
but its ‘critical realism in particular’ is anchored in Marx’s method. Yet, in the VarCap-CPE 
literature to date, discussion of Marx’s method has been confined to the method of 
presentation (Darstellungsweise) of particular historical cases, notably the critique of the 
capitalist mode of production. For this reason, I tried to elucidate his method of investigation 
(Forschungsweise). In my view, this is based on what I have termed differential-and-integral 
thinking. Furthermore, the integral synthesis requires the derivation of relatively concrete-
complex concepts, through dialectical consideration rather than a linear logical unfolding of 
concepts, from relatively abstract-simple concepts. This the method of inquiry seems to 
resonate with critical realism. 
It is on this basis that I introduced the VarCap-CPE. Yet, the VarCap-CPE is not so 
easy to grasp precisely because of its complexity and concreteness. In writing this thesis, 
indeed, I have been quite frequently asked about it what is at stake in this approach and have 
also made several attempts to introduce it even to people who do not read political economy. 
The most effective answer that I was able to provide was that it involves decomposing and, 
then, recomposing the integral paradigm, because the VarCap-CPE itself can be differentially 
analysed in terms of the philosophy of social science, social theory, value theory, capital 
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theory, institutional theory, state theory, cultural theory, spatial theory, the theory of history 
and even historiography, and then integrally synthesised again into its original formation. In 
this thesis, therefore, I attempted to introduce it, albeit insufficiently, as a (a) critical-realist 
and (b) strategic-relational articulation of: (c) Marx’s critique of political economy; (d) 
Marx-inspired evolutionary institutionalism (i.e., the RA); (e) (post-)Marxist state theory; (f) 
critical semiotic analysis, and; (g) the variegated-capitalism approach. On top of that, I also 
tried to insert (post-)colonialism, imperialism and international hegemony into the VarCap-
CPE. To do so, I return to Marx and, particularly, analysed his geographically sensitive 
insights into historical hegemonies on historical world markets. This required me to propose 
a periodisation of an imperialist order within variegated capitalism in a world market.  
Based on these theoretical considerations, I investigated the PCHM historically, 
highlighting three key points. First, an inquiry into East Asian capitalism should consider not 
only Western imperialist forces but also Imperial Japan. In this context, I regarded the PCHM 
as inscribed within the post-colonialist legacy of Imperial Japan. Second, East Asian 
capitalism during the Cold War era also be viewed in terms of the American hegemony. 
Combining these perspectives led me to analyse how the PCHM evolved into a chimerical 
model, i.e., one containing the DNA of different species just as the chimera in Greek and 
Etruscan mythology had a goat’s body, a lion’s head, and a snake for a tail. Third, the 
discourses and semiotic practices of both the US hegemon and Park Chung Hee’s 
government (notably Park himself) contributed to the stabilisation and normalisation of the 
PCHM. This was not without conflicting discursive goals and imaginaries, however; and this 
was one contributory factor to the model’s destabilisation. 
My analysis helps us better comprehend the PCHM than before. Indeed, based on my 
investigation, I can specify its institutional features systemically. First, let me point out that 
the integration of the PCHM into the international circuits of capital was rather complex (see  
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Source: My own elaboration 
 
figure 8.1). Intriguingly, South Korea never enjoyed any surplus in the balance of trade during 
the Park Chung Hee era, i.e., the PCHM was based on chronic trade deficits. Nevertheless, 
the South Korean economy experienced rapid and sustained growth. This was because 
international trade expanded the size of the economy, making deficits more manageable, 
especially as South Korea had US backing in the Cold War. Second, the PCHM dualised the 
South Korean economy. On the one hand, Park Chung Hee allowed nearly free importation 
of raw materials and capital goods that were needed for producing export goods. On the 
other, he strictly controlled the importation of durable consumer goods in order to protect 
domestic production in line with an import-substitution strategy. For this reason, the 
economic border of South Korea, too, was dualised. More details on its institutional features 






American aids  
Nearly free & mass 
importation  
Government-driven 
& mass exportation 











   OMQ=
Table 8.1 The Institutional Features of the PCHM (below) 
Industrial paradigm 
• Taylorist process (relatively unskilled female labour in 
light industries) 
• Fordist process (more skilled male labour in heavy-
chemical industries)  
• Militaristic organisation of production sites  
Regime of accumulation  
• Complex multiscalar articulation of the circuits of capital 
• Basically extraverted 
• Government-driven mass production at home, targeted 
at mass consumption abroad 
• Protected small batch production and private 
consumption at home 
• Interlinking of the two circuits 





• Relative low wages considered as production costs 
• Relatively high disposable income as source of savings 
and reinvestment 
• Tax and financial policies supporting the wage relation 
Competition 
• Monopoly capitals nurtured at home 
• Supportive of the monopoly capital for international 
competition in foreign markets 
• Relative underdevelopment of small businesses 
Money & 
Finance 
• Central role of nationalised (state-owned) banks 
• (Re-)investment based on foreign loans and national 
savings  
• High inflation 
State  • Chimerical warfare pre-national state (CWPS) 
International 
relation 
• The “cormorant” economy 
• Cliental relation to the US 
Mode of societalisation 
• Based on imaginary of a developed-developing-
underdeveloped world 
• Self-description as an underdeveloped country 
• Development-oriented 
• Aspiration for catch-up (to Japan and the West) 
• Militaristically disciplined (school, the Army, the 
Vietnam War, Reserve Forces); militaristic culture 
penetrates into nearly all organisations and communities 
– hence a warfare society 
 
Source: My own 
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The PCHM as a model of development can be regarded as the emerging complex that 
results from the differential articulation of the industrial paradigm, the regime of 
accumulation, the mode of regulation, and the mode of societalisation. Yet, although the 
South Korean economy grew rapidly based on its chimerical model, it was also highly 
unstable. This was partly because Park Chung Hee himself could not coordinate his relations 
to ethnocentric, anti-Japanese, reunification-aspired and nationalistic South Koreans, to 
Japanese politicians, to the US Administrations, and to North Korea. For instance, the 
operation of the PCHM required the subordination of the South Korean economy to the 
Japanese economy. Also, the PCHM needed the support of the South Koreans people. Yet 
the two factors mutually conflicted. His relation to Japan promoted South Koreans’ anti-
Japanese sentiment, and this undermined Park Chung Hee’s political legitimacy in his second 
phase. Likewise, the PCHM depended on US aid in return for which Park was expected to 
comply with the demands and interests of US Administrations. Yet, if Park Chung Hee had 
obeyed US Administrations, South Korea’s heavy-chemical industrialisation, that is, the 
evolution of the PCHM, would have been impossible. For this reason, Park Chung Hee 
continuously conflicted with the American state, except during the Johnson Administration. 
Likewise, US Administrations sought to transform the PCHM, even after Park was 
assassinated. Needless to say, this was related to the neoliberalisation of the South Korean 
economy, although this set of issues goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Park’s relation 
to North Korea also involved dilemmas. The PCHM was based on the anti-communist 
alliance in East Asia. On this basis, it was articulated to Japan, the US and even the Vietnam 
War. However, as the model entered its mature phase, it came to depend on ethnocentric 
(ultra-)nationalism. In short, the coordination of these contrasting sets of relations was 
impossible. For this reason, Park Chung Hee’s discourses were even self-contradictory and 
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the PCHM also had to change as different aspects of this contradictory model became 
dominant. 
The PCHM had a macroeconomic dilemma as well. Park Chung Hee sought to 
maintain massive investment, which led to chronic inflation when the industrialization drive 
began. Conversely, the PCHM was based on the relatively low price of export goods, which 
required efforts to keep wages low considered as a cost of (international) production. To deal 
with this, Park should have suppressed inflation but this would in turn require steps to 
stabilise the economy rather than maintain its destabilizing mode of growth. Park Chung Hee 
could not solve this macroeconomic dilemma. Eventually, it exploded into a crisis, when the 
second oil shocks occurred in the late 1970s. Particularly in 1979, nearly all economic advisers 
in the Bank of Korea, the Government and the Government-run research institution began 
to argue for macroeconomic stabilisation and even the marketisation of the economy. Park 
Chung Hee had no choice but to accept their suggestions. By doing so, a comprehensive 
package of policies for marketising the South Korean economy was announced in April 1979. 
In other words, the first attempt to neoliberalise the South Koran economy occurred in the 
late 1970s. Yet, in its mature phase, the PCHM rested on a combination of a suppressive 
political regime and rapid economic growth that denied the rewards of growth to the Korean 
population. This led to a wide range of political resistance in industrial cities that were located 
in the southeast of South Korea. Park Chung Hee wanted to quell it militaristically, and 
during these efforts, he was assassinated in October 1979 by the Chief of South Korea’s CIA. 
In brief, as the PCHM entered its mature phase in the 1970s, South Korea succeeded in the 
heavy-chemical industrialisation project—yet even at this moment, it could not be sustained. 
For this reason, an inquiry into the neoliberalisation of the South Korean economy 
should begin from the dilemmas and contradictions that were implicit in the PCHM. Such 
an inquiry should also be linked to the economic crisis in the late 1990s. The neoliberalisation 
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of the South Korean economy was not, of course, a linear process – especially because it 
involved a shifting balance of forces in the struggles between capital and labour as organised 
social forces. Let me recall here that, during the Park Chung Hee era, both classes were 
relatively underdeveloped as social forces. Thus, Park Chung Hee could be more 
autonomous vis-à-vis these and other social forces than is possible for political leaders in 
liberal-bourgeois democracies. Yet, South Korea in the 1980s had moved on from the Park 
era. Specifically, this decade came to witness resistance both from organised monopoly 
capitalist groups and the trade union movement and these and other emerging social forces 
in the economy and civil society have become highly influential in the dynamics of South 
Korean society. Such an inquiry should contribute to comparative or geographically sensitive 
literature on varieties of, or variegated, neoliberalisation (see, e.g., Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore 2010; Harvey 2005; Macartney 2011; Olesen 2014; Purcell 2009). It should also 
contribute to extant literature on actually existing neoliberalism (see, e.g., Brenner and 
Theodore 2002). In addition, insofar as it addresses the supranational relations of social 
forces, it is likely to contribute to extant literature on (neo)Gramscian international political 
economy. The peculiarities of the variegated process of neoliberalisation (or process of 
variegated neoliberalisation) in the political economy of South Korea is hard to understand 
in terms of the extant theoretical and empirical literature on the Asian miracle for reasons 
explored above. Accordingly, this thesis will be followed by my future research into the 
neoliberalisation and neoliberal regime of the South Korean economy. It will be also be 
theoretically informed by a VarCap-CPE approach. 
On the other hand, this thesis calls for further theoretical researches as well. Let me give 
just one example. My thesis offered an alternative analysis of the PCHM. Simultaneously, it 
gave an alternative interpretation on Marx. Although I did not develop my analysis of Marx 
sufficiently because my principal concern in this thesis is the PCHM, the resulting analysis 
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implicitly suggested a novel view not only of the origins of variegated capitalism but also of 
potential connections of Marx’s critique of political economy with the work of Fernand 
Braudel, Max Weber, and even later Marxists. First, Weber has long been regarded as a 
scholar who provided original insights into the role of religion in the emergence of modern-
Occidental capitalism—a theme that some ill-informed commentators allege that Marx 
entirely ignored, just as some Weberian scholars have overlooked the extent to which Weber’s 
work integrated key Marxian insights in his broader analysis of capitalism and its 
development. Second, Braudel has been viewed as an intriguing historian who exclusively 
highlighted both a regular change in the core sites of commercial activities, that is, a 
hegemonic transition, and the recurrence of the financial accumulation followed by a 
hegemonic decline (see also the work of Giovani Arrighi). In this context, Braudel also argued 
that capitalism should be viewed in terms of the rise and fall of commercial monopolies—a 
topic that Braudelians have argued was also completely neglected by Marx. Objecting to 
Weberians’ idealist approach to capitalism, orthodox Marxists have continued to champion 
a materialist view of history. Likewise, dismissing Braudelians’ neo-Smithian approach to 
capitalism, Marxists have emphasized the importance of the labour process, production, and 
class struggle in explaining capitalist dynamics in Western Europe. In this way, Braudelians 
have implicitly adopted methodological regionalist, if not nationalist, approach—reflecting 
Braudel’s original concern with the Mediterranean economy. In contrast, my analysis of Marx 
suggests that his approach cannot be compared with the Weberian or Braudelian paradigms. 
Let me reassert that Marx’s inquiry into the CMP was both differential and integral. Marx 
dealt, albeit partly or even rudimentarily, with all the topics that Weber and Braudel studied 
without neglecting his primary interest in the capital relation. Therefore, regardless of a 
specific investigation into the PCHM, further elaboration of the general point is required. 
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Furthermore, the research is expected to develop into theoretically and methodologically new 
insights into variegated imperialism and geo-historiography. 
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